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1 INTRODUCTION 
The global auto industry is currently in a state of change. The old, established car 
companies are experiencing hard times due to the high oil prices, the poor global 
economy, rising material costs, the sudden shift to more environmental consumer 
preferences, etc. According to Maxton & Wormald (2004) and Holweg & Pil 
(2004) the traditional market for cars – loosely speaking "the Western world" 
(including Japan, South Korea, etc.) – is already mature. At the same time, nu-
merous fresh car companies are starting to grow in the new industrial countries, 
notably China and India (see for instance Thoma & O'Sullivan 2011; Brandt & 
Thun 2010; Holweg, Tran, Davies, & Schramm 2011). These young companies 
are so far mostly catering to their domestic markets, but inevitably, these new 
entrants will eventually make the move out of Asia. At that point, they will with-
out doubt put even further stress on the currently leading auto makers to rethink 
their business strategies and reduce costs in their own products.  
It is a cold, hard fact that the established car companies cannot compete when it 
comes to labor costs. There is an alternative to this strategy, however: cost reduc-
tion by designing products that requires less labor to assemble. Especially the 
concept of Design for Assembly (DFA) should be worth a closer look (see for 
instance Mottonen, Harkonen, Belt, Haapasalo and Simila 2009; Koganti, 
Zaluzec, Chen& Defersha 2006; Sarmento, Marana, Ferreira–Batalha, & Stoeter-
au 2011).  
Design for Assembly takes already existing products under examination and sees 
whether they can be restructured and redesigned to achieve a simpler assembly 
process. Components are combined; the number of fasteners is reduced; the way 
components are gripped, oriented and inserted is simplified – the reason for usage 
and existence of all items and assemblies are put into question. (Andreasen, Käh-
ler & Lund 1988; Boothroyd, Dewhurst & Knight 2002) The resulting parts re-
duction and lower amount of assembly labor makes this technique highly interest-
ing to industrial companies working on the assembly of mechanical and electronic 
products. 
In a study by Boothroyd Dewhurst, Inc. (2004) – compiling the results of 117 
product–design case studies at 56 partner manufacturers – their numbers showed 
that using the DFA techniques resulted in parts count reductions of more than 50 
percent in 100 of the cases. Furthermore, an assembly time reduction of more 
than 60 percent was achieved in 65 of the cases.  These figures indicate that there 
is a certain amount of value in the judicious application of Design for Assembly 
techniques.  
2      Acta Wasaensia 
But is Design for Assembly not already used in the automotive industry? The car 
companies themselves say yes – especially Chrysler and Ford invested heavily in 
DFA education during the 1980:s (Matterazzo & Ardayfio 1992; Ardayfio & 
Opra 1992; Causey 1999: 222–226). Design for Assembly is not a new invention 
– it has been around since the early 1960s – and today the techniques are a part of 
the elementary background and standard toolkit of the automotive design engi-
neer. There seems to be no further improvements to be had in order to combat the 
rising influence of the new car companies. But is this really the case? The objec-
tive of this thesis will be to find out just that. 
1.1 Objectives and Research Questions 
The aim of this work will be to produce a study of the recent and present-day de-
gree of usage of DFA techniques in the automotive sector. If Design for Assem-
bly can translate into such important cost savings – are the car companies really 
using it? If benchmarking the companies against each other – where are the ex-
perts at Design for Assembly to be found? What companies should be emulated in 
order to reduce assembly cost? An objective comparison of assembly times seems 
necessary.  
This study will provide an idea of the DFA-related situation in the automotive 
industry today. It will bring a much-needed update to the few manufacturability 
analyses conducted during the late 80s and early 90s (see for instance Womack, 
Jones  &  Roos  1990).  The  objective  of  this  study  is  twofold  –  to  investigate  in  
which way the use of DFA has progressed in the auto industry over the last twen-
ty years and to pinpoint what companies have been the most successful in achiev-
ing said progression. Furthermore it will bring to light the question of whether 
Design for Assembly and Design for Disassembly can be linked and compared. 
1. What are the trends in automotive assembly time, looking at the last 20 
years? 
2. What companies consistently produce the cars with lowest (and highest) 
assembly times? 
3. Can DFA time data reliably be extrapolated from certain types of repair 
data?  
Finding objective data on the degree of usage of DFA in the automotive industry 
is difficult.  To the present day, quite few surveys or quantitative investigations 
on the use of Design for Assembly have been completed and even fewer have 
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been conducted looking expressly at the automotive industry. The automotive 
industry is nevertheless the most important industry for several of the largest 
economies in the world, and an important research area. 
The study will be based on empirical analysis of numerical data gathered from an 
unorthodox source: car repair time manuals. The chosen manuals present repair 
time estimates for hundreds of different car models sold on the North American 
market, mainly from Asia, USA and Europe. In the following chapters a case will 
be made for how these repair times can be used as an indicator of the assembly 
time involved in creating such a car. 
Assuming the validity of this line of reasoning, it seems probable that with a large 
enough database of these figures, similar car models can be compared and their 
use of “efficient” DFA design can be statistically analyzed. Based on this analy-
sis, it should eventually be possible to say something about what trends have been 
operating on the car companies' assembly times during the last decades, and fol-
lowing this, the companies’ level of success in the field of DFA. The analysis will 
span the last two decades (1990–2010), recording data from five separate years at 
five-year intervals (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010).  
It is possible that the study will show a clear trend of reduced assembly times as 
an effect of the automotive industry increasingly implementing the usage of DFA 
techniques over the last two decades, as diffusion of innovation and best practices 
results in design convergence. It is equally possible, however, that the study will 
show no such trend and that the car companies are not using assembly time reduc-
ing techniques to their fullest extent. If so, there may still be hope for the design 
driven cost reduction of the established car companies’ models, and continued 
room for international market competition between the established car companies 
and the new challengers.  
1.2 Research contribution and applications 
This comparative study stands to improve academic knowledge of several im-
portant issues in the automotive industry. 
Firstly, to the present day, very few surveys or quantitative investigations on the 
use of Design for Assembly have been completed – those that have been made 
will be discussed later on in the text – but even fewer have been conducted look-
ing expressly at the automotive industry. This work stands to improve that situa-
tion, and bring much-needed updates to those investigations that have been con-
ducted.  
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Secondly, the issue of how Design for Assembly and Design for Disassembly 
correlate and impact each other will be discussed in the light of several different 
sources. Relevant literature is reviewed, design guidelines are compared and au-
tomotive experts and researchers are interviewed to draw conclusions. With a 
successful Design for Assembly redesign have any benefits on disassembly? This 
is a relevant question to answer considering the rising interests in disassembly and 
recycling seen during the last decade.  
Thirdly, the question of where the world's foremost experts in automotive Design 
for Assembly can be found will be answered. This will provide a useful bench-
mark for those wishing to further investigate Design for Assembly practices in the 
automotive industry. It is also possible for the automotive industry companies 
themselves to use this information to see where the best practices in this area can 
be found.  
1.3 Structure of the study 
The second chapter will be overlooking current theories of design being pursued 
in the automotive industry and introduce the theory of Design for Assembly. The 
main concepts and DFA -techniques are presented, together with an outline of the 
historical impacts. The three generations of development: rule-based redesign, 
redesign based on quantifying the assembly steps of the product and finally com-
puter aided Design for Assembly – all are presented briefly with examples. We 
will look at the usage of DFA in industries and its performance in real-life appli-
cations. Previous surveys on the same issues are investigated. 
The third chapter will focus entirely on the automotive industry – why is Design 
for Assembly relevant to the assembly of a car and to the success of a car compa-
ny? A brief background on the automotive industries will be presented, looking at 
early development and the situation before and after the 2008–2009 automotive 
industry crisis. The automotive assembly process will also be investigated, look-
ing especially close at the steps where human interaction is necessary. 
In the fourth chapter the link between Design for Assembly, repair and Design for 
Disassembly will be explored, and we will hopefully establish that the connection 
between these concepts is strong enough that we can use automotive repair data to 
say something about the level of Design for Assembly used in the automotive 
industry. The Design for Disassembly and Design for Maintenance concepts are 
introduced.  
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In the fifth chapter the used methods for data collection and analysis are present-
ed. The data collection section outlines all the choices made in terms of data 
sources, data selection, car selection, repair assembly selection, etc. Limitations to 
the data are also discussed.  
In the sixth chapter we go through the data analysis, where the methods of statis-
tical analysis are outlined, tested and implemented, after suitable transformations 
make the data acceptable for statistical analysis. Car models are also analyzed on 
an individual level, to see what companies have performed the best and worst in 
the comparison.  
In the seventh chapter we discuss the results of the data analysis, and try to relate 
them to the industry's current situation. Can we see any clear links between a 
company's success in this comparison and its success in the market? Is Design for 
Assembly relevant to the major automakers of the world? Furthermore, we try to 
relate our findings to the theory presented earlier. 
Chapter eight states the conclusions of the work, and gives suggestions for future 
actions.  
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2 LEAN DESIGN AND DESIGN FOR ASSEMBLY  
In this section the leading theories in automotive product development are pre-
sented, to provide a setting for the more in-depth discussion on Design for As-
sembly methodology. A brief history of DFA leads up to a presentation (with ex-
amples) of DFA usage today.  
2.1 Lean design and current product development 
 methods  
On its most basic level, the core idea of lean production – the value methodology 
that has been the guiding light of the automotive industry for the last fifty years – 
is the elimination of waste and continual improvement (See for instance Ohno 
1988, Shingo 1984). However, lean design can be summarized as follows: 
“The main purpose of lean design is to use existing components and make sure 
that the final designs are compatible with existing processes so that the compa-
ny’s resources can be leveraged as much as possible.”   (Chen & Taylor 2009) 
The ongoing process of product innovation and product refinement has very great 
importance in today's heavily competitive environment. The aim of the companies 
is to keep the period of time between product specification and production start as 
short as possible (Gonzalez-Zugasti, Otto & Baker 2000; Velos & Kumar 2002). 
After the wide-spread adaptation of lean production principles became the norm 
in the automotive industry, companies increasingly started looking to lean design 
as  the  next  step  in  the  development  (Cusomano  &  Nobeoka  1998;  Womack  &  
Jones 2003; Hale & Kubiak 2007, etc.).  
However, lean design is not such a well defined and documented area of expertise 
as lean production (Muffatto 1998). The parts of lean philosophy that are closest 
related to design practices mainly fall under the worker-process involvement um-
brella: value analysis to forge a direct chain of information from customer into 
finished product; concurrent engineering to involve all parties from design to en-
gineering to assembly in the creation process; etc.  
According to Chen & Taylor (2009) value analysis, concurrent engineering, mod-
ularization and design for manufacturability form the basis of the lean design 
mechanism. These practices aim at minimizing costs and provide the ability to 
focus on critical value creation – value being defined as what the customer wants 
in terms of cost, product functions, etc. The concepts can be loosely defined as 
follows:  
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1. Value. Since end customers are less willing to pay for products that do 
not exactly fit their own needs, the product variety offered must be coordi-
nated by in-depth analysis of what types of variety makes the biggest im-
pact on profitability. (Jayaram & Vickery 2008; Schuh, Lenders & Hieber 
2008)   
2. Concurrent engineering. Given the increasing amount of product devel-
opment projects and the decreasing time to achieve them in, an increasingly 
smooth co-operation much stand behind every achievement. The over-the-
wall  type  of  design  cannot  be  used  if  the  product  must  be  made  right  the  
first time. (Olivella, Cuatrecasas & Gavilan 2008; Mehta & Shah 2005.)  
3. Modularization. Product variety is a fundamental characteristic of lean 
production systems. For this to be economically viable, a maximum exploi-
tation of economies of scale and scope are necessary, something which is 
simply impossible in a single project.  This means reducing the number of 
unique components in each project and re-using technologies and compo-
nents that have been developed in other projects. (Brown & Duguid 2002; 
Mehta & Shah 2005.) 
4. Design for Manufacturing (Design for X).  The increasing need for 
standardization of parts and a wish to minimize waste gave birth to tech-
niques that aim at functional integration by design. Design for Manufactur-
ing is a practice that aims at simplifying product design, minimizing parts 
count, and standardizing parts and processes. (Boothroyd et al. 2002, Mot-
tonen, Harkonen, Belt & Haapasalo 2009.)  
In the following sections we will look closer at the three last of these points, since 
they have an especially large impact on the research subject of this work. These 
methodologies form the framework in which the Design for Assembly study must 
be seen – the setting and background for the literary works this work bases itself 
on. 
2.1.1 Concurrent engineering 
Concurrent engineering is a way of doing rapid product development with less 
waste. It entails the early establishment of a cross-functional team that together 
designs the new product, process, and manufacturing activities, simultaneously 
(Rosario, Davis & Keys 2003; Valle & Vázquez-Bustelo 2009). The team mem-
bers have backgrounds in different functional areas (design, manufacturing, pro-
duction, marketing, etc.) (Gao, Manson & Kyratsis 2000). Together, they can 
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identify potential difficulties very early on in the design process.  The blending of 
cross-functional knowledge and team communication ensure that issues of manu-
facturing and sales feasibility are considered already at the creation stage of the 
product. (Hyeon, Parsei & Sullivan 1993; Koufteros, Vonderembse & Doll 2001.)  
Winner, Pennell, Bertend and Slusarczuk (1988) define concurrent engineering 
as:  "a systematic approach to the integrated, concurrent design of products and 
related processes, including manufacturing and support. This approach is intend-
ed to cause the developers to consider all elements of the product life cycle from 
conception through disposal, including quality, cost, schedule, and user require-
ments".  
Concurrent engineering was originally put forward as a way of solving the prob-
lems connected with the traditional approach for developing new products – the 
throw-it-over-the-wall approach. Traditionally, the product development system 
has focused on structured processes with sequential, clearly-defined steps; the 
future product is defined (by management, market research), designed (by design-
ers), produced (engineering) and released to the market (Iansiti 1995). If these 
activities all happen sequentially, and start when the previous step has finished, 
the end result is a product that lacks integration between its different functions 
and intentions.  
Furthermore, continuous iterations of the process are necessary to correct the mis-
takes made early on, something which results in long development cycles and 
numerous expensive redesigns (Mutisya, Steyn & Sommerville 2008; Cordero 
1991). Quality problems are another result of the traditional approach, since lack 
of communication, and misunderstanding of each other's intentions skew product 
design and production away from the customers’ needs and wants (Ulrich, Sarto-
rius,  Pearson  &  Jakiela  1993;  Umemoto,  Endo  &  Machaco  2004;  Cooper  &  
Edgett 2003, etc).  
Concurrent engineering on the other hand, based on the integrated approach to 
product development, employs parallel work solutions and coordinates the activi-
ties of different departments. With the early release of information from design, 
engineering can start working on some parts of the product while the final design 
is still being created (Rosario, Davis & Keys 2003). The aim is to make the prod-
uct right the first time, and avoid costly iterations of the design process. It is espe-
cially important that any potential problems are identified before production be-
gins, when costs of change are at their highest. (Hartley, Zirger & Kamath 1997.) 
Communication aids in the form of software and automated design programs can 
support the cross-functional teams. The effective use of information technology 
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enables team members to co-operate despite wide geographical spread. While 
Zirger  &  Hartley  (1994)  point  out  the  benefits  of  co-location,  virtual  teams  are  
commonly used to bring together the expertise of separate company function are-
as. (King & Majchrzak, 1996). Computer-aided design (CAD) and computer-
aided manufacturing (CAM) software and allows designs to be shared and edited 
simultaneously. (Coman 2000; RufÀes 2000; Tucker & Hackney 2000; Ain-
scough, Neailey & Tennant 2003, etc.) 
Benefits and drawbacks 
Concurrent engineering has had a particular appeal to the automotive sector, since 
its strategy of regular model redesigns and overhauls requires short product de-
velopment lead  times (Humphrey 2003).  
The main benefits of concurrent engineering are 1) improved customer value, 2) 
better  quality,  3)  shorter  lead  times  and  4)  cost  reductions.  (Corti  &  Portioli-
Staudacher 2004; Portioli-Staudacher & Singh 1997; Bopana & Chon-Huat 1997; 
Gaalman, Slomp & Suresh 1999). Assembly of the product will certainly benefit 
from concurrent engineering, as manufacturing problems are taken into considera-
tion during design. Also, several researchers mention the intangible benefits – 
involving all parts of the company's functional areas into the design process 
grows the  commitment  of  the  participants  (Koufteros  et  al.  2001).  This  helps  to  
achieve commitment and a sense of common goal in the process (Gupta & 
Wilemon 1990).  
According to Clausing (1994), the actual design process will be a bit more time 
consuming under concurrent engineering than with the traditional methods. More 
issues are brought up during the process and the evaluation of each is more 
through. In general this will be more than compensated by the overall reductions 
in the new product design, as the time-consuming redesign iterations are kept at a 
minimum. 
2.1.2 Modularity and product platforms 
Modularity is also of the most important concepts in automotive design and pro-
duction today (Garud, Kumaraswamy & Langlois 2003; Gershenson, Prasad & 
Zhang 2003; Hargadon & Eisenhardt 2000; Baldwin & Clark 2000). A modular 
product design means that the final product is assembled from a number of mod-
ules rather than discrete components – the modules or assemblies are in turn made 
up of sets of parts assembled (most often) by a supplier. Modular product design 
is considered a key enabler for mass customization (Partanen & Haapasalo 2004; 
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Duray, Ward, Milligan & Bery 2000), as modules can be assembled to create a 
large number of variations the final product (Sanchez 2002). 
Baldwin & Clark (1997) define modularity as building a complex product or pro-
cess from smaller sub systems that can be designed independently yet function 
together as a whole. Camuffo (2000) stresses that modularity is an ambiguously 
used term in the auto industry – a broad concept, applied to a number of systems 
(product design, manufacturing, work organisation, etc)  
The SMART example 
In Doran, Hill, Hwang and Jacob 2007 we can see a good example of the use of 
high-level modularization in the automotive industry: the design and production 
of the "Smart" car model. It is the result of a collaboration between Mercedes-
Benz and watchmaker Swatch. The Smart car is revolutionary in that the bulk of 
the value-adding activities have been shifted to upstream suppliers: only about 
twenty percent of the production value of the car is added at the final Smart car 
assembly plant. The suppliers create and develop their modules in tight collabora-
tion with the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer). Only about 25 module 
supplier are involved in the creation of the car, as opposed to the 200–300 com-
ponents suppliers normally involved in the sourcing of a car's components. Ex-
amples of modules include dashboard systems, body structure, breaking control 
systems and seating modules  
Benefits and drawbacks 
In general, the automotive sector has been experienced declining pro¿t per vehi-
cle, shorter product life cycles and tougher consumer demands on variety, all 
throughout the last few decades (Maxton & Wormald 2004, Holweg & Pil 2004, 
Womack et  al.  1990, etc.)  Velos & Kumar (2002) point out that  modularity has 
been seen by the automotive industry as a way to cope with these circumstances.  
Bene¿ts of modularity include increasing the range of product variations, fast 
upgrading of products, reducing the number of suppliers to interact with and re-
ducing costs of development and production (Sanchez 2002; Mikkola & 
Gassmann 2003). Sanchez & Collins (2001) and Ernst & Kamrad (2000) do, 
however, suggest that the most tangible bene¿t of modularity is the ability to 
con¿gure new product variations quickly and at low cost. This is achieved by 
reusing modules in new products' architectures (Weng 1999; Partanen & 
Haapasalo 2004) In addition, a company with a well-speci¿ed interfaces architec-
ture in their products can quickly substitute defective or obsolete modules without 
affecting manufacturing negatively. 
 Acta Wasaensia     11 
  
From  the  product  life  cycle  point  of  view,  Primo  &  Amundson  (2002)  see  the  
reuse of high quality modules as a great possibility for the remanufacturing indus-
try. Mukhopadhyay & Setoputro (2005) see the possibility that even a build-to-
order product could more easily be accepted back by a company (returned by the 
customer) if only the product can then be easily dismantled and the modules re-
used. 
However, some authors do argue that modularity might also make the product 
less  distinct  in  the  eyes  of  the  customer.  Kim  &  Chhajed  (2000)  found  that  if  
common modules are used in both high-end and low-end products, they reduce 
the perceived difference in quality between the products – this can have the bene-
fit of raising the customer's belief in low-end brands but will invariably detract 
from the high-end product's uniqueness. 
Product platforms 
A continuation of modular design, the wider concept of product platforms (or 
product families) is used to describe a strategy of planning multiple generations of 
products based on largely the same components and modules. If the core product 
is flexible enough in its modular design, many derivative or enhanced variants 
can be created from the basic product. (Muffatto 1999.) 
Muffatto & Roveda (2000) define product platforms as “a set of subsystems and 
interfaces intentionally planned and developed to form a common structure from 
which a stream of derivative products can be efficiently developed and produced." 
The most desired effect of implementing a platform strategy is naturally to 
achieve risk reduction and economies of scale in the sourcing of the common 
modules (Ethiraj & Levinthal 2004; Xu, Lu & Li 2012). Increased commonality 
(a measure of the extent to which product variants share the resources) tends to 
lessen the risks of supply chain management, as fewer components are sourced 
from fewer suppliers (Cucchiella & Gastaldi 2006). Product platforms are fur-
thermore often cited as being a prerequisite to implementing mass customization 
– a system under which a core product can easily be configured according to the 
customer's needs. The end product can be relatively unique, but nevertheless cre-
ated from a pre-defined set of components/modules (Meyer & Lehnerd 1997; 
Salvador, Forza & Rungtusanatham 2000; Huang, Zhang & Liang 2005). 
Benefits and Drawbacks 
The main benefit of product platforms is that they provide product variety at re-
duced costs (Gonzalez-Zugasti, Otto & Baker 2000; Marion, Thevenot & Simp-
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son 2007; Park & Simpson 2008). Having a high degree of commonality means 
simpli¿ed planning and scheduling (Berry, Tallon & Boe 1992), shorter lead 
times in new product development (Gonzalez-Zugasti et al. 2000; Krishnan & 
Gupta 2001), smaller inventories and less Work-In-Progress (Vakharia, Parmenter 
& Sanchez  1996),  less uncertainty around untested components (Rosenthal & 
Tatikonda 1992), etc.   
In addition, the possibility of catering to a wider range of customer is also made 
available. Muffatto & Roveda (2000) use the example of the automotive industry, 
and its attempts to create “world cars”.  These are car models that are planned to 
be able to gain public support around the world; with regional customization the 
common core product should be acceptable in a multitude of countries (Maxton & 
Wormald 2004).This sort of a consumer market base is something that most car-
makers have only been able to dream about before the adaptation of platform 
strategies.   
Of course, there are also drawbacks in using platforms to create variety. The 
commonality requirement puts constraints on design, and may result in products 
that feel too similar in the mind of the public. Perceptions of the products' quality 
can also be negatively affected. (Kim & Chhajed 2001; Krishnan & Gupta 2001; 
Yu, Gonzalez-Zugasti & Otto 1999.)   
2.1.3 Design for X 
As we saw during in the previous sections, an important trend in new product 
development involves taking the extended chain of production into account when 
designing a product – a key motivating factor in both concurrent engineering and 
modularity (Cooper, Edgett & Kleinschmidt 2004; Gupta, Pawara & Smart 2007). 
It is always easier to modify a design at the beginning of the development process 
and taking an all-inclusive approach to the first steps of design will reduce both 
unnecessary changes during the process and have a positive effect on the total 
life-cycle costs of the product – even after it has left the factory.   
Design for X (often referred to as Design for Excellence) is a catch-all term for 
the different design methodologies that have sprung out of the modifying-designs-
early way of thinking (Mottonen, Harkonen, Belt, Haapasalo & Simila 2009). 
DFX is a very general term – the X can stand for assembly, manufacture, quality, 
repair, disassembly, six sigma, etc (Tan, Matzen, McAloone & Evans 2010). 
There is no one single methodology that claims to be able to achieve all these at 
the  same  time  even  though  the  many  different  Design-for  techniques  have  a  
common  root.  DFX  (the  general  term)  "emphasizes consideration of all design 
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goals and related constraints in the early design stage" (Kuo, Huang & Zhang 
2001).  
According to Kuo et al. (2001), the concept was first used in the 1970s, but the 
research into the subject has accelerated since the late 1990s  (Rosario & Knight 
1989; Huang & Mak 1997). DFX is one of the more popular concepts within 
quality management (Jiang, Liang, Ding & Wang 2007) and environmental issues 
(Graedel 2008; Kurk & Eagan 2008; Bras 1997; Ehrenfeld & Lenox, 1997). The 
aim of Design for Environment is to reduce the impact of the product's produc-
tion, use and end-of life on the environment.  
We can find endless permutations on the theme of "Design-for" methodologies, 
even though Design for Assembly and Design for manufacturing are commonly 
regarded as the first techniques adapted in industries (with origins as early as the 
1940s (Stoll 1988; Chang, Lin, Chang & Chen 2007; Huang 1996)).  Evidence of 
the expansion of the field can be seen in literature: Design-for mass customization 
(Tseng & Jiao 1998), modularity (Jose & Tollenaere 2005), cost (Rungtusan-
atham & Forza, 2005), sustainability (Gehin, Zwolinski & Brissaud 2008); logis-
tics (Dowlatshahi 1999); safety and reliability (Dowlatshahi 2000), platforms 
(Jiao, Simpson & Siddique 2007), remanufacturing (Charter & Gray, 2008), envi-
ronment (Kumar & Fullenkamp, 2005), service (Lele 1997), supportability 
(Gof¿n 2000), maintainability (Takata, Kirnura, van Houten, Westkamper, 
Shpitalni, Ceglarek & Lee 2004), etc.  
Benefits and drawbacks 
In general, the aims of DFX is to reduce time-to-market, lower cost and increase 
the quality of products (Gungor & Gupta, 1999). But since there are so very many 
different methodologies under the DFX umbrella, it is hard to define a unified set 
of benefits that result from such design. Maltzman, Rembis, Donisi, Farley, 
Sanchez & Ho (2005) have studied the benefits to quality and customer satisfac-
tion, and Zuidwijk & Krikke (2008) reusability. The product life-cycle aspects 
have recently become more important to researchers and companies, and the ben-
efits to these types of redesign have been studied in for instance Huang, Kuo & 
Zhang (2001); Ferrão & Amaral (2006); Shu & Flowers (1995); Ferrão, Reis & 
Amaral (2002), Ritzén (2000), etc. 
However, implementing a successful DFX strategy is neither easy nor automatic 
(Sheu & Chen 2007). Effective implementation of DFX requires an environment 
of cooperative work and good internal communication (Skander, Roucoules & 
Meyer 2008), supported by guidelines, checklists and software tools (Gungor & 
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Gupta 1999; Bralla 1996; Huang & Mak 2003; Eversheim & Baumann 1991). In 
short, a lean design environment, as described in the earlier sections. 
2.2 Design for Assembly 
"A product cannot be regarded in isolation when we are discussing assem-
bly problematics. A product is normally divided into a series of product var-
iants; certain sub-systems in the product ca appear naturally in other sub-
systems or can be produced because of group-technological similarities 
with other components. Thus design for ease of assembly can be said to be 
the process of achieving the insertion of a single product into a well-
structured product, building element and component program." (Andreasen, 
Kähler & Lund 1988: 68) 
In this section we look closer at Design for Assembly – technically a part of the 
larger concept of Design for X, but also one of the first Design-for methodologies 
invented. It is therefore more clearly defined than several of the other DFX-
offshoots and  covered by large amounts of academic literature.  
But what is Design for assembly? In practice Design for Assembly analysis is 
generally performed by a cross-functional team consisting of designers, engineers 
and assembly staff, to improve consistence of purpose. First of all, the team looks 
at the different functions the product (or proposed product draft) – can the product 
itself may be made simpler, and functions unnecessary to the customer be re-
moved? After this, the product under investigation is opened up and the function 
of every individual component is mapped and queried. Can we remove certain 
components and still keep the product functioning as well as before? The possibil-
ity of combining several components to perform several functions is put on the 
table – for instance, supporting walls can often be redesigned to provide integral 
support, previously provided by separate components. The amount and type of 
fasteners used is debated – can we safely reduce the number, or can more easily 
fastened types be used? (Swift 1981; Andreasen, Kähler & Lund 1988; Bakerjian 
1992). 
Any amount of other, small improvements can be brought forth at this point: add-
ing chamfers that self-align the screws upon insertion, making components sym-
metrical this so that their orientation upon insertion does not matter, eliminating 
the usage of especially small and delicate components hard to handle, etc. (see 
Edwards 2002; Rampersad 1996; Boothroyd et al. 2002; Bralla 1999) – a more 
exhaustive list of design guidelines is presented in Chapter 3. Final the materials 
themselves should be challenged, to see whether using a more simple production 
technique can be used – for instance, injection molded plastics instead of welded 
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metal (Constance 1992). The end result is hopefully a product with fewer compo-
nents, a more standardized set of fasteners and materials, and with a substantially 
lower assembly time. 
The link between these steps and product cost reductions is clear. First of all, with 
a product that takes less time to assemble, workers can produce more of the prod-
uct, lowering the average price of production. The same is true for automated 
production, of course, increasing the throughput of the factory (Eversheim & 
Baumann 1991). Also, with a simpler product fewer jigs, fixtures, specialized 
tools, etc. are necessary. With increased standardization, the changeover times 
between products are reduced. (Joneja 2003). 
In terms of quality, a product designed with wider tolerances will be less sensitive 
to mistakes in the assembly process, resulting in lower rates of scrap, fewer faulty 
products reaching the customer, fewer claims, etc. As the followers of the Six 
Sigma quality methodology will assure, it is difficult to make a prefect product: 
even a microscopically small defect rate in one component will cumulate or mul-
tiply when used together with other components (Bañuelas & Antony 2003, 
Bañuelas & Antony 2004). Thus, redesigning the product to use fewer parts (with 
wider tolerances) will increase the chances of a first rate product, at the first try.  
Andreasen, Kähler & Lund (1988: 67) define four improvements that result from 
the design for assembly methods:  
1. Improvement of the effectiveness of assembly, i.e. increased productivity 
in relation to manpower and investment resources. 
2. Improvement of product quality – i.e. improved product value from the 
buyer's standpoint in relation to the product's price. 
3. Improvement of the assembly system's profitability, i.e. increased utiliza-
tion of equipment. 
4. Improvement of working environment within the assembly system.  
Improved quality comes from several  directions of the DFA process.  Firstly,  the 
cross functional team aspect gives a more consistent product. Secondly, the seri-
ous querying of the product functionalities might lead to a simpler product, also to 
a product that is more specific to the customer's needs. Thirdly, the probability of 
defective products is reduced because of assembly problems (such as misalign-
ment of components) and the new product will of course contain fewer compo-
nents that can break.  
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The improvement of the assembly system's profitability comes partially from the 
faster flow of assembly through the plant, and partially through better usage of the 
already existing tools and machines: several of the redesign guidelines concern 
the standardization of materials, fasteners and tools. The last point, improving the 
working environment within the assembly system, becomes obvious when you 
look at the ergonomics of the new product. According to the guidelines (see 
Chapter 4), the designer avoids materials that tangle or nest, that are flexible and 
fragile,  that  require careful orientation, that  are heavy to lift,  and so on. The as-
sembly worker is meant to see the greatest benefit of the redesign personally. 
2.3 Historical Origin of DFA 
According to Causey (1999: 222–226) Design for Assembly was the initial result 
of the wave of new-style automated manufacturing that swept the industries in the 
late fifties and early sixties. The new robotic assembly devices were beneficial to 
production rates, but demanded a new way of considering assembly and manufac-
turability.  
Consider the simple task of screwing together two components with a couple of 
screws. The mechanical solutions that allow a robot to do so are very complex 
and not very economical. The robot needs one (delicate) appendage to move the 
screw into place, and another (strong and revolving) appendage to fasten the 
screw. The treads of the screw must furthermore be perfectly aligned with the 
hole or the component might become scrap when the robot powers the screw in. 
(Scarr, Jackson & McMasters 1986). The change-over wastes time, the robot is 
more expensive, the scrap rate is up – in short, a bad way to fasten component. 
When realizing that the new design principles were failing them, industrial com-
panies began defining new standards for automated production. One of the first 
recognized works that dealt with this issue exclusively was General Electric's The 
Manufacturing Producibility Handbook (1960) (Causey 1999: 222–226). The 
understanding of the topic and its practical use did not follow any beaten path, 
however – many companies are said to have worked on new principles internally, 
principles that in hindsight can be called DFA methodology.  
The Design for Assembly methodologies have since evolved to consider both 
automatic and manual assembly. The original discussions about the link between 
design and industrial, high-speed assembly helped bring new issues to the fore – 
why design should henceforth be seen as a team issue and why it should take into 
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consideration a complex mix of different considerations (Gupta, Regli, Das & 
Nau 1997).  
In the beginning the two concepts Design for Assembly and Design for Manufac-
turing were generally held to be the same thing. This is partially the case also to-
day – the two terms are used relatively synonymously. Boothroyd Dewhurst Inc. 
(DFMA 2011a; DFMA 2011:b) suggests a division: Design for Assembly in-
volves the process of redesigning the product and components to reduce assembly 
time, while Design for Manufacturing focuses more on the correct choice of ma-
terial and production method to best fit the circumstances. The collective term 
Design for Manufacturing and Assembly is a registered trademark of Boothroyd 
Dewhurst Inc., but is often used to describe the whole process of redesign for as-
sembly, including material selection. 
Enabling the development 
According to Joneja (2003) two new occurrences in production engineering in the 
1970s made it possible to evolve the DFA regime: injection molded plastic pro-
duction and the concept of concurrent engineering.  
The first, injection molding of plastic, meant that old components could – to an 
increasing degree – be replaced witch cheap, multi-form plastic pieces that were 
easy to produce without using much manual labor (welding, for instance). This 
meant a veritable revolution in the way products were made, a revolution that 
furthermore promised remarkable cost-reductions.  
Secondly, companies were actively trying to speed up their time to the market, 
and  one  of  the  great  time-wasters  in  the  product  development  process  was  the  
forwards-backwards lobbing of blueprints between the designer and engineering 
(the designer had to approve of the changes added by engineers at a later stage). 
However, the formation of cross-functional product teams proved to be an effec-
tive way around this. (Gupta, Regli, Das & Nau 1997; Prasad 1996; Cutkosky & 
Tenenbaum 1992) The manufacturability of the product improved as it was no 
longer implemented as an afterthought.  
According to Gupta, Regli, Das & Nau (1997) the teamwork aspect of the design 
process cannot be overstated. In its loosest definition, the origin of the design for 
assembly and manufacturing may in fact lie as soon as the World War II, when 
the high pressure to develop new and more advanced weaponry forced designers 
and engineers to work together under a common motivation (Ziemke & Spann 
1993). Many of the successful weapons developed during the wartime were in 
fact designed by small, tight, multi-disciplinary teams, striving for a common 
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goal. During the later peace-time industrial growth, these forms of co-operation 
were forgotten in the face of scientific management, with clearly defined depart-
mental structures and a hierarchical decision flow.  
2.4 Development Generations 
As Causey (1999: 222–223) states, there were three overall generations in the 
evolution of DFA principles, (with a certain degree of overlap, time-wise). The 
first generation (1960s to late 1970s) was qualitative in nature. With the help of 
design rules (more about these in Chapter 4) a designer or a team could redesign a 
product to increase its manufacturability. (General Electric 1960; Boothroyd, Poli 
& March 1978; Stoll 1988; Scarr et al. 1986) This method depended heavily upon 
the individual, and the individual’s skill in applying the guidelines to the process. 
A labor intensive method, but nevertheless valid – this was how the earliest as-
sembly designers worked, and how many solutions are reached still today.  
The second generation (1970s to present day) consists of the quantitative methods  
– the Boothroyd Dewhurst method, The Hitachi Assemblability Evaluation Meth-
od, The Lucas DFA Technique, Toshiba Design for Automatic Assembly, 
MOSIM etc. (Causey 1999: 222–223; Andreasen et al. 1988; Boothroyd & Ra-
dovanovic 1989; Takahashi & Senba 1986; Angermüller & Moritzen 1990). 
These methods brought quantitative measurement of assemblability into the de-
sign improvements. According to these methods, each part of the product is as-
signed values based upon their manufacturability. Problem areas are identified 
and the product is redesigned, maximizing the product's overall manufacturabil-
ity. (Ardayfio, Paganini, Swanson & Wioskowski 1998; Matterazzo & Ardayfio 
1992; Kuo et al. 2001) Naturally, also this method relies upon the skill and 
knowledge of the person redesigning the product.  
The third generation (1990s to present day) is  a step in the direction away from 
that reliance. If a computer is taught the systematic method of manufacturability 
analysis, and furthermore programmed with the more intangible general guide-
lines (whenever they can be defined in terms that a computer can understand), the 
computer can be made to perform certain parts of the design process without hu-
man guidance (Coma, Mascle & Véron 2003; Sanders, Tan, Rogers & Tewkes-
bury 2009; Tan 2006) This is  a monumental  task,  of course,  and one that is  still  
under rich development. But nevertheless, computers have the added advantage of 
being able to iterate designs considerably faster than a human, and can as such 
have the capability to come closer to an optimal solution – by brute force if noth-
ing else. Some of these new methods will be explored in Chapter 2.4.3. 
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2.4.1 First generation DFA 
The first generation of the Design for Assembly relied completely on the skills of 
the individual designer. To help, lists of design guidelines were created, with use-
ful principles to guide the inexperienced industrial designer. These guidelines 
would help the designer see the priorities of Design for Assembly and the point in 
the direction of right solutions. In Table 8, Chapter 4, we will see a compiled list 
of the Design for Assembly guidelines that are mentioned most often – if we start 
looking at specific types of products, we can find many more.  
The guidelines concern such things as a using the minimum amount of compo-
nents to fulfill a function, using standardized materials, tools and components for 
easier assembly, designing the individual components for self-alignment and easy 
insertion, avoiding parts that were especially small, delicate, sharp, tangling, 
heavy etc – all so the human worker or the automated assembly machine can have 
an easier time assembling the product.  
In general, the first DFA guidelines in the 1970's often emphasized making the 
single components more simple (Boothroyd et al. 2002:3). However, the best 
gains are generally made when single parts are combined or eliminated complete-
ly. In reality, there are also several "cumulative" benefits to reducing the number 
of parts – benefits such as simpler handling, less storage, cheaper tooling, etc. 
One of the most central postulates behind the DFA methodology is that the de-
signer should challenge the existence of the product at its most basic level.  
"There is only a limited rationalization effect to be gained when one evaluates 
only a product's components with a view to easier assembly. A much greater ef-
fect can be achieved by tackling the product's structure or considering the prod-
uct assortment more thoroughly in conjunction with the setting of goals for a ra-
tionalization of assembly." Andreasen et al. (1988:130) 
A Redesign Example  
An interesting case study is provided by the Materials and Process Performance 
Research  team of  the  University  of  Hull  –  the  redesign  of  an  automotive  wind-
screen wiper according to DFA principles. The two designs, old and new are 
shown in Figure 1.  
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 (University of Hull 2011) 
Figure 1.  DFA redesign example, windscreen wiper motor.  
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The redesign is radical, but solves many of the problems connected with the old 
design. The old motor had a number of alignment problems and required many 
two-handed assembly operations. Furthermore, because of the small size of the 
motor, several of the components used earlier were small enough to be difficult to 
handle and easy to drop. Out of the total  29 parts,  only six had a clear function 
related to the operation of the motor.  
In the new design there are only six components, all of which have a function. For 
instance, the top plate and the housing have now been merged. There is only one 
sturdy bearing instead of two (also removing the need for rivets and the bearing 
retaining plate at the end). The brushes have been moved to the other end of the 
housing, making the armature more stable around its one bearing. The brushes are 
spring-loaded themselves, negating the need for separate springs.  
According to the design rules in Table 8, Chapter 4, the redesign fulfills many 
important guidelines: 1) the number of components has been reduced to a mini-
mum, 2) the functions performed by each component has been maximized, 3) the 
types of material used have been reduced 4) fasteners such as rivets have been 
removed, 5) parts that are very small have been avoided 6) flexible parts (springs) 
and 7) tangling parts (springs) have been removed, 8) a base component has been 
supplied to mount assemblies on (housing), 9) the product can be assembled from 
above, in a stack, 10) the product is now asymmetrical to make the correct assem-
bly direction obvious and 11) several sharp angles and corners have been re-
moved. 
2.4.2 Second generation DFA 
The second-generation DFA methods were created for a logical reason: without a 
systematic and quantifiable method of analysis, these are no ways to quantify how 
much better one new redesign is to another new redesign (Boothroyd et al. 
2002:3). Using a quantitative approach, the designer can try out several solutions 
and quickly see how they measure up against each other. Furthermore, the design 
rules can guide the designer in homing in on problematic areas more specifically. 
These methods are by no mean an automatization of the redesign process – one 
cannot get around the fact that hard work and thorough evaluation is necessary to 
find the different ways certain assemblies can be modified to yield a more effec-
tive design. However, the numbers can help the designer in directing his or her 
efforts in the most beneficial direction. 
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Much in the same way as the first generation methods, the second-generation 
techniques were created by many parties more or less simultaneously. The three 
most well known are probably the Boothroyd Dewurst DFMA method, the Hita-
chi Assemblability Evaluation Method and the Lucas DFA Technique, which are 
explained more closely below.  There are, however, several other second-
generation Design for Assembly techniques proposed by researchers and compa-
nies:  
- The Sony Corporation developed a method for analyzing design for as-
sembly cost effectiveness, using keywords and a visual hundred point rat-
ing system for each operation (Yamigawa 1988). 
- FUJITSU developed the Productivity Evaluation System (PES) (Miyaza-
wa 1993) 
- Angermüller & Moritzen (1990) developed a MOSIM, A knowledge-
based system supporting product design for mechanical assembly 
- Warnecke & Bassler (1988) developed the Assembly-Oriented Product 
Design method, where each part is given a rating based on its functional 
value and parts with the lowest functional value (separate fasteners, etc.) 
are assigned out (whenever possible). 
- Poli & Knight (1984) developed a spreadsheet method to rate designs on 
ease of automatic assembly.  
 
The Boothroyd Dewurst method  
The Boothroyd Dewurst Design for Manufacturing and Assembly method is per-
haps the most well-known and widely used quantitative DFA methodology. It was 
primarily developed during a joint research project between the University of 
Massachusetts (USA) and the University of Salford (UK) in the late 1970s. (Hsu, 
Fuh, Zhang 1998; Andreasen et al. 1988:150) 
The Boothroyd Dewhurst method aims to first reduce the number of components 
and then ensure that the remaining components are as easy to assemble as possi-
ble (combining two components, for instance, eliminates one assembly operation) 
(Ardayfio, Paganini, Swanson & Wioskowski 1998; Matterazzo & Ardayfio 
1992). First of all the designer uses three basic questions to cast doubt on the ne-
cessity of each separate component. The questions are:  
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1. Does the part move relative to all other parts already assembled? 
2. Must the part be of a different material or be isolated from all other parts 
already assembled? 
3. Must the part be separate because otherwise necessary assembly or disas-
sembly operations would become impossible? 
For  a  component  to  continue  its  existence  it  should  play  a  key  part  in  the  func-
tioning of the product. The designer is required to provide reasons why the part 
cannot be eliminated or combined with others. Secondly, the assembly time is 
estimated using a database of time standards developed specifically for the pur-
pose. These depend on what motions the attachment of the component entails – 
two-handed grip, one-handed, etc. A DFA index (a percentage value known as 
design efficiency) is obtained by comparing the assembly time with the theoreti-
cal minimum of parts. On the basis of this figure, assembly areas that can lead to 
manufacturing problems are identified. Any iteration after the first design effi-
ciency index is calculated will have to top the original index number, or be dis-
carded directly.  (Kuo et al. 2001).  
A Boothroyd Dewhurst method example  
In Stone et al. (2004), we see a redesign example where the Boothroyd Dewhurst 
method is used to improve an ordinary household tool – a heavy-duty stapler. The 
unit consists of a casing, a handle and a spring-loaded mechanism inside to propel 
the staple into the material it is used on. A very simple and classical product but 
nevertheless one that can be improved substantially in terms of assembly.  
In  Table  1  we  see  the  assemblability  evaluation  of  the  old  design.  In  the  table,  
column 2 depicts how many times a certain operation must be carried out (two 
rivets, thus two riveting operations) and column 3 is a two-digit handling process 
code from a manual handling chart (part of the DFMA material) with pre-
determined classifications of handling and operation methods, such as 'one-
handed operation', 'one-handed operation with grasping aid', etc. Orientation is 
classified by the rotation necessary to install the component.  
Column 4 is simply the handling time in seconds, also obtained from the manual 
handling chart on the basis of the handling code. Column 5 is a two-digit insertion 
process code, obtained from the manual insertion chart, based on the component's 
insertion technique. Column 6 gives the insertion time, based on the insertion 
techniques determined in column 5.  
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Finally we have column 7, which give the total operation time (the sum on han-
dling time and insertion time, multiplied with the number of operations, and col-
umn 8 which shows the theoretical minimum of parts to be used in an assembly. 
Filling column 8 is done by asking the three questions:  
1. Does the part move relative to all other parts already assembled? 
2. Must the part be of a different material or be isolated from all other parts 
already assembled? 
3. Must the part be separate because otherwise necessary assembly or disas-
sembly operations would become impossible? 
If any of the three questions can be answered with “yes”, one point is added to the 
column (thus if all three questions are answered with yes, a '3' goes into column 
8).  
At the bottom of the table the manual assembly design efficiency value is calcu-
lated using the formula:  
MANUAL DESIGN EFFICIENCY (%) = 3 x (THEORETICAL MINIMUM 
NUMBER OF PARTS / TOTAL MANUAL ASSEMBLY TIME).  
Using this theoretical measure as a metric, redesign of a component becomes 
more systematic and a designer can more easily see where the difficult, time con-
suming components/operations lie.  
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Table 1. Boothroyd Dewhurst DFA evaluation table – old design.  
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1 1 30 1,95 00 1,5 3,45 1 Plastic support 
2 1 30 1,95 30 2,0 3,95 0 Hammer guide 
3 1 23 2,36 30 2,0 4,36 1 Hammer 
4 1 30 1,95 06 5,5 7,45 1 Stapler advance mecanism 
5 1 33 2,51 06 5,5 8,01 1 Left casing 
6 2 15 2,25 0, 3,5 11,50 0 Rivet 
7 1 10 1,50 31 5,0 6,50 1 Bottom leaf spring 
8 1 10 1,50 00 1,5 3,00 0 Top leaf spring 
9 1 30 1,95 00 1,5 3,45 1 Left lifter 
10 1 00 1,13 06 5,5 6,63 1 Plastic pin 
11 1 33 2,51 01 2,5 5,01 1 Right lifter 
12 1 30 1,95 07 6,5 8,45 1 Plastic handle 
13 1 30 1,95 30 2,0 3,95 0 Metal handle 
14 1 15 2,25 30 2,0 4,25 1 Pin 
15 1 15 2,25 30 2,0 4,25 0 Stud 
16 2 30 1,95 06 5,5 14,90 0 Lifter cover 
17 1 30 1,95 06 5,5 7,45 0 Spring mount 
18 2 05 1,84 06 5,5 14,68 2 Springs 
19 1 35 3,00 06 5,5 8,50 0 Metal spring holder 
20 1 33 2,51 06 5,5 8,01 1 Right casing 
21 1 15 2,25 38 6,0 8,25 0 Pin 
22 1 39 4,00 31 5,0 9,00 0 Circlip 
23 2 – – 35 7,0 14,00 0 Riveting (rivet row 6) 
24 1 33 2,51 08 6,5 9,01 0 Front casing 
25 1 15 2,25 38 6,0 8,25 0 Pin 
26 1 39 4,00 31 5,0 9,00 0 Circlip 
27 1 23 2,36 31 5,0 7,36 1 Locking pin 
     Totals 204,18 14   
Total number of parts is 29           
The manual design efficiency is given by EM = 3x14/204,18 = 20,60% 
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The Stapler 
The authors consider the following changes possible in the stapler: 
1. Combining the hammer guide with the plastic support. 
2. The casings could be attached by snap fits to the plastic support 
3. The two leaf springs could be combined into one leaf 
4. Slots in the plastic pin could eliminate the lifter cover 
5. The spring holder could be combined with the handle assembly 
6. The spring mount could be integrated with the casings.  
 
These changes would reduce the stapler components according to what is dis-
played in Table 2. The old stapler had a parts count of 29 and an assembly time of 
204, 18 seconds (3,4 minutes). The new stapler design has a parts count of 11 and 
an assembly time of 88,08 seconds (1,5 minutes) 
 
Table 2. Boothroyd-Dewhurst DFA example, old design vs. new.  
Module Existing design   Proposed concept   
  Component  descriptions 
Part 
count Time 
Component  
descriptions 
Part 
count Time 
Staple Plastic support 1 3,45 Casings 2 7,45 
  Staple advance mechanism 1 7,45 
Staple advance 
mechanism 1 16,02 
Rotation- Metal handle 1 3,95     
translation Leaf springs 2 9,50 Hammer with integral leaf 1 6,00 
1 Hammer 1 4,36 spring and projections   
  Hammer guide 1 5,01    
  Left lifter 1 5,01    
  Right lifter 1 6,63    
  Plastic pin 1 9,01    
  Front casing 1 4,25    
  Stud 1 4,25    
  Lifter covers 2 14,90    
Rotation- Springs 2 14,68 Handle with integral leaf spring  1 14,00 
translation Spring mount 1 7,45    
2 Metal spring holder 1 8,50    
  Casings 2 16,02     
Grip Plastic handle 1 8,45 Handle with integral leaf spring 0  
      Casings 0  
Pin Pin 1 4,25 Pin 1 4,25 
Lock Locking pin 1 7,36 Locking Pin 1 7,36 
Other Rivets and riveting 2 25,50 Screws 4 33,00 
parts Pins 2 16,50    
  Circlips 2 18,00    
    29 204,18   11 88,08 
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In Figure 2 we see a rendition of what the two different designs would look like, 
compared to each other.  
 
 
(Stone et al. 2004) 
Figure 2.  Boothroyd Dewhurst DFA redesign example – heavy-duty stapler.  
 
The Hitachi Assemblability Evaluation Method 
According to Miyakawa & Ohashi (1986) the Hitachi Assemblability Evaluation 
Method (or AEM) uses so-called Cost Ratio Indices to pinpoint candidate com-
ponents for redesign. Initial drawings or concepts of the product under scrutiny 
are used by the designer to fill in the AEM form (component names and numbers) 
in a logical assembly sequence. The assembly operations are then analyzed and 
classed, using about 20 different AEM symbols. On the basis of these, the final 
assemblability evaluation score, or assembly cost ratio, can be calculated. If the 
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final scores are lower than the 'target values', the product is redesigned. The com-
plete analysis sequence is : 
1. Preparations  
– Prepare the products to be evaluated, such as conceptual drawings, de-
sign drawings, assembly drawings, samples, etc.  
– Prepare the assemblability evaluation calculation form. 
2. Determine attachment sequence 
– Enter the part names and the number of parts on the evaluation form in 
the same order as the attaching sequence.  
– Determine the attaching sequence of the subassembly units. 
3. Determine attaching method 
– Determine the parts attaching procedures.  
– Enter the symbols for each part of the evaluation form. 
4. Calculate evaluation indices 
– Calculate the product assemblability evaluation score, the part evalua-
tion indices score and the assembly cost ratio. 
5. Evaluation index judgment 
– Compare calculated indices to the target values. It is desirable that the 
product assemblability evaluation score be over 80 points. It is desira-
ble that the assembly cost ratio be below 0,7. 
6. Improve product design (if necessary) 
– Find subassemblies and parts having relatively small p-values, then at-
tempt to reduce the number of attachment movements.  
– Attempt to reduce the number of parts.  
– A reduction in the number of parts sometimes results in a small prod-
uct assemblability evaluation score. In that case, reduction in the as-
sembly cost ratio is preferred to a smaller product assemblability eval-
uation score. 
– When the design is improved, gradual improvements in the product as-
semblability evaluation score (20 to 30 points) are desirable. 
– Prepare proposed improvements. 
 
The Lucas DFA Technique 
The Lucas Technique is also one of the more well-known DFA methods. Accord-
ing to According to Andreasen et al. (1988:156) the Lucas system is mixture of 
knowledge engineering and CAD modeling. The system uses the same classifica-
tion method for automatized and manual assembly. The analysis goes through the 
following steps: 
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1. Product design – important strategic choices are made as to the individual-
ity of the product and standardization possibilities.  
2. Functional analysis – components are divided into groups depending on 
their functional importance. Unimportant functional components are prime 
candidates to be cut in redesign, or combined into one larger or more 
complex component.  
3. Feeding analysis – each component is assigned a feeding technology sym-
bol and assigned a value from a feeding cost index. Individual components 
must be compatible with the intended manufacturing method.  
4. Gripping  analysis  –  the  components  are  evaluated  on  their  ease  of  grip-
ping and graded on an index. This is especially important when consider-
ing automated assembly. 
5. Insertion process analysis – the designer creates an assembly sequence 
flowchart and grades each assembly process according to a cost index. If 
disproportionately expensive assembly processes are necessary for certain 
components, they are prime candidates for redesign.  
6. Assessment – the total cost index vales are used as a basis to brainstorm 
up new proposals around the components and the product.  
The Lucas method's cost indices are calculated by using the following formulas, 
and then by minimizing the cost of assembly total: 
(1)  Cost of assembly 
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Cp: Total capital costs of automated system 
Nt: Total number of assemblies produced in the system lifetime 
Ca: The annual costs of operating the system 
Na: The annual production of assemblies 
Cm: The cost of labor per assembly 
Np: The number of parts in the assembly  
Cf: The feeding costs of an individual part 
Cg: The gripping costs of an individual part 
Ci: The inserting costs of an individual part 
(Andreasen et al. 1988:156) 
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2.4.3 Third Generation of DFA 
The third  generation  of  the  Design  for  Assembly  makes  the  jump from pen  and  
paper to software – trying to create a program that can take on a part of (or why 
not the entire) process of redesigning the product according to DFA principles. 
Taking the first steps on this path is relatively easy – creating programs that can 
aid the designer in the design process – but going all  the way to creating a pro-
gram that can create a new design on its own is a very complicated task (Hsu, Fuh 
& Zhang 1998).  
Computerizing the second generation methods 
Boothroyd Dewhurst Inc. offer softwares that computerize their DFMA process. 
Their  DFA  software  helps  the  designer  optimize  their  product  design,  and  the  
DFM software gives fast cost estimates of how much the new design will cost to 
produce. The DFM software can also help with the choice of material, and show 
you whether certain production processes are incompatible with the envisioned 
design (DFMA 2011a, DFMA 2011b). Boothroyd et al. (2002:2) state that one of 
the main problems separating 'optimal' design from the real world, is that design-
ers (naturally) will conceive their products in terms of components and materials 
that they are the most familiar with. This means that they may easily overlook a 
component or material that would in the end have produced a cheaper, better 
product.  
According to Choi & Guda (2000), the Boothroyd Dewhurst computer software 
functions in much the same way as the pen-and-paper method. The user is led 
through the process of deciding the sequence of assembly, building a structure 
chart and answering the three DFA questions for each component. Several more 
questions are added to pinpoint the design of the product further. The user is 
asked to choose what simple, geometrical shapes most closely resemble the real-
world  shapes  of  the  components.  Irregular  shapes  are  not  considered,  so  some  
approximation is inevitable.  
The authors contrast the Boothroyd Dewhurst DFMA software with a computer 
aided production engineering tool named Dynamo (Technomatix Technologies). 
This program relies on 3D modeling of the product and its production line, and is 
more concerned with "finding an optimal sequence of assembly for a given de-
sign". In the authors’ opinion the Boothroyd Dewhurst DFA program could bene-
fit from incorporating more visualization into its software – letting the designer 
play with his or her design in a combined DFA/Virtual prototype setting. As it is, 
the designer would be better served by using both programs simultaneously.  
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Going beyond 
A number of attempts have been made to automatize the DFA process beyond 
simply computerizing the Boothroyd Dewhurst method. Li & Hwang (1992) use a 
semi-automated system modeled on the Boothryd Dewhusrt method, which sys-
tematically finds all feasible assembly sequences for a product. Ong and Lye 
(1992) and Rosario (1988) use a part's CAD model to calculate optimal overall 
dimensions and rotational symmetries. Lucas Engineering have created a 
knowledge-based design system to de¿ne an assembly-sequence and analyzing 
each components for ease of part-handling and assembly (Shehab & Abdalla 
2006). Coma et al. (2003) present a geometric tool software solution for automat-
ed Design for Assembly assessment where each component is first analyzed to 
identify  mass  dimensions  and  symmetries  and  secondly  to  identify  form  –  after  
this the optimal mechanical assembly method can be pinpointed.  
The closest thing to an all-round solution is perhaps the multi-faceted expert sys-
tems such as the one presented by Sanders, Tan, Rogers and Tewkesbury (2009): 
software combining four expert systems (computer-aided design (CAD), auto-
mated assembly analysis, manual assembly analysis and design analysis). The 
four systems are able to take data from each other, and thus make the design pro-
cess more seamless. The program can analyze a design and provide ideas for de-
signers, and it can do so on the basis of existing CAD drawings. Furthermore, the 
system can estimate assembly times and costs for manual or automatic assembly, 
suggesting optimal assembly techniques along the way. This is not the self-
designing program that would crown third generation DFA, but nevertheless a 
functional DFA software that will help the designer speed up the process signifi-
cantly.  
2.5 Does DFA work? 
There are numerous academic articles and industrial news sources that present 
successful redesign case studies, case studies where real-world products have 
been remodeled to significantly reduce parts count and assembly time. Below, a 
few are presented together with a case study compilation carried out by Booth-
royd Dewhurst Inc. on their own customer base. This to give us an idea of what 
benefits have been achieved using efficient industrial design methods.  
We should do well to remember, however, that any articles written about DFA 
case studies will be predominantly positive simply because of human psychology 
– it is unlikely that anyone will publish an article about unsuccessful redesign, or 
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at least about very marginal results from the redesign venture. Small results are 
most often deemed lacking in news-value.  
Case studies 
We already remember the two studies presented in connection with the DFA 
techniques earlier on – Stone et al. (2004) described the redesign of a heavy duty 
industrial stapler, and the University of Hull present an improved windshield wip-
er motor. In the case of the stapler, the authors suggest that it is possible to reduce 
the part count from 29 to 11 (a reduction of 62%). In terms of assembly time, the 
old model consumed 204,18 seconds while the new model would use only 88,08 
seconds (a reduction of 57%). The windshield wiper motor achieved a parts re-
duction from 29 to 6 (a reduction of 79%).  
Ardayfio, Paganini, Swanson & Wioskowski (1998); Matterazzo & Ardayfio 
(1992), Ardayfio & Opra (1992), Ardayfio, Dembsey, Kreucher & Schmitt 
(1998); Sarmento, Marana, Ferreira-Batalha & Stoeterau (2011) da Conceicao & 
da Silva (2010) present successful case studies of Automotive Fuel Intake Covers, 
Automotive Electrical and Electronic Systems, Front Suspensions, Convertible-
Top Vehicles, Brake and Clutch Pedal System at Ford Motor Company, GM, 
Chrysler and Delphi Automotive Systems.  
Boothroyd et al. (2002), though hardly impartial in the matter, produce an impres-
sive list of successful projects, where the DFA techniques have produces signifi-
cant positive results: Donnell Douglas used DFMA methodology to redesign the 
F/A Hornet jet fighter, resulting in a bigger, lighter product with 42% fewer parts. 
Dell Computer Corporation used DFA tools to design and manufacture a new 
desktop computer chassis, with savings reported as a 32% reduction in assembly 
time, a 44% reduction in service time, a part count reduction of 50%, and a direct 
labor cost reduction of 80%. Motorola, on the redesign of their walkie-talkie ve-
hicular adapters, realized assembly time reductions of 87%, from 2742 seconds 
(45,7 minutes) initially to only 354 seconds (5,9 minutes) when finished. Ciba 
Corning Diagnostics Corp, a medical company building blood-gas analyzers, re-
duced their overall number of parts by 48% and cost by 22 %. Magna Interior 
Systems Seating Group, a company making seats for the car industry pulled down 
total parts count form 105 to 19 and assembly time form 1445 seconds to 258. 
Whirlpool used the method to make their new microwave oven faster to assemble 
(by 26%) despite adding a new forced convection technology to it, in addition to 
the old functionality.  At Ingersoll-Rand Corporation's portable compressor divi-
sion, the DFMA software was used to redesign an oil cooler and a radiator as-
sembly to achieve a parts count reduction from 80 parts to 29 (64%) and an as-
sembly time reduction from 18,5 minutes to 6,5 minutes (65%). In a later attempt, 
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the same company redesigned a control and instrument panel assembly to achieve 
a parts count reduction from 36 to 24 (33%) and an assembly time reduction from 
8.5 minutes to 6.1 minutes (28%).  
Port (1989) relates two successful case studies: IBM's redesign of their ProPrinter 
and NCR's cash register terminal. The IBM printer (automated assembly) was 
redesigned to result in a parts count reduction from 152 to 91 (40%) and an as-
sembly time reduction from 30 minutes to three minutes (90%). Furthermore, the 
printer could now be manually assembled, because of its more simplistic design. 
The cash registered achieved a parts count reduction of 80% and an assembly 
time reduction  of  75% through the  DFA analysis.  As  an  added  bonus  of  the  re-
duced part count, the number of suppliers needed went down by 65%.  
Stone et  al.  (2004) presents the redesign of an ordinary kitchen wok. As for the 
wok, parts count dropped from 33 to 13 (a reduction of 61%) and assembly time 
from 233.48 seconds to 91 seconds (a reduction of 61%). Causey (1999), using 
the DFMA methodology, suggests redesigns to a normal flashlight achieving a 
part count reduction from 14 to 7 (50%). Stevens & Eijsink (1994) describe the 
redesign of a wall-mounted emergency fire hose reel. According to their calcula-
tions, their redesign reduces parts count from 59 to 27 (a reduction of 54%) and 
manual assembly time from 525 seconds to 264 seconds (a reduction of 50%).  
There is no shortage of impressive cost reductions to be seen in literature – the 
presented studies are just a sample from the top of the pile and there exists a mul-
titude of similar case studies in design literature and journals. The following ex-
ample is especially interesting in that it describes the usage of Design for Assem-
bly methods already during the creation stage of a new product – a new product 
only exists in potentia, but cost estimates and assembly simulation can still be 
done during the development phase to see whether the new design shows promise 
or not.  
Hydrogen fuel cells: using DFA before production 
In an article for Design Engineering news (2007) we can read about a project un-
dertaken by the technical consulting firm Directed Technologies Inc. on behalf 
the U.S. Department of Energy, to create a hydrogen fuel cell. The fuel cell 
should be a tangible alternative energy solution, with set technical and financial 
goals for each step of the project. The final target (for 2015) is set at 15 dollars 
per kilowatt, an ambitious goal, considering that the 2006 cost target was set at 70 
dollars per kilowatt.  
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Importantly, the goal of the project is to consider all possible solutions (systemat-
ic, material, operational, etc.) that might lead to cost reduction compared to the 
current products. DFMA software is used to rapidly calculate estimates of manu-
facturing and assembly costs with only light initial information.  
The hydrogen fuel cell stacks consist of several hundred plates with differing 
electrical charge that act as anode and cathode, as well as a similar amount of 
semi-permeable membranes that guide the electrons and protons in a desired 
route. The design of the plate for optimal processing surface to minimum manu-
facturing cost is therefore of great interest to the designing engineers.  
After several different iterations, considering the effects of process, plate design, 
plate material and production batch sizes, it was concluded that stamped steel 
plates would function better than injection moulded composite plates, and that 
pieces stamped from a roll  of steel  with the exact width of the plate would pro-
duce zero waste at an 80 plate per minute rate. By changing their designs in this 
manner, the designers have been able to bring the projected cost of the fuel cells 
down to $25/kW. 
Survey work  
There are very few surveys made on the subject of how often redesign projects 
have been successful, as opposed to only achieving moderate or marginal im-
provements. The closest thing we can come to an industry-wide benchmark of the 
situation in companies where Design for Assembly is used is another study by 
Boothroyd Dewhurst, Inc. (2004). Again, we must be aware that private company 
is not the best source of objective data, but since similar studies are almost non-
existent, we have to consider it the best source available. 
The Boothroyd Dewhurst study compiled the results of 117 product-design case 
studies by 56 manufacturers, conducted over the last 15 years. The their numbers 
showed, for instance, that using the DFMA techniques resulted in an average 
parts  count  reduction  of  54%  in  100  of  the  cases  studies.  Similarly,  an  average  
assembly time reduction of 60% was calculated on the basis of 65 case studies. 
The full survey is presented in Table 3. The figures indicate that there is a consid-
erable amount of value in the judicious application of Design for Assembly tech-
niques. 
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Table 3. Case study compilation results.  
Category Number of 
cases 
Average reduction 
(%) 
Part count 100 54 
Assembly time 65 60 
Product cost 31 50 
Assembly cost 20 45 
Assembly operations 23 53 
Separate fasteners 20 60 
Weight 11 22 
Labor costs 8 42 
Manufacturing cycle 7 63 
Part costs 8 52 
Unique parts 8 45 
Assembly tools 6 73 
Material cost 4 32 
Number of suppliers 4 51 
Manufacturing steps 3 45 
Assembly defects 3 68 
2.6  Is it used? 
Even though there are numerous case studies on the improvements that DFA can 
generate, surveys on the extent of its usage in various industries are few. Present-
ed below are five different surveys connected to DFA in various settings – they 
vary strongly in scope and setting, but each can give us a few insights into the 
usage and problems surrounding DFA. They also represent a large part of the sur-
veys ever done on DFA usage and methodology, unfortunately. 
Dean & Salstrom (1990) present a survey of the extent of familiarity with and use 
of Design for Manufacturing (DFM) tools and techniques in San Francisco Bay 
area firms, and Huang & Mak (1998) make a similar investigation in Design for 
Manufacture in the UK furniture manufacturing industry. Boothroyd-Dewhurst 
Inc. presents a roundtable survey conducted at their customer conference (2009), 
and Sirat, Tap & Shaharoun (2000) a survey on the extent of DFA application in 
Malaysian industries. The most relevant study of manufacturability concerning 
the automotive industry is presented in The Machine That Changed the World by 
Womack, Jones & Roos (1990: 96–97). There, the well-known authors on Lean 
production present the results of an MIT International Motor Vehicle Program 
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survey where a set of car manufacturers were asked to rank each other in terms of 
manufacturability.  
DFM in San Francisco firms 
Dean & Salstrom (1990) conducted a survey on the usage of and familiarity with 
Design for Manufacturing techniques in the San Fransisco Bay area. The Ameri-
can industries were at the time suffering hardening competition from mainly Jap-
anese producers, and according to the authors, the heavy investment in robotics, 
flexible manufacturing systems and computer-aided design had not provided as 
large a competitive advantage as had been hoped. Therefore, a greater linkage 
between design and manufacturing (and especially the automatic assembly meth-
ods used) was desirable. The aim was to see whether companies recognized the 
benefits of industrial design and furthermore to determine the extent to which 
companies had already implemented DFM tools. 
The authors conducted their survey by questionnaire, handing out their inquiry 
forms during the course of three different conferences. They thereby received a 
good number of responses – 98 completed questionnaires, in which 60 of the re-
spondents stated they were ‘management’. Out of the 90, 58 were in manufactur-
ing and 28 in design.  
The survey identified six benefits to implementing DFM (percentage in brackets): 
1) Higher quality (88%), 2) Lower total costs (88%), 3) Fewer engineering 
change orders (70%), Improved morale (54%), Increased market share (51%), 
Increased creativity (31%).  
The survey also identified seven main problems to implementing a successful 
DFM program. The problems were: 1) Lack of management commitment (62%), 
2) Resistance from design engineers (53%), 3) No budget to implement DFM 
tools (37%), 4) DFM tools have long term benefits but I have short term problems 
(29%), 5) Difficult  to implement DFM tools (29%), 6) Lack of tangible benefits  
(9%), 7) DFM tools hinder creativity (6%).  
As  for  the  usage  of  DFM in  the  companies,  the  majority  of  respondents  gave  a  
moderate answer (agree, neither, disagree – as opposed to strongly agree or 
strongly disagree) on the question whether their companies did a good job imple-
menting DFM. The majority answered the question whether their companies have 
formal DFM implementation programs negatively. On the other hand, the abso-
lute majority of respondents with a ‘strongly agree’ on the question whether the 
potential benefits from DFM are very high.  
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Interestingly enough, a difference between the responses of manufacturing and 
design personnel showed that the design personnel were more positive in their 
belief that their DFM programs were succeeding than the manufacturing person-
nel, in almost every category. This sort of a discrepancy seemed to indicate that 
complete “concurrentness” in the design phase had not been achieved.  
DFM in the UK furniture industry 
Huang & Mak (1998), both of the University of Hong Kong, carried out a survey 
to ascertain the familiarity with and usage of Design for Manufacture in the UK 
furniture industry. The aim of the study was to “establish the relevance of DFM to 
the furniture manufacturing industry and what special needs this particular sector 
has.”  
This was a questionnaire survey, with 200 questionnaires sent and a response per-
centage of about 15%. The respondents were mainly senior personnel such as 
managing directors, design managers, etc. and the questionnaire inquired whether  
1. DFM (and other techniques such as value analysis and Quality Function 
Deployment) were currently being used in the company 
2. How the company would choose to implement such techniques 
3. The perceived benefits and potential to implementing such techniques 
4. Current problems in the manufacturing process. 
 The survey concluded that while there was a relatively high degree of knowledge 
about the DFM methodology (as well as other value and quality management the-
ories) there was not, generally, a great degree of implementation of the tech-
niques. The benefits of DFM were seen as speeding up product manufacture, im-
proving product quality and reducing product cost, as well as necessitating less 
engineering changes, being able to compete better in the market, etc.  
However, the real barrier to implementing DFM was seen as not having enough 
budget to spend on such systematic changes. External consultants were consid-
ered too expensive, but several firms were open to the possibility of sending their 
engineers on short workshops on the subject. However, according to the authors, 
a lack of true understanding about the methods and benefits of DFM could well 
be another reason why the methods have not been implemented to a greater de-
gree in the furniture industry.  
DFA in Malaysian industries 
Sirat, Tap & Shaharoun (2000) of the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia present the 
results of a survey they conducted to find the extent of DFA application in Malay-
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sian industries. The questionnaire was sent to about 200 companies in Malaysia 
(with a response percentage of 19%) and was answered by senior personnel in the 
companies (Managing directors, R&D managers, etc.). 
The survey concluded that the level of DFA awareness is relatively low. The 
number of companies that replied they have never heard of DFA was 26%, while 
a  further  26%  answered  that  they  did  not  understand  DFA  (partially  or  fully).  
There was in fact only three of the companies that answered stated that they were 
actively using DFA in their production practices. These were all in the ‘large 
company category’, and used the Hitachi method, the DFMA method, or a meth-
od created in-house.  
The authors feel that there is a large potential for wider usage of DFA, and that 
the reason for the low adaptation degree is mainly the lack of knowledge about 
the method. DFA is not as well-known in Malaysia as the larger industrial man-
agement methodologies such as Just-In-Time production, Total Quality Manage-
ment, etc. The respondents were generally interested in the benefits DFA are able 
to bring, though – reduced lead time and assembly times being the most popular 
areas of interest to the respondents.  
Boothroyd Dewhurst's customer review 
In a survey conducted at a company quality seminar, Boothroyd Dewhurst asked 
their customers what benefits they see in DFMA and what kind of benefits they 
feel they have gotten from implementing the method. Only 19 customer repre-
sentatives were present, but of the companies involved, many are fairly well-
known: Motorola, Dell corp., GE, Harley-Davidson, KPMG, TRW automotive, 
Raytheon, Magna Intierior Automotive Seating, Boeing, etc.  
The quantitative results of the survey are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Roundtable survey results.   
Which of these categories do you believe contribute to product development 
costs that could be avoided by analyzing product deigns with DFMA?  
 responses % 
Testing and prototyping  10 52.6% 
Engineering change notices  13 68.4% 
Production throughput  17 89.5% 
Factory floor space  13 68.4% 
Quality inspection  15 78.9% 
Inventory  13 68.4% 
Shipping  8 42.1% 
Supply chain management  13 68.4% 
Warranty and service  10 52.6% 
Order entry and part tracking  9 47.4% 
Assembly documentation  13 68.4% 
ERP, BOM, and MRP admin 10 52.6% 
CAD and PDM  7 36.8% 
End-of-life considerations  4 21.1% 
Other assembly 2 10.5% 
   
For which of these categories has your company measured savings in overhe
ad costs related to DFA part-count reduction? 
 responses % 
Testing and prototyping  6 31.6% 
Engineering change notices  7 36.8% 
Production throughput  13 68.4% 
Factory floor space  9 47.4% 
Quality inspection  6 31.6% 
Inventory  7 36.8% 
Shipping  6 31.6% 
Supply chain management  8 42.1% 
Warranty and service  3 15.8% 
Order entry and part tracking  6 31.6% 
Assembly documentation  7 36.8% 
ERP, BOM, and MRP admin 5 26.3% 
CAD and PDM  4 21.1% 
End of life considerations  1 5.3% 
Other assembly 1 5.3% 
(IndustryWeek 2007) 
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The MIT IMVP assemblability study 
The most interesting survey from an automotive industry perspective is one car-
ried out by the International Motor Vehicle Program (Womack et al. 1990: 96–
97). The survey was carried out by questionnaires sent to 19 major auto assem-
bling companies. The firms were asked to rank their competitors “according to 
how good you think each company is at designing products that are easy for an 
assembly plant to build”. It is widely known that car producing companies regu-
larly buy cars form their competitors, disassemble them and study their build, 
their functionality and their innovations. Therefore it is only logical to presume 
that the other car companies should know what companies are the best at produc-
ing manufacturable cars (in essence Design for Assembly).   
Eight companies answered the survey and the findings are presented in Table 5: 
Table 5. IMPV manufacturability survey results.  
Producer Average rank Range of rankings 
Toyota 2,2 1–3 
Honda 3,9 1–8 
Mazda 4,8 3–6 
Fiat 5,3 2–11 
Nissan 5,4 4–7 
Ford 5,6 2–8 
Volkswagen 6,4 3–9 
Mitsubishi 6,6 2–10 
Suzuki 8,7 5–11 
General Motors 10,2 7–13 
Hyundai 11,3 9–13 
Renault 12,7 10–15 
Chrysler 13,5 9–17 
BMW 13,9 12–17 
Volvo 13,9 10–17 
PSA 14,0 11–16 
Saab 16,4 13–18 
Daimler–Benz 16,6 14–18 
Jaguar 18,6 17–19 
We can see that the Asian (Japanese) producers rank highly on this list – probably 
because of their prowess in Lean production/design. The highest ranking Ameri-
can company is Ford (at fifth place), beaten surprisingly enough by Fiat, ranking 
fourth on the list.  
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In connection with this survey, Womack et al. (1990:96) also presented GM’s 
productivity comparison between two American assembly plants: GM’s Fairfax 
plant (producing the Pontiac Grand Prix) and Ford’s Atlanta plant (producing 
Taurus and Mercury Sable). The comparison was done by disassembling both 
kinds  of  cars  and  assembling  them with  the  aid  of  the  manufacturer’s  assembly  
manuals.  The conclusion of the comparison was that the Ford plant was signifi-
cantly more productive, and that the design of the Taurus accounted for 41% of 
this productivity gaps. The Taurus used fewer parts, and the pieces fit together 
more easily. The other causes for the difference were set as: Factory practices 
(48%), Sourcing (9%) and Processing (2%). This indicates that a careful design 
can have significant impact on the production’s costs and throughput. 
Reasons why DFA may not be used 
Boothroyd et al. (2002: 16–21) have identified several reasons why DFA is not 
more commonly used in general:  
No time. The designers may feel that they have no time to put on simplifying de-
sign, when it works already. 
Resistance from the designers. The DFA initiative often comes from the outside, 
and a designer may take this as direct critique of his or her work. The designers 
are crucial to the effort since they are in a unique position to build DFA into the 
product from the beginning.  
Low assembly cost. If the assembly costs are already marginal to the material and 
manufacturing costs of the product, there may be no reason to run the DFA pro-
cess.  
Low volume. When products are produced in small rounds, a DFA process will 
not form any economy of scale benefits, even if it is successful. There is a possi-
bility of increased quality because of clearer parts orientation and so on, but the 
benefits are less prominent.  
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3 THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY AND DFA  
In this section we will  go though the recent situation of the automotive industry 
and the events that led up to the current day; we’ll look at the automotive assem-
bly process and its usage of robotic and human labor; and finally look at why 
DFA is relevant to the automotive industry – why DFA can have an impact on the 
future business situation of the established car companies.  
3.1 A short background on the automobile industry 
 and its situation today. 
This section is split into three parts – early automotive history, the situation up 
until the automotive crisis of 2008–2009 and the situation afterwards. There have 
been many crises in the automotive industry over the last sixty years, but this lat-
est one is especially important to the subject of this work. This crisis exposed the 
structural weaknesses of the old automotive companies and allowed the new au-
tomakers of especially China to raise their heads and see the possibility of direct 
competition. As we will see later on in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, it was during this 
time period that China passed Europe as the largest automobile producing region 
in the world. Furthermore, during the crisis the Chinese automakers were able to 
turn the tables on everyone and start making acquisitions among the struggling 
Western car companies and suppliers (e.g. Volvo).  
3.1.1 Early history  
Mass production 
The automotive society as we know it today started in the United States, with 
Henry  Ford  and  his  principles  of  assembly  line  production.  The  Model  T  Ford  
was in fact a revolution in manufacturability and assimilability. According to 
Womack et al. (1990: 27), the greatest, most revolutionizing concept that Ford 
came up with was not necessarily the moving assembly line or the specialization 
of labor, but rather the interchangeability of components, to a level that assembly 
line assembly work could become possible. The first cars (Daimler, Benz, etc) 
were all more or less unique, handcrafted, and could not as such be assembled by 
just anyone (Ford Motor Company 2010).   
According to Hounshell (1984) Ford perfected his new production technique in 
steps. First by having all necessary components delivered to an assembly station 
before they were needed, later by making the assemblers perform only a single 
 Acta Wasaensia     43 
  
task on the product. And finally, the culmination of the mass production system, a 
moving assembly line that meant that workers no longer had to waste time by 
walking between their assemblies – the assemblies came to them.  
The Model T Ford came in nine body styles (two-seat roadster, four-seat touring 
car, four seat covered sedan, two seat-truck, etc) but they were all based on the 
same chassis and the same mechanical parts. At the peak year of Model T produc-
tion (1923), Ford produced over two million Model T chassis, a figure that was in 
fact the high-water mark for standardized mass production (Womack et al. 
1990:37) 
The T-Ford based its popularity on low prices, not especially much on high level 
of quality or on a wide range of selection. Towards the end of the T-Ford’s pro-
duction life span (1908–1927) (Ford Motor Company 2010) the competition from 
other companies finally broke its monopoly simply by offering more modern and 
interesting cars, at prices not much higher than the Ford’s.  
According to Hounshell (1984) the beginning of today’s selection-of-choice auto 
industry started in General Motors. This company was the first automotive com-
pany to establish a wide selection of car brands and models to allow the customer 
freedom of choice in his or her purchase. With the introduction of GM’s five 
brand product range (from Chevrolet at the cheapest end to Cadillac at the most 
expensive), GM was able to create a stairway of progression for its customer, and 
make the car into a symbol of status.   
In Europe, the craft manufacturing tradition was not given up easily – Henry Ford 
experienced considerable resistance when trying to implement his mass-
production system in Great Britain (Womack et al. 1990: 24–25). After the two 
World Wars, however, much of the old society had been swept away forcedly by 
the ravages of war. The resistance to mass-production was at an end, and the eco-
nomic upswing of Europe during the post-war era can probably be ascribed to a 
full embrace of these new methods of production (not only in the automobile in-
dustry, of course (Womack et al. 1990: 24–25).  
As Womack et al. (1990:43) continues, the American car industry had its golden 
days in the 1950’s, with booming post-war economies, especially marvelous and 
impressive car models and a strong mass production technique. The Big Three  
(GM, Ford and Chrysler) accounted for the absolute majority of cars produced in 
the world. Already in 1955, however, the European manufacturers were begin-
ning to make serious instep into the competition. André Citröen, Louis Renault, 
Fiat’s  Giovanni  Agnelli,  Herbert  Austin  and  William  Morris  among  others  had  
visited Ford’s plants and learned the new concepts of mass production – only the 
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war effort hindered them from translating their automotive knowhow to the new 
system. The total output of the European auto industry would grow considerably 
during the 1960’s and 70’s, rivaling that of the United States. 
The Europeans specialized in smaller, compact economy cars, and sportier fun-to-
drive  cars,  that  broke  off  from  the  old  model.  A  new  kind  of  sporty  luxury  car  
won instep on the old luxury sedans. Many new mechanical innovations such as 
the front-wheel drive car, disc brakes, fuel injection and unitized bodies (no sepa-
rate frame) were invented in Europe in the 1960’s and 70’s. For a period of time 
between 1950 and 1970, the Europeans were the main competitors of the Ameri-
can car industry, both quite undisturbed by other entrants. 
Lean Production 
The late 1960’s showed the start of a new kind of revolution in the automotive 
industry: the Lean production methods. According to Holweg (2007), Eiji Toyoda 
(member of the founding family of Toyota) visited a Ford plant in the 1930s, to 
learn about the mass production methods of the automotive industry. However, he 
concluded that there would be problems implementing such a system in Japan. 
Firstly, the domestic market was small and demand was split in many ways. Sec-
ondly, the native work force was too proud to work well in a mass production 
system. And thirdly,  Japan was poor and starved for capital  after the war,  so no 
large production machineries could be bought. In addition to this, the outside 
world was actively looking to enter the Japanese market, to fill it with their own 
automotive products. Womack et al. (1990: 49–50).  
So the response of Eiji and his now legendary chief engineer Taiichi Ohno was to 
change  the  production  system to  fit  the  circumstances.  They  wanted  to  work  in  
smaller batches and produce many different models to satisfy the varied demand 
(Ohno 1988). However, the first and biggest problem they ran into was the usage 
of dies for stamping out the forms of the car’s steel components. These dies took 
a very long time to change in the machines, and thus it was more economical to 
run long production series in between changes. But Ohno set to eliminating this 
problem by mechanizing and effectivizing the changeover process, and could, by 
the late 1950’s change dies in three minutes. (Toyota 2010.) 
The most interesting thing about this achievement was the discovery that produc-
tion in small batches, now made possible, was actually more profitable than large-
batch production (Shingo 1984). The large inventories of components and partly 
finished goods that the long production series required could be eliminated, and 
mistakes in the production machinery, process, components, etc. could be spotted 
almost instantly, and thus with less wastage.  
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The benefits of these findings were multiplied by many other new and revolution-
izing practices. As a result of a strengthening of the worker’s unions after the war, 
the  workers  of  Toyota  had  moved  on  to  life-long  employment  with  the  same  
company. However, the workers were in return expected to be flexible in their 
work functions and more importantly, use their own initiative in offering im-
provements to the production processes (Ohno 1988) The famous concept of Kai-
zen (approximately “continuous improvement” in Japanese) was born. Kaizen 
means, among other things, the use of quality circles to let the workers share their 
ideas for quality improvement and waste avoidance, to engage all workers in of-
fering up ideas for improving the company’s processes, and to use a tangible part 
of one’s work time to implement these improvements (Monden 1983).  
Since  Ohno  reasoned  that  the  cost  of  errors  will  multiply  the  longer  down  the  
production line they go, the most cost effective thing would be to avoid all pro-
duction error from the beginning (by improving the processes) or at least spotting 
errors whenever they occur (Ohno 1988). The workers were given possibility and 
responsibility to halt the production assembly line whenever quality problems or 
machinery errors were noticed (the Andon-system).  
Continuing this line of thinking, it was only logical that also the component sup-
pliers would become involved in this hunt for errors and waste. Toyota grew 
stronger ties to their suppliers and started educating them in the practices taught 
inside the company. The suppliers were given considerable leeway in suggesting 
changes and improvements in the design of their components. A certain degree of 
cross-equity-ownership made the ties stronger still.  (Womack et al. 1990) 
But the final step in building what would later become known to the rest of the 
world as the Toyota Production System was something that completely changed 
the entire structure of the production flow. According to Shingo (1984), the con-
cepts of "pull-manufacturing" and "Just-In-Time production" were implemented 
to co-ordinate the flow of goods down the supply chain.  The idea of pull  manu-
facturing dictated that the ultimate expression of small batch production is not to 
produce anything until an impulse is give from the end of the supply chain, when 
a customer buys a product. Then the production is started, with the impulse work-
ing its way up the chain of production, and each work station kicking into life 
when the work station beneath it requires replenishment. Inventory of half-
finished assemblies between the work stations are minimized. The now famous 
Kanban-system is simply a system of cards used to make this flow of production 
impulses work in the most simple and visual way.  
If expanding this concept to encompass the entire supply chain, including suppli-
ers, you get the Just-In-Time system, where the entire supply chain is supposed to 
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work as one big machine, in sync with each other and in sync with the Takt-time, 
that sets the pace of production. The result – a production system that produces a 
wide variety of products, at an unmatched level of quality and at prices lower than 
the old mass-production system.  
The Japanese production miracle 
By the end of the 1960’s the world market’s tastes had begun to shift. There was a 
growing demand for variety in car models: cars were by now a fixed part of the 
working life for almost everyone in the Western world and the increasing stand-
ards of income had started making it possible for households to buy two cars. 
Furthermore, with the growing complexity of the cars mechanical systems, relia-
bility was becoming a much more important issue. In this climate, the Toyota 
Production System was set to shine.  
When finally the two oil crises struck in 1973 and 1979, the cheap, energy-
efficient Japanese cars won over all obstacles and formally flooded into the Unit-
ed States, where the effect of the rising petrol prices was felt the most. The CAFE 
(Corporate Average Fuel Economy) consumption standards were imposed by the 
American government to ensure that the American car fleet would no longer be as 
dependent on foreign important oil (Gerald & Lave 2005). This meant a large 
redesign of American car models, from predominantly rear wheel drive large fuel 
hungry versions to relatively more energy-efficient smaller front-wheel-drive ver-
sions. The Japanese cars already fit in the profile without redesign, however.  
In  all  honesty,  the  Americans  who  cried  ‘invasion’  during  this  time,  did  have  
some truth to their claims: the wage levels were lower in Japan at the time and 
large car export was encouraged by the government of Japan through tax breaks 
and low interest rates.  But even with these factors discounted, the price/quality 
ratio of the Japanese cars spoke volumes about the strength of their production 
methods (Holweg 2007). 
According to Womack et al. (1990:260), the South Korea example later showed 
that cheap wages could not outweigh the quality aspects of the Japanese produc-
tion system. The Hyundai Excel was broadly speaking a copy of the Mitsubishi 
Colt, built on license from Mitsubishi. As the Japanese Yen was starting to get 
more expensive in the middle of the 1980’s, Hyundai saw their chance to grab 
market share in the United States, in the low-price segment. This worked very 
well, but as soon as the Korean currency started appreciating a few years later, the 
cost advantage was no longer there. Hyundai used more hours to build a car than 
their Japanese counterparts, and their defects rate was up to six times higher. 
 Acta Wasaensia     47 
  
In Figure 3, we can see the world's vehicle production, and its development over 
time (U.S. Department of Energy 2008; Ward's Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures 
2009). In Table 6 we see the same development in numbers for greater clarity. 
The annual production of motor vehicles has been rising constantly since the 
1950s but the figure shows percentage shares – the maximum is always on hun-
dred percent.  
The early history is laid out clearly according to what we have just gone through 
– in the beginning North America dominates the world market almost completely. 
Then the European producers pick up the competition and keep the shares of pro-
duction relatively stable over a period of growth in the late fifties and early six-
ties. The Japanese car makers start making an entry to the market at this point, 
and quickly grow to become the third major automobile producing region.  
Again  we  have  a  period  of  relative  stability  and  growth  before  the  oil  crises  of  
1973 and 1979 strike. The European and Japanese producers are not hit equally 
hard because of their already more fuel-efficient cars – it is the American au-
tomakers that suffer the worst effects. During the 80s and early 90s, we see a 
quite stable situation where North America's, Europe's and Japan's vehicle pro-
duction grow, and grow together. Lean production methods are to some degree 
adopted over the board. The growth of South Korea's vehicle production is incor-
porated in the increase of "Other" towards the late 80s, early 90s.  
The next two chapters will describe the situation during the last 10 years only – 
but 10 years that have seen enough change to last for several decades. As the fig-
ure indicates, the serious rise of production in many other countries, and the ex-
ponential vehicle production growth of China dominate the picture at the moment. 
The automotive crisis of 2008–2009 introduced further structural changes into an 
already dynamically changing situation. 
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(Ward's Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures 2009) 
Figure 3.  World motor vehicle production, relative shares, 1950–2009.  
Table 6. World motor vehicle production, thousands, 1950–2009.  
Year USA + 
Canada 
Western 
Europe 
Japan China Other World 
Total 
1950 840 199 3 0 16 1 058 
1955 965 374 7 0 16 1 363 
1960 831 684 48 0 87 1 649 
1965 1199 958 188 0 83 2 427 
1970 944 1 305 529 0 164 2 942 
1975 338 1 358 694 0 221 3 311 
1980 933 1 550 1 104 14 255 3 857 
1985 1358 1 611 1 227 44 250 4 491 
1990 1171 1 887 1 349 51 399 4 856 
1995 1440 1 705 1 020 143 691 4 998 
2000 1573 1 675 1 015 207 1 273 5 743 
2005 1464 1 681 1 078 567 1 788 6 577 
2009 720 1 230 794 1 365 1 901 6 009 
World Vehicle Production (Thousands)    
 (Ward's Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures 2009) 
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3.1.2 Situation before the 2008–2009 automotive industry crisis 
 
 (OICA 2005) 
Figure 4.  Motor vehicle production per country, 2005–2006 (units).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -  4 000 000  8 000 000  12 000 000
 United States
 Japan
 Germany
 PR China
 South Korea
 France
 Spain
 Canada
 Brazil
 United Kingdom
 Mexico
 India
 Russia
 Thailand
 Italy
 Belgium
 Turkey
 Iran
 Poland
 Czech Rep.
50      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 (OICA 2005) 
Figure 5.  Passenger vehicle production per company/group, 2006 (units).  
As we can see, in 2005, the biggest single motor vehicle producer is still the Unit-
ed States with almost 12 million vehicles produced annually. Japan is close with 
almost 11 million. However, at this point in time Europe is the largest production 
region, with manufacturing in Germany, France, the UK, Spain, Italy, Poland, 
Sweden, Slovakia, Portugal, the Czech Republic, etc. The People's Republic of 
China is the fourth largest producer, but with a double-digit growth rate, some-
thing which will soon bring it to the top. India, Brazil and Mexico are nowhere 
near China in automotive significance. 
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At this point in time, GM is still the largest of automotive producer in the world 
with almost 9,000,000 passenger vehicles produced. Toyota, on second place, will 
finally win over GM in 2008 and become the new number one. The big estab-
lished Western car companies are still unrivaled champions, with India's Tata 
coming in only on 21st place, and China's Chana on 23rd. However, over 15 of 
the 50 top companies are Chinese – this reflects the strong growth potential Chi-
nese automakers. 
 
USA 
 
 (Maxton & Wormald 2004:122 
Figure 6.  North American volume car market, market shares 2002.  
In Figure 6, we can see a breakdown of the North American volume car market – 
volume car in this case means common passenger car models (mostly sedans, but 
also hatchbacks, wagons, etc.). The brands of the American Big Three cover al-
most 60% of the market, but we can also see that Asian brands have established a 
significant level of presence. The European automakers are not strongly present in 
the  volume  car  segment  (mostly  Volkswagen  models)  but  would  show  a  much  
stronger performance if we were to look specifically at the high end car segments 
(sports cars and luxury vehicles). 
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The US automotive industry is not a significant source of exports – mainly be-
cause of its large local industrial presence in other countries. GM and Ford have 
an extensive plant production in Europe, but work mainly by joint ventures in 
Asia.  At 2005, the American automobile manufacturing industry represented 
about 5% of the US GDP (BERA 2005).  
The American Big Three have had a long standing history of strong sedan brands, 
but despite this many sedan models were discontinued or dropped in status to 
fleet sales in the decade leading up to 2005(Autoblog 2006). The focus of GM, 
Ford and Chrysler (DaimlerChrysler 1998–2007) shifted away from the volume 
model (midsize and compact cars) to focus on light trucks and especially Sports 
Utility Vehicles (SUVs).  
In the late 1990s, when SUV sales were at their highest, more than half of the Big 
Three's profits came from light trucks and SUVs. Their volume car models on the 
other hand, would often not break even, cost-wise. The compact cars were kept on 
only to bring customers to the brand, and later keep customers that climbed the 
income ladder tied in with the brand. According to the estimates of automotive 
industry researchers, the big three North American automaker needed to sell ten 
compact cars to make the same profit as one big vehicle. (CarAndDriver 2008). 
However, the sales of SUVs peaked in 1999 and have not returned to that level 
ever since (Maxton & Wormald 2004:15). The rising oil prices from 2003 for-
ward led to a strangulation of the market in fuel hungry light trucks and SUVs. 
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Europe 
 
 (Maxton & Wormald 2004:123) 
Figure 7.  European volume car market, market shares 2002.  
In Figure 7 (Maxton & Wormald 2004:123), we see the division of the European 
volume car market. Also this region is dominated by "local" brands: almost 60% 
of the volume car market is covered by European car companies. The dominance 
is divided among more companies,  though.  The 0,3% North American segment 
stands for imports from America – quite unusual since both Ford and GM have a 
strong transplant factory presence in Europe. Chrysler on the other hand has not 
managed to make a significant instep in the European market. Similarly, the 
Asian brands have not reached a very strong presence in Europe – the European 
Union's common (strict) external import rules have hindered the inflow of im-
ported cars somewhat. 
Before the automotive crisis of 2008–2009, the EU was still the world’s largest 
automotive manufacturing region, and the world’s largest automotive consump-
tion market. The European automotive industry stands for nearly 9% of the EU 
manufacturing sector. The largest producer is Germany, with about 30% of the 
EU’s total production. France comes second with 19%, followed by Spain (17%), 
and the UK (10%).  
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According to the US International trade commission (2002:51), the large interest 
in light trucks seen in the US is not present in Europe – light trucks represented 
just 11% of new vehicle registrations in Europe 2001, as opposed to over 50% in 
North America. The reasons include higher fuel prices, population density, con-
stricted urban areas and narrower streets. High fuel prices meant a boost to the 
fuel-efficient diesel technology – in 2001 43% of newly registered vehicles were 
diesel powered.  
According to the US International trade commission (2002:53), the decade lead-
ing up to 2002 included a significant restructuring and consolidation of automak-
ers in Europe (but also globally). The merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler 
(1998–2007), GM's acquisition of Saab, Ford's acquisition of Jaguar, Land Rover 
and Volvo's passenger car division and Volkswagen's acquisition of SEAT, 
Skoda,  Bentley  and  Lamborghini  –  these  are  just  a  few  examples  of  the  lively  
acquisitions race. This development was facilitated by the European Commis-
sion's decision to open up the internal EU car market, making it easier to buy cars 
from  other  EU  countries,  to  established  dealerships  anywhere  in  the  EU  and  to  
broaden options for vehicle repair. 
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 (Maxton & Wormald 2004:124) 
Figure 8.  Asian volume car market, marketshares 2002.  
The Asian volume car market is unique in its level of domestic dominance – over 
90% Asian brands (Maxton & Wormald 2004: 124). European cars account for 
only 8% and North American exports for as little as 1%. Admittedly, the situation 
looks more moderate if you consider stock interests – Ford has controlling interest 
in Mazda, GM has equity in Subaru and Suzuki, Renault has a controlling interest 
in Nissan, etc. Be this how it may, the Asian countries have managed to avoid 
both direct imports and transplants to a surprising degree. 
Japan 
According to the US International trade commission (2002:58) the Japanese have 
a longer history of automotive production than South Korea and China, but the 
Japanese national car market has of course long since matured. The automotive 
industry is extremely important to Japan – the combined motor vehicle industries 
account for over 13% of the countries manufacturing output and 10% of country's 
jobs. In 2001, Japan exported up to 44% of the vehicles produced (about 8 million 
passenger cars). The United States is the most important export market, receiving 
about 35% of this outflow. Their success is based on quality: US market quality 
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studies put Japanese brands in the lead of 12 out of 14 categories of passenger 
cars and light trucks.  
On the  other  hand,  imports  only  account  for  5% of  vehicle  sales  in  Japan,  with  
German cars making up the majority of these imports (BERA 2005). According 
to the US International trade commission (2002:57), Japanese consumers pur-
chase new, domestic vehicles instead of imports or used cars, something which 
creates a large supply of secondhand vehicles. Japanese used cars are popular 
throughout Asia.  
The Asian financial crisis during the late 1990’s dampened the demand and pro-
duction of cars in Asia. According to BERA (2005) the problematic domestic 
market were beginning to lead to problems for some of the Japanese automakers, 
and before the 2008-2009 crisis their American and European competitors were 
allowed equity ownership in some Japanese companies in return for financial in-
fusions, etc. 
South Korea 
Several of the Korean passenger car producers were also shaken by the Asian 
financial crisis towards the end of the 90s (US International trade commission 
2002:60).  A wave of consolidation begun – Hyundai acquired Kia in 1999, Dae-
woo took a controlling interest in Ssangyong in 1998, a few years before GM 
bought a large interest in Daewoo itself (42% in 2002). Samsung Automotive was 
acquired by Renault in 2000.  
According to BERA (2005) South Korea exports more than a third of its vehicle 
production. This is probably an effect of the country’s long-standing conscious 
efforts to become a net car exporter: foreign auto imports were prohibited up until 
1987, and Japanese imports were not admitted until 1999. South Korea's greatest 
export market is the US (more than 30% of South Korean exports go there). Much 
in the same way as in Japan imports are negligible, accounting for about 0.7% of 
the passenger car market. 
China 
Already before the crisis, the Chinese auto makers were growing rapidly, and it 
was  envisioned  that  the  Chinese  would  soon  surpass  the  Japanese  as  the  as  the  
main automobile producing country of the region. (BERA 2005.) In absolute 
terms, the number of produced cars in China grew larger than that of Japan in 
2009 (OICA 2009).  
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The automobile industry in China is composed of over a 120 vehicle manufactur-
ers, and the industry employs about 2 million people (an impressive number in 
absolute terms, but only about 0,3% of the entire work force). However, the offi-
cial government policy is set to encourage the growth of the domestic automobile 
manufacturing industry. There are trade barriers in place for foreign competitors, 
and tariffs on foreign auto imports.  
The FAW (First Auto Works of China) group is China’s first large-scale auto 
manufacturer, and early on it tied agreements with for instance Volkswagen to 
produce their Jetta model and Audi sedans in China. The second and third largest 
automotive producers of China are Dong Feng Motor Corporation and Shanghai 
Motor Group, respectively. 
3.1.3 Situation during the 2008–2009 automotive crisis 
The 2008–2009 automotive crisis might actually be a misnomer – in fact the au-
tomotive industry crisis was only a smaller part of the overall global economic 
downturn triggered by the 2008 sub-prime mortgage crisis in USA and the con-
secutive failure of several international banks. Nevertheless, 2008–2009 saw se-
verely reduced profits and production for almost all automotive industry compa-
nies across the world and the partial bankruptcy of two of the American Big 
Three – Chrysler and GM. The consequences were many and far-reaching but the 
following section will briefly mention the most important happenings during the 
period.  
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Figure 9.  Motor vehicle production per country, 2005–2010 (units).  
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(OICA 2010) 
Figure 10.  Passenger vehicle production per company/group, 2009 (units).  
As we can see in Figure 9, big changes in the structure of the world’s automotive 
production occurred during the few years before, during and after the automotive 
crisis of 2008–2009. China is now the world's leading automotive producer with 
18 million vehicles produced annually – an increase of 220 % between 2006 and 
2010. China passed Japan in 2009, Japan having in turn passed USA earlier be-
cause of the economic crisis (ChinaAutoWeb 2011). Asia is now the largest au-
tomotive producing region in the world.  
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The automotive industries of the industrialized countries – but especially that of 
the United States – fared badly during the automotive crisis. The United States' 
production fell 35% between 2006 and 2010, France's with 37% and Japan's with 
almost 11%. Germany's production on the other hand stayed relatively static dur-
ing the crisis and even grew a bit. Similarly South Korea managed to defend its 
position and even grow with 15%. India is a large winner of the great restructur-
ing with a 116% growth between 2006 and 2010. 
There is a lot to be said about the ups and downs of the established automakers 
during 2006–2009 (Figures 5 and 10). The old Western car companies took a ma-
jor hit. Those worst affected were the American Big Three: GM's production de-
creased by 28%, Ford's decreased by 25% and Chrysler's – the company affected 
most of the three – decreased by no less than 62%. Toyota, which rose to surpass 
GM in 2009, did this mainly by not losing as much: only a 10% decrease in pro-
duction. Toyota fared better than its other Japanese colleagues though – Honda   
(–18%), Nissan (–15%), Mazda (–29%) and Mitsubishi (–39%) all fell even far-
ther. Volkswagen (+7%) and Fiat (+6%) did mildly well, and the other European 
automakers did not fall drastically. The only real winner of the old top-ten crowd 
turned out to be Hyundai-Kia, with an increase of 21% (adding Hyundai's and 
Kia's results from 2006).  
As we can also see, even that positive result is dwarfed by those achieved by the 
Chinese car companies. The biggest Chinese automaker Chana (Chang'an Auto-
mobile Co. Ltd.) is now ranked 13th in the world – a staggering increase of 173%. 
FAW (+104%),  Chery  (+66%) and  SAIC (+95%) all  do  very  well,  but  all  these  
pale next to the success of BYD (Build Your Dream) with a 611% growth in pro-
duction over four years. 
USA 
Bankruptcy and bailout 
In September of 2008 the first signs of impending trouble showed, with the Amer-
ican Big Three asking for a 50 billion dollar loan (about 35,7 billion euro) from 
the government to help support the car companies. Nominally the loans would 
help companies develop greener, more fuel-efficient models in response to con-
tinuous escalation of gas prices, but other issues such as the health care expenses 
carried by the companies were also included in the plea. The United States Con-
gress approved a 25 billion dollar loan (about 17,9 billion euro). (Minyanville 
2008). 
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However, in December of 2008 the car companies asked for additional loans, 
bringing the total up to 34 billion dollars (24,3 billion euro). Chrysler and GM 
needed immediate funds just to keep running – as a compensation the companies 
submitted new revised plans for cost reductions (lowering the executive's pay, 
reducing the number of brands, refinancing company debt, etc.). Ford had earlier 
secured some credit in the private market and was not under direct threat of de-
fault. (PBS Newshour). 
The government under President George W. Bush approved the bailout plan, 
which would give 17.4 billion dollars (about 12,4 billion euro) worth of loans to 
stave off the default of the two companies – 13,4 billion dollars immediately (GM 
9.4 billion dollars and Chrysler 4 billion dollars) and 4 billion dollars in February 
of 2009. This mainly because of the importance of the automotive industry to the 
economy of the USA. (New York Times 2008b).  
In February of 2009, General Motors and Chrysler declared that they would need 
even bigger loans still to avoid default in the future: a total of 21,6 billion dollars 
(about 15,4 billion euro), GM 16.6 billion dollars and Chrysler 5 billion dollars. 
In return GM would downsize 47000 jobs, close five plants, discontinue 12 car 
models  and  try  to  sell  Swedish  Saab.  Chrysler  would  downsize  3000  jobs  and  
discontinue three car models. (BBC News 2009i). The companies did not receive 
that amount but smaller sums were made available during April and May (Fox 
News 2009). 
In April and June of 2009, Chrysler and GM respectively filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy (BBC News 2009d; BBC News 2009b). Chapter 11 bankruptcy is also 
known as restructuring, when a corporation is allowed to renegotiate contracts, 
sell assets or daughter businesses, negotiate debts, etc. to see whether the corpora-
tion can survive in a reduced form.  
At the point of bankruptcy General Motors was almost a wholly publically owned 
company, with the American government owning 60% and the Canadian gov-
ernment 12.5%, with the remainder being owned mainly by employees (BBC 
News 2009d). A large share of Chrysler was sold to Italian Fiat (PRNewswire 
2009) and in June of 2011 Fiat bought an even larger stake in Chrysler bringing 
its ownership up to 52%. This made Chrysler a wholly owned subsidiary of Fiat 
(Bloomberg 2011).  Both GM and Chrysler discontinued several brands and ter-
minated agreements with many dealerships as a part of the bankruptcy agree-
ments. Ford Motor Company was able to survive without entering bankruptcy 
partly due to a large line of credit obtained in 2007. 
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Background and reasons for the crisis 
Several factors are said to have contributed to the automotive crisis situation of 
2008–2009. First of all, the American Big Three were negatively affected by the 
continuously rising oil prices in the period leading up to 2008 (MSNBC 2008). 
The American focus on fuel hungry SUVs and pickup trucks, made them espe-
cially sensitive to changes in oil prices and the subsequent customer refocus on 
more energy-efficient cars. Secondly, car sales in the USA were commonly fi-
nanced as a part of the home purchase loan, and when the American mortgage 
crisis struck, the availability of such credit declined drastically leading to falling 
sales on the American home market (SeattlePI 2007). These two factors were 
probably the most significant and immediate.  
Thirdly, North American automakers were dealing with higher total costs of labor 
than the foreign transplants (foreign car companies that have built plants in the 
United States) because of the long-standing benefits, healthcare, and pensions 
packages negotiated with the United Auto Workers union (CSNNews 2008; Na-
tional Post 2009). The transplants, having started production more recently in 
America, retain a younger workforce and have avoided many of these issues by 
default. The estimated labor cost differences range from 10–30 dollars per hour 
(LA Times 2008; New York Times 2008; Mclean's 2008), or about 350–500 dol-
lars per vehicle (CBC News 2009).  
Finally, the Big Three upkeep a wider selection of brands and a larger dealership 
network than its competitors. More brands mean a greater chance to capture the 
customer's fancy, but also entail higher costs in marketing and product develop-
ment and can lead to a situation where the company's brands cannibalize each 
other's customer base. According to Deutsche Bank in 2008, reducing GM's 
brands from eight to three would save 5 billion dollars annually (about 3,6 billion 
euro) (New York Times 2008). As part of its bankruptcy, GM was left with only 
four brands: Chevrolet, Cadillac, GMC and Buick (New York Times 2009). 
Argumentation for and against the bailouts 
The automotive industry is normally a very important industry to a country's em-
ployment  and  GDP.   According  to  the  Center  for  Automotive  Research  (CAR)  
(2008), allowing the American Big Three to fail completely would mean a loss of 
up to 240 000 jobs at the car companies themselves, and a further 980 000 jobs 
from the automotive suppliers and dealers, plus as much as 1,7 million additional 
jobs closely impacted by the loss of the original 1,2 million. In terms of personal 
income, this would mean a loss of 398 billion dollars (about 284,3 billion euro) 
over three years. The ensuing loss of tax revenue and increase in welfare spending 
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would amount to a total of 156 billion dollars (about 111,4 billion euro) over 
three years. 
According to other opinions, foreign car companies such as Honda and Toyota 
could have stepped in to compensate for the loss by opening up new plants if the 
competitive climate changed, dampening the negative effects to employment. The 
government's bailout plans could be seen as an attempt to throw good money after 
bad – the opinion that the effects of poor management decisions (unpopular mod-
els,  bad investments decisions,  failure to compete efficiently,  etc.)  should not be 
corrected by government spending (CNBC.com 2008). As of early June 2009, the 
governments under presidents Bush and Obama had invested close to 80 billion 
dollars (about 57,1 billion euro) in support GM and Chrysler (Fox News 2009) 
 
Asia 
Japan 
Toyota was affected negatively by the economic and automotive crisis of 2008–
2009, with sales in North America and Europe falling by 34% compared to previ-
ous years (CTV News 2008) and experiencing its first annual losses since 1938. 
The net profit 2008 was negative 1,7 billion dollars (about 1,2 billion euro), as 
compared to a profit of positive 28 billion dollars (about 20 billion euro) in 2007. 
The loss resulted from falling sales in mainly the North American market, but 
also in Toyota’s promising ‘future’ markets, India and China. (New York Times 
2008c).   
In the American markets, the sales of big pickup trucks and S.U.V.’s fell strongly, 
and Toyota’s large investments in such production became difficult to carry dur-
ing the economic downturn. Toyota responded by cutting production in its Amer-
ican truck plants.  To further worsen the situation, the growing demand on more 
fuel efficient cars could not be met in the short run. Toyota was not able to pro-
duce enough of the Prius, Corolla and Yaris models fast enough to compensate 
their loss. (New York Times 2008a).   
During 2009 and 2010, Toyota was further struck by another problem – the dis-
covery that their vehicles could experience unintended acceleration. In some cases 
this was due to floor mats trapping the accelerator pedal and in other cases due to 
a mechanical sticking of the accelerator pedal. (Toyota USA Newsroom 2011). 
Toyota eventually issued a recall of 5.2 million vehicles over the floor mat prob-
lem, and 2.3 million vehicles over accelerator pedal problem. The problems oc-
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curred on many of Toyota's models, including the Corolla, Matrix, Camry, Ava-
lon and several other.  (BBC 2010). 
Honda too experienced a drop in sales of 31,6 percent between 2007 and 2008 –
from 8.1 billion dollars (about 5,8 billion euro) to 2.5 billion dollars (about 1,8 
billion euro) (CBC News 2008). Nissan reduced their vehicle production by al-
most 80 000 vehicles, and temporarily laid off workers (ABC News). Suzuki cut 
production by about 30 000 vehicles (Bloomberg 2008c).  
South Korea 
The South Korean car manufacturer Hyundai-Kia was able to withstand the crisis 
relatively well. Their line-up of small and energy-efficient cars, such as the Kia 
Picanto, Cee’d and i30 sold well, even in the worsening American market. Fur-
thermore, the Korean currency (the Won) stood low against the dollar and yen, 
further improving the export possibilities of Hyundai. (Bloomberg 2008a) During 
2008, Hyndai managed to bypass Honda as the world’s fifth largest car producer 
(Autoblog.com 2008), and in 2009 it passed Ford Motor as the world's fourth 
largest car producer (sgCarMart.com 2009).  
But the South Korean car companies could not entirely avoid certain negative 
effects of the global recession. Because of lower market demand, Hyundai Motor 
Company started reducing production at its plants in the U.S., China, India, Tur-
key and Slovakia from 2008 forward. Hyundai-Kia furthermore announced a 
freeze of wages for office workers and reduced factory operations to an average 
of four hours per day. (Bloomberg  2008a). SsangYong Motor, (owned by Chi-
nese SAIC – Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation) was hit strongly be-
cause of its heavy focus on SUVs (sales down by 63 percent). In 2008, SAIC 
fought the SsangYong workers' union into accepting its restructuring plan, threat-
ening to withdraw the parent company's support (Korea Times 2008).  
The South Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy stated clearly that there 
would be no bailout programs from the government's side for South Korea's five 
automakers – Hyundai, Kia, Ssangyong, Samsung Renault and GM Daewoo (Ko-
rea Times 2008).  
China 
The  effects  of  the  global  economic  crisis  on  the  automotive  industry  of  China  
were noticeable, but nevertheless of little consequence – China's was one of the 
best performing automotive industries during the crisis.  
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In 2008, the Chinese market experienced a slow-down of the rate of growth of car 
sales to a single-digit number, for the first time in ten years. This lead to the Chi-
nese central government implementing steps to stimulate the industry. One signif-
icant stimulus policy halved the vehicle purchase tax on cars with engines below 
1,6 liters, targeting the companies that provide lower-price cars for large consum-
er groups (i.e. Chery and Geely), and led to companies focusing on larger models 
(e.g. Great Wall, China's largest independent producer of SUVs) diversifying into 
the smaller car segment. (Reuters 2009). 
China's exports were probably affected most strongly – the majority of cars manu-
factured in China are sold within China, with only about 370 000 cars being ex-
ported in 2009 – this out of a production of 13,8 million vehicles (China Daily 
2010; ChinaAutoWeb 2011) However, the 370 000 cars sold represented a drop 
of 46% compared with 2008 (China Daily 2010).  
China took the opportunity to look for interesting investment opportunities when 
the prices of overseas automotive companies and suppliers trended downwards. 
Geely, China's biggest private automaker put in the winning bid for Swedish car 
company Volvo when it was sold off by Ford (BBC News 2010d). Furthermore 
Geely also bought certain parts of the bankrupt Australian gearbox maker 
Drivetrain Systems International – known as the world's second largest producer 
of automatic gearboxes (MoneyMorning 2009). 
Similarly, Chinese BAIC (Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Co Ltd) joined 
Koenigsegg Group in a bid on GM's Saab division (MoneyMorning 2009). Si-
chuan Tengzhong Heavy Industrial Machinery Company Ltd. made a bid for 
GM's Hummer brand (New York Times 2009).  Even though both of these deals 
later fell through, this marked a significant change in the dynamic between China 
and the Western automotive manufacturers. 
India  
The State Bank of India chose to lower interest rates on loans for new cars, in an 
effort to stimulate the consumption level in general and the important auto indus-
try in particular (ET Bureau 2009). Indian car manufacturer Tata launched its ul-
tra-cheap car Nano (100 000 rupees, 2000 dollars) to great interest of the public 
(not only in India) in the economically troubled times. The launch in 2009 (APF 
2009), served to stave off Tata from the worst effects of the global crisis, giving 
them the possibility to return to positive profits during 2010 (Reuters 2010). 
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Europe 
In Europe, the economic crisis had a strong negative impact on car sales, and the 
car industry was deemed in need of bailout, much in the same way as in North 
America. However, while there was an initial move to form a common EU bailout 
package, this was not realized; the individual car producing countries decided on 
their own plans to support their car industries.  
Germany 
Germany, the EU's largest car producer felt several negative effects of the auto-
motive crisis. Daimler announced it would cut 3500 jobs at their North American 
plants  and  halt  production  at  its  largest  German  plant.  BMW  closed  a  plant  in  
Germany, and Opel two. Volkswagen AG applied for loan guarantees through the 
German government's bank bailout program. (Speigel Online 2008). 
In response to USA's bailout package to its own industry, the German Association 
of the Automobile Industry pleaded for state aid to the German auto manufactur-
ers, citing competitive edge as the main reason. They also debated for a joint Eu-
ropean Union package of 20–40 billion euro in low-interest loans to European 
auto manufacturers, especially earmarked for the development of environmentally 
friendly vehicles. (Speigel Online 2008).  
However, the German government refused to issue a bailout plan for the German 
car companies just because of international pressure (The Telgraph 2008). How-
ever, The German government did set up an old-cars-scrapped program valued at 
1,5 billion euro (about 2,1 billion dollars) where owners of 9-year-old or older 
vehicles who scrapped their cars would receive 2500 euro (about 3500 USD) 
when buying a new one. The target of 60 000 participants in the program was met 
already during 2009. (People's Daily online 2009). 
France 
France budgeted 7,8 billion euro to invest in the national car industry, setting a 
condition that any automaker receiving support must strive first and foremost to 
keep their production plants in France running (People's Daily online 2009). 
Peugeot Citroën received such a loan for 3,9 billion euro in February of 2009, and 
also announced cutting 2700 jobs worldwide in 2008 and 11 000 jobs during 
2009. However, because of the conditions of the bailout loan, the production per-
sonnel in France was largely unaffected by these cutbacks.  
Renault experienced a 78% fall in profits during 2008, but nevertheless managed 
to get a (barely) positive net result for the year (BBC News 2009h). 
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Italy 
Italy’s Fiat felt the economic effects of the economic crisis through falling profits 
and sales (25% fall in sales of Fiat, Lancia and Alfa Romeo cars in 2008) (BBC 
News 2009c), but nevertheless announced in January of 2009 that it would be 
buying 35% of Chrysler.  The deal was a sort  of swap: in exchange for the 35% 
equity stake and access to Chrysler’s dealership network, Chrysler would gain the 
use of Fiat’s environmental and fuel efficiency technology.  
Chrysler simultaneously received a 4 billion dollar emergency loan from the US 
government, and committed to producing nine Fiat-derived cars over a four year 
period – four of these models hybrids or electric vehicles. (Edmunds.com 2009) 
Fiat made this move because they have had a hard time creating substantial sales 
in the US, while Chrysler similarly has never had a strong presence in Europe. 
(BBC News 2009b).  
The United Kingdom 
The UK budgeted 3,8 billion dollars (about 2,7 billion euro) to industry support: 
half for straight guarantee loans to the auto industry, half for investment in the 
production of greener cars (People's Daily online 2009). One of the biggest hits to 
the  British  auto  industry  in  terms  of  employments  was  Nissan  UK's  announce-
ment that they would cut down 1200 jobs (out of 4900) at their factory in North 
East England as of 2009 (BBC News 2009e).  
British Jaguar Land Rover, bought by Indian Tata Motors in early 2008 from the 
Ford Motor Corporation, negotiated with the British government for loans to keep 
Jaguar Land Rover running, but due to the hard conditions set for such loans, Tata 
chose to seek private sector loans instead (289 million dollars or about 206 mil-
lion euro) (autoblog.com 2009). However, Jaguar Land Rover received a 550 bil-
lion dollar loan from the European Investment Bank in 2010 to develop more en-
ergy efficient car bodies and hybrid drive trains (EIB 2010). Tata managed to turn 
profit on both companies for the last part of 2009 (BBC News 2010b).  
Sweden 
In Sweden, the Swedish government supported Volvo and Saab with credit guar-
antees and rescue loans amounting to 3,5 billion dollars (about 2,5 billion euro) in 
2008 (BBC News 2008). However, the since GM and Ford (the owners of Saab 
and Volvo respectively) were facing economical difficulties of their own, the two 
Swedish companies were put up for sale in 2010. Volvo was sold to Chinese 
Geely Automobile for a price of 1,8 billion dollars (about 1,3 billion euros) (BBC 
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News 2010d). Saab was bought by Dutch producer of luxury sports cars, Spyker, 
for 74 million dollars (about 53 million euro), and an additional 400 million euro 
loan (about 560 million dollars) from the European Investment Bank (BBC News 
2010c).  
Russia  
Russia's automotive industry was hit especially hard by the economic downturn. 
The passenger car production numbers fell steeply from 1470 000 units in 2008 to 
597 000 units in 2009 (Federal statistics agency). The government stepped in with 
a 5 billion dollar (about 3,58 billion euro) economic support plan: car company 
bailouts of 2 billion dollar and subsidies to buyers of Russian cars worth 3 billion 
dollars (Financial Times 2008). The government decided to support Russia's larg-
est car company Autovaz (maker of Lada and Niva brands) with a 600 million 
dollar loan (about 430 million euro) (BBC News 2009g).  
In further measures to strengthen the domestic production of cars, the tariffs on 
imported cars were increased to a 50% minimum (RIA Novosti 2009) and a gov-
ernmentally financed old-cars-scrapped program implemented. (RBTH 2010). 
The increased tariffs lead to protests in some cities, especially Vladivostok (on 
the eastern sea border of Russia). Vladivostok has a long standing tradition of 
importing second-hand Japanese cars rather than using the Russian models – the 
quality difference is seen as substantial (RIA Novosti 2009) However, in general, 
the stimulus package was effective and Avtovaz'  sales doubled in the 2010, re-
turning the company to profit (BBC News 2010a). 
 
Summary 
In general, we can see that the status quo of the established car producing coun-
tries is being challenged once again – much in the same way that that happened 
when the European and Japanese firms challenged American's dominance in ear-
lier years. These waves of change left the old leading companies diminished, but 
they were nevertheless able to sustain themselves on the continuous growth of the 
automotive markets. However, the automotive markets of the established car pro-
ducing countries are long since mature. Any further expansion will unavoidably 
happen by cannibalizing the market shares of other companies. The economic 
crisis might well prove to be a catalyst to this change – a chance for the Chinese 
and Indian car companies to start growing beyond their home markets as worsen-
ing economic conditions bring consumers towards more low-price products.  
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3.2 The Automotive Assembly Process Explained 
In this section we look at the automotive assembly process, to get a better idea of 
what impact redesigned products could have on assembly in the automotive in-
dustry. Furthermore, we will see more closely what sections of a vehicle are done 
by robotic assembly and what sections use human workers. Before this we briefly 
go through the recent history of robotic assembly, especially in the connection 
with car production. For further reading on the automotive assembly process, to-
gether with detailed examples of the assembly of actual components (doors, alter-
nators) see for instance Whitney (2004). 
A Short History of Robotic assembly in the automotive industry 
The first industrial robot (Unimate) was created in 1954 and in 1961, General 
Motors purchased and installed its first Unimate-robots for die casting handling 
and spot welding. (Devol 1961.) In the 1980's, automotive companies invested 
strongly in robots to improve the profitability of their assembly lines (often in 
response to the Japanese Lean production methods). General Motors spent 40–45 
billion dollars on automatization of their plants during 1980–1985 (Robotworx 
(2011a).  
However, the robots could most often not replace human assembly: the high capi-
tal cost and lack of flexibility in the robots' work abilities meant that they were 
only profitable during extremely large production runs. In general, a production 
volume of 100 000 – 1000 000 units annually is considered necessary for robotic 
assembly to be profitable (Hamazawa 1999). Furthermore, the production system 
must be highly coordinated and flow perfectly (Brogårdh 2007). In 1988, robots 
at the Hamtrack Michigan plant even went out of control, smashing windows and 
spraying their vincinity with paint. (Finkelstein 2006).  
Because of the early shortcomings the robotics industry only regained its status 
relatively recently. If used correctly, industrial robots perform their tasks with 
great consistency, in both accuracy and precision – the product quality improves 
significantly. They handle toxic substances, lift, carry and select products that are 
demanding ergonomically. They are also good at repetitive and detail-driven jobs 
that exhaust a human. (RobotWorx 2011b; Kucera 2011).  
The automotive industry uses the robots mainly for welding, painting and assist-
ing human workers with insertions and orientation of heavy components 
(Brogårdh 2007). Robotic welding is an especially well suited area of usage: there 
are thousands of spot welds on a car and the welding equipment is heavy. Robots 
are capable of carrying the equipment and placing it in the correctly with near 
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perfect repeatability. Another area of usage is the paint job, where consistent ap-
plication is crucial (Endregaard 2002). Painting robots can apply paint along the 
same  patterns  and  at  the  same  distance  on  every  car  in  less  time  than  even  the  
most skilled human being. (Lippert 2010).   
The Automotive Assembly process 
In this section the modern automotive assembly process is presented step-by-step 
(MadeHow 2011). Figure 11 shows the 14 general steps through which a normal 
car model passes on its way to completion. The complete car is produced on two 
separate "branches": the chassis together with heavier components (engine, axes, 
brakes, suspension, etc.) are assembled separately, and the body is assembled and 
painted separately.  
1. Procurement, logistics.  
The first step consists of successfully sourcing and receiving the components nec-
essary to produce a car.  In the days of Henry Ford, the company strived to own 
the entire supply chain, from raw material to finished product, but today sourcing 
and supply chain management is extremely important in building the product (a 
product that uses more than 4000 outside suppliers). This is also a logistical chal-
lenge, since most automakers endeavor to use Just-in-Time manufacturing: the 
necessary parts should arrive exactly when needed in small batches..  
2. Chassis assembly 
The second step is the pre-assembly of the chassis. The car frame is clamped to 
the  assembly  line's  conveyor  belt.  The  car  is  built  from the  bottom up  as  far  as  
possible: the heaviest and most bulky "base" components are installed, and lighter 
surrounding components are added in order. The frame moves between compo-
nents assembly areas where suspension, fuel tanks, axles, drive shafts, gear boxes, 
steering and brakes are installed in sequence.  
3. Drivetrain pre-assembly 
Before the engine is mounted on the frame it is coupled with its transmission, and 
then lifted onto the frame by robotic arm. Robotic arms are generally responsible 
for lifting the heavier components into place, to ensure human ergonomics and 
safety. The human assemblers bolt the components onto the frame with pneumatic 
wrenches.  
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(Madehow 2011) 
Figure 11.  The automotive assembly process.  
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4. Body assembly, welding 
The construction of the car body starts with the floor pan, the largest part of the 
body,  onto  which  structures  and  panels  are  bolted  or  welded.  The  left  and  right  
quarter panels are the first major body sections to be attached to the floor pan. 
After  this  the  front  and  rear  door  pillars,  the  roof  and  the  body  side  panels  are  
added to the shell in consecutive assembly stations. The shell of the car is gener-
ally assembled and welded by robots since they achieve a high degree of accuracy 
and a high weld speed. Furthermore they are easily able to pick up heavy panels 
such as the roof and hold them in place while welding at high tolerances.  
5. Body assembly, secondary 
In the next phase,  the body moves from the welding area assembly area and the 
secondary body assemblies are installed. These include doors, deck lids, hood 
panel, fenders, trunk lid, and bumper reinforcements – all the components that are 
included in the so called "body-in-white" or the parts of the body that need to go 
through the paint shop. The fitting and attaching off these assemblies is mostly 
done by human labor with pneumatic tools, if yet assisted by robotic arms for 
insertion. 
6. Paintjob 
Once the body shell is finished, is taken away for painting. The body is visually 
inspected in a brightly lit white room. The body is wiped down with a highly re-
flective oil compound enabling the inspectors to see any defects in the sheet metal 
clearly. Any dents in the material will stand out compared to the unbroken sur-
face. If any defects in the surface are found, they are repaired at this point. After 
inspection and repair, the body shell continues to a cleaning station where it is 
fully immersed in a cleaning compound that removes all the residual oil and dirt.  
Once the shell is dry again (having passed a drying booth) it is dipped in a bath of 
an electrostatically charged undercoat paint or primer. Again the body is dried, 
and finally the main paint operation can start. The body is spray-painted by robots 
arms, which move over the body along pre-programmed paths, spraying it with 
the exact amount of paint for the exact amount of time. (Endregaard 2002.) The 
result is a smooth and glossy paint surface that is that result of intensive research 
and programming. Once the paint job is complete the body shell is transferred to a 
baking oven station where the paint is cured in high temperatures.  
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7. Interior assembly 
After this the now painted body continues to the interior assembly area where 
workers insert all the interior trim and equipment that the finished car model will 
contain. This includes instrumentation panels and consoles together with the in-
struments necessary, wiring systems, dash panels, interior lights, seats, door and 
trim panels, headliners, radios, speakers, windows, steering column, brake and 
gas pedals, carpeting, etc. All of these fittings are necessarily done by human la-
bor, since the assembly work is highly varied and complex.  
8. Windshield installation 
The final step before the body encounters the chassis is the attachment of wind-
shields – robots with suction cups insert the windshields into place after having 
applied a urethane sealant around the edge of the glass. The body also goes 
through a water test to ensure that the seals, doors and windows are tight.  
9. Merging + Final additions 
At this stage the two conveyor belts meet, and the body shell is mated with the 
chassis. The body shell is lifted onto the car frame by robotic arm and assembly 
workers above and below the car bolt the body onto the frame. After this car is 
essentially ready, but it continues down the line to receive liquids, fuel, a battery, 
etc. Other steps such as final inspection and wheel balancing can be added to the 
list, but from an assembly point of view to car is now finished. 
Assembly intensive work stages  
In terms of DFA, all assembly operations (including body assembly, drive train, 
chassis) could technically be improved to lessen the time demand, but the real 
improvements would most probably be realized in the interior assembly. These 
work steps are labor intensive and must be achieved in complicated ergonomic 
positions (upside down, etc.). The assembly and overhaul sequences are especial-
ly similar in this area of the car – very little automatization is possible.  In the 
next section we can see two redesign examples – an instrumentation panel and a 
seat – that show a great time savings potential in the interior assembly.  
However, we must also consider the fact that greatest gains would not necessarily 
come from making the final assembly process (as seen above) more DFA, but 
rather by making the modules provided by the suppliers DFA. Final assembly is 
becoming more and more an issue of connecting modules produce elsewhere, as 
can we will see in Chapter 4.5. In terms of Figure 11, it is actually the first stage 
that might be the most important to DFA.  
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3.3 Why is DFA relevant to the auto industry? 
Price competition from lower-wage countries 
Relatively soon China and India will be ready to start exporting cars on a large 
scale. As we saw in Chapter 4.1, China is only exporting a small part of its mul-
timillion unit production. The reason for this is probably twofold – a very large 
demand inside of China and very mature markets outside that demands a high 
degree of quality and equipment (see for instance Holweg & Pil 2004). To sup-
port the argument that China and India will actually turn to exports, let us look at 
Clayton Christensen’s theories of technology trajectories and disruptive innova-
tion, since these have direct relevance to the issue.  
Christensen (1997) found that the established, leading companies specialized in a 
mature technology tend to over-develop their product over time. In an effort to 
offer something new, they strive to improve the performance of their product eve-
ry year, add new features, etc. They do this according to their best sense of busi-
ness – trying to please their customers and keep them loyal. In other words, they 
think about adding even more features and performance to better serve their high-
end customers – a demanding group, but also a group that is willing to pay a pre-
mium to get the best.  
Logically, it is best for a company to focus on high-end, because the profits are 
larger there, and the established companies have the skill set necessary to develop 
the already existing technology further and further (a process called sustaining 
innovation).  This  is  not  an  easy  achievement  –  a  lot  of  time and  money will  go  
into this development, ultimately to please the customer.  
Unfortunately, the low-end market segment will most probably not get their wish-
es fulfilled by the same company. An established company may well try to offer 
more basic products for a lower price, but their focus will not be on that segment. 
The low-end offers lower profit margins, and we must remember that R&D pro-
jects constantly compete for resources within the company. The prospect of de-
veloping a really cheap product (with low profit margins) as opposed to develop-
ing a high-end product (with high profit margins) makes most managers uncom-
fortable.  
In the end this leaves a segment of consumers unsatisfied. Alternatively there may 
also be a segment of non-consumers "beneath" the unsatisfied consumers: people 
who cannot afford even the basic product. The savior of these consumers will 
most probably be a new company, a company that has a significantly different 
business model that can make "acceptable" profits even on the low end. 
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This new company will produce a product that is basic and cheap, but fulfills an 
unsatisfied need. Their new way of doing business is profitable even at the low-
end, their supply chain is also able to function with lower profits, and they have a 
company culture built around serving a new kind of customer. The old established 
companies are often quite willing to cede this market, as it is of little interest to 
them. Better to focus on the higher end, and serve their core customers better. 
However, in the ceding the low-end segment they may already have started their 
own defeat.  
The new, small and hungry company will eventually look "up-market" and see 
large profits to be made by only improving their product a little bit. Furthermore, 
if they do so, their new business model will ensure larger profits for them than for 
the established companies. The established companies may even voluntarily re-
peat their former strategy: cede the mid-market and retreat up-market.  
This process may well continue, until the new companies are directly competing 
for the high-end of the market. At which point, the new company will probably be 
the larger, more successful company, with deeper pockets and a more effective 
product. Eventually the old, established companies will find themselves out of 
business.  
In Figure 14 we can see concept of disruption explained. The two lines moving 
upwards at a shallow angle represents the technology performance demand of the 
high-end and low-end of the customer market. The two lines moving more steeply 
upwards are the technology performance supplied by the established companies 
and the "upstarts". Sooner or later, we see the upstarts moving up to the level of 
technology demanded even by the high-end of the customer market. By that time, 
they are the new “big” companies and the cycle begins anew, with other upstarts 
challenging them for dominance, with yet new business models and practices.  
This process is called low-end disruption by Christensen, and has happened in 
numerous industries already. On-line bookstores, discount stores, low-price air-
lines, there are many examples. There may be established companies that can 
fight the disruption, but this takes large efforts and a high degree of awareness of 
customer signals.  
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(Christensen 1997) 
Figure 12.  Technology trajectories.  
If we want, we can draw parallels between the low-end disruption theories and the 
situation of the automotive industry today. As we saw in Chapter 3.1, the new car 
companies in especially in China and India are growing exponentially. They are 
mainly satisfying the needs of non-consumers – offering cars that are bought by 
Chinese and Indian customers who could not previously afford cars (previous 
owners of bicycles, scooters and motorcycles, for instance). But they are also of-
fering a good alternative to unsatisfied consumers of the established companies, 
who would happily settle for a simpler product if only it were cheaper. The Tata 
Nano is a brilliant example of this principle. Extremely cheap and basic, but ex-
actly what is needed in urban India.  
This principle may well be the reason (coupled with political factors of course) 
why Chinese car companies are so successful in the Chinese domestic market. 
The Western companies (the old established companies) have been trying to gain 
a foothold in China and have succeeded moderately. However, to them, designing 
extremely cheap cars with low profit margins and with limited functions probably 
feels unnatural – they would rather focus on the high-end market with large prof-
its, something which could be seen from the SUV craze of the late 1990s. The 
compact car models were treated quite coolly, as they could not offer the same 
margins  as  the  SUV  and  light  truck  models.  The  Chinese  manufacturers  on  the  
other hand are in their own element.  
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We can see the Western companies trying to emulate this by creating divisions 
and joint ventures in China. Christensen agrees that this may be a possible solu-
tion for the established companies – creating spinoff companies or buying small 
disruptive competitors. However, these new companies must then be allowed to 
cannibalize the old companies to a certain degree as they grow, and cannot be too 
closely regulated by the mother company or old business practices will dominate. 
Not very many companies can do this successfully.  
According to Maxton and Wormald (2004:10), the problem with China as a mar-
ket for the established car companies, is that the Chinese government has made  it 
perfectly clear that it expects China's demand for cars to supplied in full by Chi-
nese companies. An automotive industry policy document was issued by the State 
planning committee in 1994 that lays out when, how and how many Chinese 
firms will dominate what sectors of the Chinese automotive market. It specifically 
states that the automotive industry will be an independent one, and free from for-
eign control. A further draft policy document from 2003 states that by 2010 one 
half of the Chinese car market should be in the hands of 100% Chinese owned 
firms using their own models and technology. Few foreign car companies seem to 
have taken these statements seriously. 
The importance of assembly labor cost 
According to the American automotive industry union UAW (United Auto Work-
ers) labor costs only represent a marginal part of the vehicle's price. The UAW 
Research Department (2010) calculated a labor cost of 2400 dollars per car, on 
the basis of hours-per-vehicle data from the 2007 Harbour Report (a widely used 
analytical benchmark report presented annually by Harbour Consulting) and labor 
costs as reported in the companies’ financial statements. This price includes di-
rect, indirect and salaried labor for engines, stamping and assembly at the au-
tomakers’ plants. The 2400 dollars represent only 8.4 percent of the typical 28000 
dollar price of a new vehicle in 2006.  
According to the Macleans (2008) it takes on average 30 hours to produce a 
Chrysler automobile. Using this piece of information together with another – 
GM’s projected average labour costs for 2008 is 69 dollars per hour – and assum-
ing that the American Big Three have a relatively similar wage structure, we can 
calculate that it takes 2070 dollars worth of labor to produce an average vehicle. 
This is not far away from the estimates produced by the UAW.  
However, these calculations are a truth with modification – they are looking only 
at the cost of final assembly. We must not forget that the cars are a part of a sup-
ply-chain. According to Maxton & Wormald (2004:144) over 75% of the vehicles 
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total value was bought from suppliers in 1995. Looking at the entire supply-chain, 
there  are  significant  savings  to  be  had  –  if  the  assembly  cost  of  every  module  
could be halved, the total cost of a car would certainly fall.   
The precise cost structure of a car and its components is naturally a closely guard-
ed company secret – the data is not available freely. However, there has been 
some research into the issue; Monteiro (2001) presented a study in 2001 that 
compares the production cost structures of three Portuguese automotive industry 
suppliers, providing stamped steel parts for the automotive industry. The figures 
are presented in Table 7. They show a higher significance of labor costs – about 
19% of the production costs are related to labor. This is understandable, consider-
ing that a larger amount of value is added to the final product by the suppliers 
than the automobile producing company (Wormald & Maxton 2004).  
Table 7. Production cost structures of three Portuguese automotive indus-
try suppliers.  
Material Cost 50 % 
Main Machine Cost 12 % 
Overhead Labor Cost 10 % 
Labor Cost   9 % 
Tooling Cost   7 % 
Energy Cost   6 % 
Maintenance Cost   5 % 
Buildning Cost   1 % 
 (Monteiro 2001) 
Of course, 10–20% of the cars’ and components’ total cost may not sound very 
much. However, Boothroyd et al. (2002) stress that cost savings come not only 
from reduction of assembly labor, but from the elimination of unnecessary com-
ponents, the usage of fewer materials and a simpler product structure in which 
less material is used. And as we can see in Table 7, material costs make up 50% 
of the production costs. With a significant reduction of both assembly time and 
material costs, tangible cost-benefits should be realized by a successful DFA re-
design. 
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A large untapped cost-reduction potential  
In the following, we will see two DFA case studies that seem very relevant to the 
automotive industry. 
1. Instrumentation panel case study 
Boothroyd Dewhurst Inc. (1999a) presents the redesign of an instrument panel 
from a current truck model, using the DFMA method – a straight example of the 
improvements possible in the automotive industry's current products. The point of 
the work is stated to be a demonstration of redesign potential.  
The instrument panel is always a tricky component of a car: because of its size 
and shape complexity it is fairly hard to insert. The article defines four assembly 
problems that are encountered especially frequently when considering instrument 
panels: 1) the panels are not secured on insertion and need to be held down during 
assembly, 2) the panels' components are not easy to align for insertion, 3) the 
panels' components are assembled with obstructed access or restricted view of the 
of the insertion point and 4) the panels contain components which resist insertion 
or require some manipulation for insertion. Because of these problems, the in-
strument panels are work-intensive to assemble, but more importantly, add an 
important source of assembly defects and quality problems. 
The analysis of the panel showed that there was indeed room for improvement.   
The old design consists of 314 parts in 28 subassemblies, which have to be com-
bined in a total of 482 assembly tasks. The total estimated time for these tasks is 
3780 seconds or 63 minutes. The analysis of the old panel design shows that only 
about five minutes were spent on tasks that are absolutely necessary (installing 
wire harnesses, instruments, etc.). A full 17 minutes goes towards assembling 
separate fasteners, 24 minutes to assemble components that the author considers 
candidates for elimination, and 16 minutes to perform tasks such as welding, stak-
ing,  gluing,  etc.  These  three  main  assembly  task  categories  all  contain  room for  
improvement.   
After the initial analysis, a newer and leaner product design was proposed, to-
gether with time and cost estimates for its production – the improved design can 
be seen in Figure 12. The results are impressive – the overall assembly time may 
drop as low as 12 minutes. The material costs of the two designs are estimated to 
$38,69 (old) and $39,06 (new).  
The basic idea of the new design is to a) integrate the existing panel components 
into larger units, b) provide structural integrity by the shape of the injection mold-
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ed parts, rather than by separate supports and c) increase the recyclability of the 
instrument panel by removing the need to disassemble it for non-plastic compo-
nents when recycling.  
The new design could (probably) be completed in 121 assembly steps. For in-
stance – the number of fasteners in the redesigned product would only be 23, as 
compared to 123 in the old. The "candidate components for elimination" category 
is reduced from 173 to 39, of which the remaining are mainly separately molded 
parts in the four air deflector assemblies, assemblies which could probably be 
further improved. 
 
 (Boothroyd-Dewhurst Inc 1999a) 
Figure 13.  Redesigned truck instrumentation panel.  
 
2. Car seat case study 
Another relevant case study is Boothroyd-Dewhurst Inc.'s (1999b) redesign of a 
pickup car seat together with the Magna Seating group. The car seat initially con-
sists of 105 separate parts made from four different material types and uses sever-
al different manufacturing techniques (welding, riveting, screwing, snapping, 
etc.). Wire welding of small components that are difficult to handle is common – 
this is an especially work intensive technique. In general the work steps consist of 
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MIG welding the basic framework, assembling the tubular framework and attach-
ing the final cushioning. The total assembly time is 24 minutes . 
The two redesigns were made – one where only small modifications to the basic 
structure was allowed, and one where major changes could be made to the seats' 
outlook as long as their functions were preserved. The first "conservative” rede-
sign eliminated a lot of the welding steps and several multilayer parts were made 
integral. As a result, the parts count could be reduced from 105 to 19, and assem-
bly time reduced from 24 minutes to 4.3 minutes.  
The second round of redesign – where any change could be accepted as long as 
the functionality of the system remained – eliminated most of the welding, kept 
only the essential screws and rivets, removed all tubular parts and integrated their 
functions with the seat cushions and back support stampings, removed all separate 
brackets and weld nuts, etc. Such a seat would in effect only consist of nine com-
ponents, and assembly time would only be in the neighborhood of 1,5 minutes. It 
is doubtful whether such a seat would be approved by the industry as a whole, but 
the first "conservative" redesign nevertheless shows the potential that DFA rede-
sign has to improve existing products. In Figure 13 we can see the old and second 
new designs.   
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 (Boothroyd-Dewhurst Inc 1999a) 
Figure 14.  Redesigned car seat.  
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The future of the automotive industry 
Eventually, the Chinese companies will start to export more aggressively.  Even-
tually, the quality of these upstarts will become so good that they will be accepted 
in the Western world, and at that time, a wave of export cars (currently a trickle) 
will surge to North America and Europe (see Holweg, Tran, Davies & Schramm 
2011; Holweg, Davies & Podpolny 2009). We have seen this happen back in the 
day when Japan and South Korea were still considered low-cost, low-quality 
countries.  
China and India are experts at exporting – acoording to Qureshi & Wan (2008) 
the trade to GDP ratio in China was 70% in 2005 and India’s was 44%. Nothing 
says that cars are a different product. Furthermore, the average annual wage in 
China 2007 was about 25000 Yuan (about 3900 dollars or 2800 euro) (Yang et al. 
2010). The wages are rising fast, granted – in 2002 the same figure was 1329 dol-
lars for China (and 285 dollars for India)( Qureshi & Wan (2008) – but compared 
to the average annual 30 000+ dollars of the Western world, there is still a signifi-
cant difference.  
But  what  can  the  established  car  companies  do  to  fight  for  their  position?  And  
fight they must if they want to keep their position as car company giants – other-
wise they will become niche players, focusing only on certain market segments, 
constantly under attack by the new companies (see the example of Harley-
Davidson in Christensen 1997). They can choose to fight back with better tech-
niques, like in the example of South Korea in Section 3.1.: despite the low wages 
and positive exchange rate of South Korea in the 1980s, Korea could not compete 
with the superior quality of Japanese cars in the American market. Only much 
later, when South Korea had adopted lean production techniques, could they rival 
the Japanese companies.  
Design for Assembly could become one of the weapons of the established com-
panies.  Production machinery and robotics can only push down production costs 
so  far  and  does  not  solve  all  problems of  assembly,  as  we  saw previously.  Fur-
thermore, it is relatively easy for the new companies to buy the same machines. 
Radically different design on the other hand is harder to incorporate in a produc-
tion environment that supports old techniques. (Thoma and O'Sullivan 2011). 
Expertise in assembly design could become the new (old) defense of the estab-
lished car companies. 
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4 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ASSEMBLY AND 
 REPAIR 
In this section we look closer at the link between assembly and repair. Our focus 
in  this  study  is  mainly  on  Design  for  Assembly,  but  the  objective  would  be  to  
infer the presence of DFA in the car models we study by looking at repair times. 
For this to make any sense, we must assume that a product that has been designed 
for assembly will have faster repair times. This would probably not be a 1:1 rela-
tionship – certain types of assembly improvements are bound to have positive 
effects on repair time, while other will affect the results negatively. However, a 
certain degree of positive correlation seems possible, especially when looking 
closer at the connection between assembly and repair, or more precisely, the con-
nection between assembly and disassembly.  
4.1 Design for Assembly guidelines 
In Table 8 we see some of the design guidelines for DFA, collected from litera-
ture and compiled into a general list. 38 guidelines are given here, but there are 
certainly more if we start looking at product specific literature. The guidelines can 
be grouped into four different categories we might call minimize, standardize, 
handling and assembly. The minimize and standardize guidelines are about mak-
ing the product simpler, easier, less complex. A smaller number of components, 
materials and fasteners used, and these should all be assembled in a standardized 
way with a normal toolset.  
The handling guidelines are about ease of use in the industrial workplace. Com-
ponents that are tangled, sharp, slippery, small, flexible and delicate are hard for 
assembly workers to grip and control, especially considering they might be wear-
ing gloves and holding tools at the same time. The assembly guidelines are called 
so because they are meant to facilitate the process of putting product together – 
visibility, easy orientation, modularity, access, wide tolerances, etc. Ideally the 
number of movements and insertions should be kept at a minimum, the product 
should be stacked from the bottom up and two-handed grips and insertions should 
be avoided. Keeping these guidelines in mind might well produce a much more 
efficient product to assemble, even without quantitative calculations or computer 
programs.  
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Table 8. Design for Assembly guidelines.  
Minimize 
1. Eliminate product features of no value to the customer 
2. Reduce the number of components to a minimum 
3. Reduce the number of materials used 
4. Reduce the number of fasteners used (safely) 
5. Minimize the types of fasteners used 
6. Maximize functions performed by individual components 
 
Standardize 
7. Use standardised components 
8. Standardize materials used in the product 
9. Specify material that is easy to obtain 
10. Use a standardized, normal toolset 
11. Use standardized fasteners 
12. Fastener ranking: Snap fit (best) – Plastic bending – Riveting – Screw fastening (worst) 
 
Handling 
13. Avoid parts that stick together 
14. Avoid parts that are slippery 
15. Avoid parts that are very small 
16. Avoid parts that are very delicate 
17. Avoid flexible parts (difficult to control) 
18. Reduce the weight of components for easier handling by human workers 
19. Avoid parts that are hazardous to the handler (sharp, splinters, etc) 
20. Provide features to prevent jamming or nesting of parts when stored 
 
Assembly 
21. Ensure clearance for hands, tools, probes, etc. 
22. Place fasteners away from obstructions. 
23. Consider access and visibility for each production step 
24. Make sure disassembly is equally practical as assembly 
25. Modularize multiple parts into single subassemblies. 
26. Design a base component to reduce the need for jigs and fixtures 
27. Design a stacked product that can be assembled from above 
28. Avoid orientation after insertion 
29. Design components to maximize operations possible without repositioning  
30. Eliminate high precision fits 
31. Design to reduce resistance to insertion of components 
32. Design shapes, protrusions that will disallow incorrect assembly 
33. Design Parts to be self-locating and self-aligning 
34. Make components symmetrical 
35. If symmetrical components are not possible, exaggerate asymmetry to facilitate orienting 
36. Avoid sharp edges and angles 
37. Avoid designing parts that need holding down during assembly 
38. Avoid secondary operations – plating, painting, heat treatment, etc. 
 
(Andreasen 1988; Edwards 2002; Rampersad 1996; Joneja 2009; Boothroyd et al. 2002; Bralla 1999 ) 
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4.2 Design for Maintainability guidelines 
While there are almost no references to such a concept as Design for Repair, there 
are several that are concerned with Design for Maintainability (see for instance 
Lele 1997; Takata, Kirnura, van Houten, Westkamper, Shpitalni, Ceglarek & Lee 
2004). The terms maintainability and serviceability seem to be used almost syn-
onymously (Blanchard & Fabrycky 1998) but both methodologies are concerned 
with allowing for easy maintenance by incorporating certain functions already on 
the design stage (Tan, Matzen, McAloone & Evans 2010). The objectives are to 
identify and prioritize maintenance requirements, increase the available run time 
of the product and decrease maintenance time, increase customer satisfaction and 
decrease lifecycle costs. (RIAC 2011; Moss 1985). Dhillon (1999:1) defines 
maintainability as "…the measures taken during development, design, and instal-
lation of a manufactured product that reduce required maintenance, man-hours, 
tools, logistic cost, skill levels, and facilities,…". 
The Design for Maintenance methodology is certainly less well-known than De-
sign for Assembly or Design for Manufacturing, and has not been a part of the 
Design-for family very long. Interestingly enough, NASA is one of the forerun-
ners in this field: NASA has published several editions of its publication Man-
Systems-Integration Standards, where Design for Maintainability is given much 
attention. The MSI Standards are comprehensive set of guidelines that define the 
requirements for space facilities and other equipment used by man in space. Un-
der such conditions, when replacement equipment is not readily available and 
breakdowns can cause life-threatening situations, it is important that all machin-
ery is easy to repair by human hand. The MSI Standards define minimum stand-
ards of physical access, visual access, removal, replacement, modularity, fault 
detection, test points etc. (NASA 1995)  
Also  General  Motor’s  is  said  to  be  using  a  "Serviceability Task Evaluation Ma-
trix" (STEM), a design tool that evaluates estimated repair and maintenance time, 
parts cost, diagnosis time, tool requirements and part availability, etc. (Lynch 
1995). Tjiparuro & Thompson (2004) classify the five most important Design for 
Maintenance objectives: simplicity, part features, operating environment, part 
identi¿cation and assembly/disassembly principles.   
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Table 9. Design for Maintainability guidelines.  
Standardize 
1. Maintenance equipment and tools shall be kept to a minimum 
2. Design all adjustments  controls in same direction (i.e. clockwise, right, up) 
3. Use standard fasteners and components 
4. Reduce number of components in final assembly 
5. Conformance to national, international, and industry standards and codes 
6. Maintenance requiring special skills shall be minimized 
  
Handling 
7. Avoid sharp edges, corners and protrusions that can cause injury 
8. Component size, shape shoud ensure self-alignment during insertion 
9. Adjustment controls should be self-guiding and self-stopping 
10. Provide guide pins for alignment of modules 
11. Provide handles for components weighing over 5 kg or unwieldy components 
12. Mount heavy units as low as possible 
13. Installed components should require no or minimal adjustment 
14. Quick-disconnect connectors should be used 
  
Replacement 
16. Provide a path to remove replaceable units w/o removing other units.  
17. Make it possible to remove replaceable units w/o interrupting functions 
18. Make it possible to test units w/o interrupting functions 
19. Provide test points or self-diagnostics on circuit boards 
  
Access 
20. Route cables for easy access and replacement 
21. Provide clearance around connectors for viewing and access 
22. Components most critical to system operation shall be most accessible 
23. Access ranking: no cover (best), transparent window, quick-opening metal cover 
(worst).  
  
Identification 
24. Code cables and wires for easy identification 
25. Parts references displayed next to each part 
  
(Kuo et al. 2001; Ivory, Thwaites & Vaughan 2001; NASA Man-Systems Integration Standards 1995; RIAC desk refer-
ence 2011; FreeQuality 2011) 
 
88      Acta Wasaensia 
A summary of relevant guidelines is presented in Table 9. These guidelines can 
be roughly divided into five categories – standardization, handling, replacement, 
access and identification. The standardization guidelines define that maintenance 
should be performed with a minimum of special skills, special tools, special fas-
teners etc. This ensures that maintenance can be performed on a daily basis, easi-
ly. The handling guidelines ensure that components are as easy to handle as pos-
sible, by using lightweight modules, self aligning components, etc. The replace-
ment guidelines ensure that it is easy to test and remove components even while 
running the machine, and the access guidelines define easy access to critical 
components. Finally the identification guidelines state the need for clear refer-
ences to color coding for easy troubleshooting.  
Now, these guidelines are in fact not very similar or perhaps even compatible 
with  those  of  Design  for  Assembly  –  and  the  argument  of  this  work  is  that  we  
should be able to see evidence of Design for Assembly in the repair data we will 
be analyzing. However, at this stage we must jump forward to Section 5.4, where 
we can see the definitions of the repair procedures given in the repair guide final-
ly chosen as the source of data. First of all, the most commonly used procedure in 
the guide is: 
“Remove and Install (R&I): Remove a part or assembly, set it aside and reinstall 
it later. The time shown includes the alignment that can be done by shifting the 
part or assembly.” (Collision Estimating Guide Imported 1991: P3.) 
The term Remove and Replace (R&R) can be used almost synonymously, since in 
that case, the part is removed and replaced with a new replacement part. In both 
cases, there is no damage to the part being removed and installed. We can also 
look at the following quote from the guide: 
“[the times] are for replacement with new undamaged parts from the vehicle 
manufacturer on a new undamaged vehicle… The actual time taken by individual 
repair facilities to replace collision damaged parts can be expected to vary due to 
severity of collision, vehicle condition, equipment used, etc.” (Collision Estimat-
ing Guide Imported 1991: P3). 
Given these definitions it is clear that Design for Maintainability is not the correct 
discipline to be looking at – the repair guide is not talking about maintenance, but 
rather about disassembly and reassembly (limited to a particular component and 
the components blocking it from access). From this point of view it makes more 
sense to look at another design methodology altogether: Design for Disassembly. 
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4.3 Design for Disassembly 
Design for Disassembly is a design methodology that assists the disassembly of 
products, often in connection with recycling, and also often seen as a part of De-
sign for Remanufacturing and Life Cycle Costing techniques. However, on its 
most basic level, it is simply a way of designing a product that can be taken apart 
more easily – as an effect of more easy disassembly, recycling simply becomes 
more viable option. (Gungor & Gupta 1999.) DFD stresses the selection and use 
of correct materials, the design of components and product architecture, and the 
selection and use of fasteners (for literature on disassembly planning see for in-
stance Mascle 1998; Yokata & Brought 1996; Zussman, Krivet, & Seliger 1994; 
O’Shea, Kaebernick & Grewel 2000).  
Design for Disassembly is also often mentioned in connection with Design for 
Assembly, since Disassembly is a relatively new offshoot of the Design-for fami-
ly (circa early 1990s) and borrows some principles from the older DFA (West-
kamper, Feldmann, Reinhart & Seliger 1999; Feldmann, Trautner, & Meedt 1999 
and Yu & Li 2006). The 2000 European Union directive on vehicle end-of-life 
handling and the 2004 European Union Waste Electrical and Electronic Equip-
ment (WEEE) directive are often cited as significant boosts to its popularity – the 
directives places the responsibility of disposing products with their manufacturer 
(Sundin 2004; Chung and Wee 2011, Kumar and Putnam 2008 etc.).  
The European Parliament end-of-life vehicles (ELV) directive 2000/53/EC de-
fines the minimum reuse and recovery rates for end-of-life vehicles (Ferrão & 
Amaral 2006): 
– Until 01/01/2006: reuse and recovery of 85% on a mass basis (recycling 80%) 
for vehicles produced after 1980. 
– Until 01/01/2006: reuse and recovery of 75% on a mass basis (recycling 70%) 
for vehicles produced before 1980. 
– Until 01/01/2015: reuse and recovery of 95% on a mass basis (recycling 85%). 
This has brought several issues to attention: the blending of materials, which can 
make components impossible to recycle; the extensive use of non-openable fas-
tening methods such as gluing; the popular use of special tools in assembly which 
makes disassembly problematic; etc. According to Sundin (2004), metal recycling 
is a complex issue since contaminants destroy the possibilities of reuse. The addi-
tion of copper, tin, zinc, lead, or aluminum makes steel and iron less recyclable, 
while the addition of iron, steel, chromium, zinc, lead, copper or magnesium 
makes aluminum less recyclable, etc (Bellmann & Khare 1999). In general, un-
plated and low alloy metals are the best for future reuse.   
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Remanufacturing 
A concept that is often closely connected with disassembly is remanufacturing – 
the practice of disassembling, cleaning, refurbishing, replacing parts (as neces-
sary) and reassembling the product so that it will function as well as a new prod-
uct (Hazen, Overstreet, Jones-Farmer & Field 2012). The remanufactured product 
is sold as an equivalent of a new product, if yet often at lower prices (45–65% of 
comparable new products) because of their lower perceived quality (Lund & 
Hauser 2010).  However, a remanufactured product can be taken into use with a 
reasonably high degree of confidence that it will last another full cycle of usage. 
(Bras & Hammond 1996; Guide & Li 2010). Thorn & Rogerson (2002) define 
remanufacturing as "the process of disassembling, cleaning, inspecting, repairing, 
replacing, and reassembling the components of a part or product to like-new 
condition" 
In Table 10 we can see some compiled DFD guidelines. The DFD guidelines can 
be roughly divided into five groups – minimize, standardize, handling, disassem-
bly and recyclability. The minimize, standardize and handling categories match 
the DFA guidelines very well. The last two – disassembly and recycling – on the 
other hand are of course specific to DFD, especially the recycling aspect. Those 
guidelines consider mainly the re-usage of the materials after the product has been 
disassembled. As such they are more an aspect of Design for Environment, but 
nevertheless often mentioned in connection with DFD.  
In Table 11 se see a matrix matching the DFA and DFD guidelines against each 
other. Several of the DFA and the DFD rules match relatively well – 16 rules re-
semble each other to a large degree, and very few seem to directly contradict each 
other. The environmental aspects of DFD and the clearly assembly-connected 
aspects of DFA make up for the largest differences. Looking aside from these, 
Design for Disassembly and Design for Assembly have a lot in common. On the 
other hand we must always remember that intent and the background thought is 
what really matters. Even though the most basic guidelines – minimizing the use 
of components, materials, fastener types, etc. cannot be interpreted very different-
ly no matter what your intent, other guidelines such as easy insertion and self 
aligning shape of components (assembly) promises nothing in terms of easy dis-
assembly.  
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Table 10. Design for Disassembly guidelines.  
Minimize 
1. Minimise the number of components used 
2. Minimise the number of component types used 
3. Minimise the number of material types used 
4. Minimise the number of fasteners used, safely 
5. Minimise the types of fastener used 
  
Standardize 
6. Standardize components used 
7. Use standardised, normal tools 
8. Standardise the types of fasteners used 
  
Handling 
9. Use lightweight materials and components easily handled by workers 
10. Avoid toxic or harmful materials and chemicals 
  
Disassembly 
11. Separate working components into modular sub-assemblies  
12. Consider the use of destructive fasteners 
13. Improve access to components and fasteners 
14. Try to make the plane of access to components the same for all 
15. Avoid permanent fixing (adhesives, co-molding) 
16. Mount electrical components with sockets, do not solder 
17. Use fixings which snap, clip or slot into place 
  
Recyclability 
18. Design connectors to withstand repeated assembly and disassembly:  
recyclability 
19. Prefer metals over plastics, more easily recyclable 
20. Avoid using laminates, amalgams – bad for recycling 
21. Avoid painting parts, contamination prevents recycling 
22. Apply markings (e.g. etching, moulding) for easy sorting 
  
(Güngör 2006; Guy & Ciarimboli 2005; Shedroff 2010; Active Disassenbly Research 2005; Information Inspiration 2011) 
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Table 11. DFA-DFD guideline similarities.  
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Eliminate features 1                       
Min components 2  X                      
Min materials 3   X                    
Min fasteners 4    X                   
Min fastener types 5     X                  
Max functions/comp 6                       
Standard comp. 7      X                 
Standard materials 8                       
Easy-get material 9                       
Standard toolset 10       X                
Standard fasteners 11        X               
Fastner ranking 12                 X      
No stick 13                       
No slippery 14                       
No very small 15                       
No very delicate 16                       
No flexible 17                       
Light components 18         X              
Not hazardous 19          X             
No jam/nest 20                       
Clearance 21             X          
Free fasteners 22             X          
Access + visibility 23                       
Disassembly 24                  X     
Modular 25           X            
Base component 26                       
Stacked assembly 27              X         
Min orientation 28                       
Max one-side 29                       
No precision fits 30                       
Easy insertion 31                       
Impossible incorrect 32                       
Self-locating/aligning 33                       
Symmetrical 34                       
Assymetrical 35                       
No sharp edges 36                       
No holding down 37                       
No secondary 38                      X 
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Interestingly enough we see that both the Design for Assembly and Design for 
Disassembly guidelines recommend the usage of snap fits. We can immediately 
see the benefit in terms of assembly – a component that snaps on can be inserted 
in seconds, while a component that is screwed on might take minutes to fasten 
correctly. However, when talking about disassembly the benefits are less intui-
tive. A snap fit can be relatively easily opened, but might easily break if opened 
forcefully or without knowledge of its exact location and shape. Penev (1996) 
distinguishes two types of disassembly – nondestructive (true disassembly) and 
destructive (dismantling). While snap fits should be used cautiously if attempting 
true disassembly, they are perfectly all  right thinking of dismantling a product – 
dismantling is most often the precursor of recycling, and the most important thing 
is that components and materials are separated. On the other hand, the alternative 
fastener types (such as screws or rivets) might well perform even worse for true 
disassembly: rivets cannot be opened without some destruction, and aged screws 
tend to jam, break, and "go bald" (the groove on the screw's head breaks) if han-
dled with force. Comparatively speaking snap fits are very easy to open.  
4.4 Connecting DFA and DFD – Evidence from 
academic research 
Some scientific research makes a connection between Design for Assembly and 
Design for Disassembly. Gupta & McLean (1996), Penev & Ron (1996), Booth-
royd & Alting (1992) have all reviewed the Design for Assembly methods and 
compared them to those of the newer Design for Disassembly. Feldmann & Sla-
ma (2001); Westkamper, Feldmann, Reinhart & Seliger (1999); Feldmann, Tra-
utner, & Meedt (1999) and Yu & Li (2006) study integrated methods of planning 
design for assembly and disassembly. Aguinaga, Borro & Matey (2007) create an 
automated disassembly planner that integrates with assembly and maintenance 
simulation tools to provide disassembly analysis information during product de-
sign. 
The collection term Design for Assembly and Disassembly is mentioned by Nof 
& Chen (1992) and Velásquez & Nof (2009). Hammond & Bras (1996)  use the 
Boothroyd-Dewhurst assemblability index method as a model for the cretion of a 
remanufacturability index. They point out the many similarities between the two 
methodologies – tools, techniques and fixtures. Jovane, Alting, Armillotta, Evers-
heim, Feldmann, Seliger & Roth (1993); Brennan, Gupta & Taleb (1994) and 
Bras & Emblemsvag (1995) look at the role assembly plays in remanufacturing.  
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 According to Penev (1996:34) the application of DFA is the first step in achiev-
ing a successful disassembly. He goes on, however,  to stress that  DFA is only a 
first step – to achieve truly suitable products for disassembly further redesign ef-
forts have been made. Seliger, Karl & Weber (1997) and Barkan & Hinckley 
(1993) state similar findings.  
In Harjula, Rapoza, Knight & Boothroyd (1996) we see one of the few existing 
empirical studies about the link between DFA and DFD. In their first example a 
normal household coffee maker is redesigned using quantitative DFA redesign 
software, but a disassembly sequence (with recyclability cost calculations) is also 
generated at the same time. The original product consists of 84 parts (only 9 theo-
retically needed) and has an assembly time of 660 seconds (11 minutes). After the 
redesign,  however,  the  parts  count  is  down  to  58  and  the  assembly  time  is  473  
seconds (about 7,9 minutes). The number of materials used has been reduced to 8 
from  12.  The  disassembly  time  has  also  been  drastically  reduced  from  333  se-
conds (about 5,6 minutes) to 130 seconds (about 2,2 minutes).  
The study goes on to check the relationship between assembly and disassembly 
on a few larger products: a washing machine, a refrigerator and a TV set. On av-
erage, the DFA redesigns (again using the same software and method) have re-
sulted in disassembly time reductions of 48%. The authors conclude that a typical 
DFA redesign will have an almost equally positive effect on the disassembly of a 
product. For an even better result, however, the disassembly considerations 
should be included already in the design phase, alongside the DFA analysis.  
At the moment it is hard to find a consensus in academic writings on the issue of 
whether efficient Design for Assembly is reflected in efficient Design for Disas-
sembly  –  the  study  by  Harjula  et  al.  is  almost  unique.  However,  given  that  the  
Design for Disassembly is a research area of growing interest, it seems probable 
that we shall soon see more research trying to quantify the relationship, and that 
these works can be used to strengthen the validity of this particular work.  
4.5 Connecting DFA and DFD – Interview results 
To investigate the general opinion of the automotive industry concerning the link 
between fast assembly and fast disassembly, several interviews were conducted 
with automotive professionals and academic specialists. 
The interviews were conducted either by phone or mail, and included a total of 
eight professionals with experience of seven major automotive companies. The 
interviewees are automotive researchers, managers, and engineers: 
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– BMW – Former Senior Researcher 
– Ford Motor Co. – Materials & Manufacturing Research Manager 
– Honda R&D Americas, Inc. – Advanced Materials Researcher 
– Hyundai Motors – Senior Researcher 
– General Motors Brazil – Vehicle Architect + Senior Product Engineer 
– Valmet Automotive – Simultaneous Engineering Manager 
– Volvo Car Corporation – Former Director Executive Business Support 
The questions posed to these persons were divided into a short-set and a long-set, 
depending on their time and availability. The short-set simply asked: 
 
1. Does your company normally consider Design for Assembly at the design 
stage?  
2. If you answered yes, why does your company use this methodology? 
3. Does your company normally consider Design for Disassembly at the de-
sign stage?  
4. If you answered yes, why does your company use this methodology?  For 
remanufacturing, repair or recycling?  
5. Do you think that a successful Design for Assembly -redesign would im-
prove or worsen the ability of some later company to disassemble the car? 
 
The long-set added the following three questions  
 
6. Do your suppliers know about DFA and DFD, considering that more and 
more significant modules are being designed and manufactured by them? 
7. Are there any companies in the world that are especially well-known for 
their easy-to -assemble cars? What about easy-to-disassemble? 
8. In your own opinion – were cars easier or harder to assemble ten years 
back? Twenty years? Has anything changed? 
 
The answers of the interviewees can be summarized as follows: 
Is DFA used, and why? 
In  general  –  it  seems  that  DFA  and  DFM  are  still  being  used.  Especially  the  
American companies continue to upkeep the methodology and even publish a few 
articles on their redesign projects. However, in the non-American companies, 
DFD seems to be getting a stronger interest than DFA.  
A few of the answers seem to indicate that DFA methods were used more actively 
10 to 20 years ago, and have seen less development lately. However, the compa-
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nies  that  are  using  DFA  and  DFM  say  that  these  design  methodologies  have  a  
considerable impact when it comes to saving money – program costs, timing and 
manufacturing ease (ergonomics). 
In the companies that do not expressly use DFA, the ease of assembly is still tak-
en into consideration during the design phase, but not in a formalized way, but 
rather by using the designer's experience and seeing what works. The companies 
that are not expressly focusing on DFA at this moment do not seem to be eager to 
implement it as a methodology either.  
Is DFD used, and for what purpose? 
DFM is a growing area of research for the automotive industry, all interviewees 
agree on this. The companies that are actively focusing on DFD at present time 
have seen their recycling rates (the amount of materials in a car that can be recy-
cled)  grow  constantly  since  implementing  their  DFD  programs.  But,  the  ELV  
(End of Life Vehicle) directives (present or future) of different countries do seem 
to have been the main reason for these companies' efforts. 
The general consensus of the industry seems to be that recyclability is not some-
thing that the general public will pay for. The car companies that are focusing on 
DFD admit that the customer plays quite a small part in that particular methodol-
ogy  choice  –  the  customers  will  not  be  swayed by  a  car  that  is  easy  to  recycle.  
Design for Disassembly is seen as a way to realize the governmental demands for 
vehicle recyclability. And specifically recyclability – disassembly and reuse of 
components (remanufacturing) is not the aim. Naturally, the OEM's do not have 
recycling  businesses  of  their  own,  and  will  therefore  focus  mainly  on  their  cus-
tomer's needs and wants, in order to increase their market share and profits. 
Ease of repair is equally not considered much in the industry: easy-to-repair is not 
a marketing point – rather an admission of failure in public eyes. The customers 
are still mainly interested in:  
– Styling ( Design Studio ) 
– Robustness ( Engineering ) 
– Comfort ( Engineering / Design Studio ) 
– Fuel economy ( Engineering ) 
– Price (Everyone – Engineering/Design Studio/Marketing/Finance, etc. ) 
Does DFA have a (positive) effect on DFD? 
The interviewees disagree on the effect of DFA on DFD – about half feel that 
DFA have a positive effect on DFD, and half feel that there is no link to be seen 
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between the two. The people that do see a link say that there might be certain sim-
ilarities between the DFA and DFD, but probably not that large – the intent 
should be to design with both in mind simultaneously to improve on both. How-
ever, as a disassembly sequence is often the reverse of the assembly sequence, 
and DFA expressly gives such guidelines as "reduce the number of parts and inte-
grate" and "simplify the structure" etc., disassembly times should be affected 
somewhat positively.  
The interviewees that do not feel that DFA and DFD correlate in any way (or 
even see one as detrimental to the other) especially point to fasteners and inte-
grated materials as key problem areas that separate the two methods. 
An interior door trim panel can either be attached to the door proper with 5–6 
screws (with cover caps to hide them) or with internal push pins (snap fits). The 
screws and caps can be attached in about 30 seconds, while the clip-on solution 
only takes about 10 seconds to attach. The clip-on is certainly DFA, but bad for 
DFD, especially if you want to get the part out undamaged.  
Integrated materials are the second problem – since fewer components doing 
more work is a key aim of DFA, more complex single components are often the 
end result. The weather-strips of the doors are a good example – they contain soft 
rubber for effective water seal, hard rubber to provide structure, steel to provide 
stiffness, and other soft rubber types to produce a nice appearance and feel. If the 
aim is to separate materials completely (as is often the goal of DFD for recy-
cling), this successful DFA redesign produces problems later on. In general, DFA 
redesigns that result in components or materials being joined by thermal or chem-
ical processes become hard to disassemble. Unfortunately the automotive industry 
is clearly heading in a direction where more mixed materials are used. 
Several of the interviewees will point out that the best results are achieved if both 
DFA and DFD are taken into account at the same time (an integrated approach); if 
the components that need removal or can be reused are identified at the beginning 
of the design process, a solution with better access to these components can be 
achieved. 
Are the suppliers using DFA 
In general it seems that a lot of the responsibility of design is moving to the sup-
plier. Some of the closer suppliers are working with the OEM:s on DFD projects, 
but  the  question  remains  how  much  DFA  is  still  in  the  picture.  In  America  the  
possibility is better, but in other countries, the low enthusiasm of the automakers 
for DFA is probably reflected by their suppliers. 
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The  future  is  looking  a  bit  bleak  for  DFA  at  the  moment.  The  trend  is  towards  
increased separation of tasks in the supply chain – between OEM and supplier, 
and even between OEM and assembler (initial design by the OEM, nuts-and-bolts 
engineering and assembly by another, specialized company). This sort of separa-
tion (geographical, company-cultural) may form another obstacle for the concur-
rent-engineering -minded DFA process.  
The  possibility  to  achieve  Design  for  Assembly  is  somewhat  limited  by  the  big  
suppliers – a radically new design is made hard by the usage of more standardized 
components, shared between several car manufacturers. On the other hand, a 
higher degree of standardization (as a side effect of using the components of large 
suppliers)  might  also  have  its  positive  effects  on  DFA  and  DFD.  Twenty  years  
ago, the cars were much more unique in terms of components than they are today.  
What companies  are especially well-known for their easy-to -assemble cars? 
There is assumed to be a link between Design for Assembly and lean design, as 
spearheaded by the Japanese car makers over the last decades. Logically then, the 
Japanese car makers should be best at making easy-to-assemble designs. Toyota 
is mentioned as the most probable candidate. But these opinions are not based on 
any particular measurements, just overall gut-feeling.  
Other issues – Modularity 
However, across the board, it is felt that the future (and now) of the automotive 
industry design lies in modularity. The OEM:s will design an end product that 
consists of modules that trusted suppliers will design and engineer much more 
independently. This so-called black-box design will allow cost cutting for the 
OEM:s, but it is also seen that assembly and repair will benefit significantly from 
such methods. Assembly will simply be a matter of joining modules through 
standardized interfaces, and repair will aim at replacing the entire module rather 
than a single part. Whether disassembly is affected positively depends on the 
build of the module – it will certainly be easier to get the module out of the vehi-
cle, but if a certain part in the module needs to be changed, that can be signifi-
cantly harder if DFD is not taken into account by the supplier. Robust and durable 
modules will, however, be an excellent source of material for remanufacturers.  
Academic interviews 
In further interviews with members of the MIT International Vehicle Program and 
authors on Design for Assembly, the question of whether fast assembly and fast 
disassembly have common factors is debated. Two IMVP researchers consider 
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that there is a certainly degree of overlap between the two methodologies – on the 
surface, as much as 70%–80% seems common to both easy assembly and easy 
disassembly. A well-known expert  in DFA techniques replies that  it  is  not obvi-
ous that the assembly, disassembly and repair will follow the same pattern – the 
dislocation lines in the structure where assembly and disassembly are intended 
will probably not be similar following the different design regimes.  
Conclusion – open 
To summarize – the question of how DFA affects DFD is certainly debatable and 
about half  of the researchers and industry experts seem to believe that there is  a 
positive link between easy assembly and easy disassembly. The other half are 
doubtful.  
However, if we consider repair time data to be a combination of the time it takes 
to disassemble and reassemble an assembly on a car, even a weak positive link 
should make it possible to assume that models with lower repair times display 
elements of DFA. If  looking at  a large enough sample,  general  trends in ease of 
assembly should be reflected in lower repair times, as long as the disassembly 
fraction of the repair time is not inversely proportionate to the assembly fraction. 
We will go forward on this assumption, and meanwhile continue to try and find 
more a more conclusive answer to the question. 
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5 METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION  
General preferences 
Choosing the setting for an investigation of car models is not easy, but we can 
make several choices based on simple availability. First of all – the region to 
study. It is a fact that the Asian and European car markets have long been domi-
nated by local brands. According to Maxton & Wormald (2004:16) trade barriers, 
policy choice and customer preferences have kept the markets safe from outside 
interference until relatively recently. The authors mention customers' brand loyal-
ty is a strong motivator, coupled with the fact that different markets demand dif-
ferent cars. The Asian markets for instance traditionally preferred smaller and 
more fuel-efficient cars for use in congested cities where gasoline is expensive. 
Powerful, American v-engine sedans would simply not have been well-received 
there.    
 
(Maxton & Wormald 2004) 
Figure 15.  World market for cars (2002).  
In Figure 15 we see a breakdown of the world market for cars in 2002. Since then, 
Asia has become the largest car producing region in the world, but we can assume 
that the relative class proportions have not changed radically during the last ten 
years. The market is divided into several segments – super luxury, entry-level, 
micro-car, comfort upline, performance upline and the three volume segments 
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(missing is also the super performance segment, which is too small to register). 
The volume segments are mainly made up from sedan models, but also contain 
hatchbacks, wagons, etc.  
The North American market 
North America, despite its low European brand content, is actually the market 
with the greatest amount of equality between cars from the three production re-
gions.  Europe and Asia are dominated by their own production, and American 
brands have not managed to gain significant instep in these markets – except by 
buying subsidiaries and forming joint ventures.  
The North American car market has remained remarkably open to outside in-
vestment. This fact is demonstrated by the Japanese "trade-invasion" of the 70s 
and 80s, when the products and car models produced by Lean production methods 
washed over the USA. Even today foreign car companies have an extensive pro-
duction in North America and the North American market remains an attractive 
export market to many of the car producing countries (as we saw in Section 3.1). 
Therefore it seems logical to choose the USA market for this particular compari-
son – the largest amount of different car models are sold there at any given time. 
Of course the USA market is dominated by the American brands, but the Asian 
competitors have a presence that is almost equally large. Also the European 
brands are present – to a smaller degree – but certainly this is their largest pres-
ence outside of Europe. There is also a lot of easily available data on this market, 
which certainly helps matters greatly.   
The sedan body type 
Secondly, we should choose the type of car to compare. In this case, the sedan 
seems the best choice – it is by far the most widely used and produced body type 
in the world (gasoline powered sedans, naturally, since that is by far the most 
common power source for the world's cars). The sedan is also the most consistent 
and internally comparable type of car that we have. Wagon type models, vans, 
minivans, off-roaders, coupes, sports cars: all of these classes show a much larger 
variation in terms of size, style, equipment, and other design solutions. Further-
more the sedan model is a body type that has been consistent for a long time. The 
sedans of today have better performance and a higher basic equipment level, but 
are still easily recognizable when compared with something that existed 20–30 
years ago. 
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Time interval 
Finally,  the  time  interval  –  what  time  period  should  we  look  at,  and  how  often  
should we look in order to produce a valid comparison of car design between 
companies, regions and its development over time? This must necessarily be a 
function of availability: what data can we get, how far it spans, etc. – this we will 
look at more closely in the next section. However, we can already say now that it 
is hardly necessary to compare each and every year with the previous.  
According to Holweg and Pil (2004) the cycle of redesign is currently about five 
years. During this time a model is sold constantly with only smaller cosmetic 
modifications, but at the end of the cycle the model is either substantially upgrad-
ed or dropped from the company's lineup. This cycle is shortening, of course – in 
1970 the average product lifecycle was seven and a half years. But since it is what 
it is at the moment, we can assume that a five-year interval will be enough for a 
good investigation: no new models are completely missed during their lifespan, 
and we should be able to see an almost completely new and refreshed set of vehi-
cles during each measurement interval. 
5.1 Selecting Sources of Data 
There are several sources that hold that kind of repair data we are looking for. The 
best thing would of course be to select several of these sources and combine the 
data to form a very reliable composite database. However, the possibility to do so 
depends on the compatibility of the different sources. In general, the data that we 
will look at will come from either  
a) the type of repair guide intended as a help for the workshop mechanic or 
from 
b) the insurance claims estimate guides intended as a help to the insurance 
estimator presenting a quote on how expensive it will be to repair a car.  
There are several commercial options available, unfortunately none free-to-use. 
The following is a short list of the most common sources of repair time data (da-
tabases mentioned often on the Internet, either as close competitors or comple-
ments to each other). The list is by no means exhaustive, but these are certainly 
the most well-known alternatives. 
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Alldata 
Alldata is a leading North American provider of auto repair software. They pro-
vide diagnostic, repair and collision information, together with business manage-
ment tools for the automotive service industry. Alldata was founded in 1986 (Cal-
ifornia) and functions offered are (in the simplest versions): manufacturer tech-
nical service bulletins and recalls, wiring diagrams, maintenance tables, parts and 
labor information, part removal procedures for disassembly, diagnostic and repair 
procedures, etc. (Alldata 2011.)  
This database is often considered the most widely spanning source of automobile 
repair data. The company offers versions that contain both Asian, European and 
North  American  cars,  all  presented  to  an  astonishing  degree  of  detail.  The  only  
problem is price – at €1500 and more per license it is clear that Alldata is intend-
ed for serious professional use at a workshop. More affordable alternatives are 
available. 
Autodata 
Autodata is a leading European supplier of technical information for automotive 
repair shops and other automotive professionals. Established in 1975 (U.K.), Au-
todata provides their data through both electronic and printed media. Functions 
offered are (in the simplest versions): Technical data, vehicle identification, ser-
vice adjustments, lubricants and capacities, tightening torques, repair times, wheel 
alignment, service illustrations, service schedules, diagnostic trouble codes, wir-
ing diagrams, etc. (Autodata 2011.) 
Autodata provides a similar database to Alldata, and at a more affordable rate 
(about €500). However – the problem is that it focuses on the European market, 
omitting some of the American brands that have not made it Europe. Plymouth, 
Oldsmobile, etc. – none of these are covered in the guide. Renault, Citroen and 
Seat are all present on the other hand. It's a question of choice – which market do 
we focus on? But since the North American market is very wide and international, 
coupled with the fact that it is easier to find historical car data from this area, we 
choose to look at that particular market, and in effect have to ignore the Autodata 
software as a source.  
Chilton Automotive Data 
Chilton is a producer of automotive repair guides and reference sources for ser-
vice shops and enthusiasts. It was founded in 1904 (Philadelphia) as The Chilton 
Publishing Company with a focus on periodicals for automotive repair. The com-
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pany has kept to its roots – while the company upkeeps online databases too, the 
focus is traditionally on printed media and disc editions. (Chilton 2011.)   
Chilton provides a number of different types of manuals – most commonly repair 
time manuals and service manuals, but also more specific volumes such as the 
"Timing Belts, 1985–2005" "Brake Specifications and Service 1990–2000" etc. 
The repair time manuals – which are of the greatest interest to us – cover Europe-
an and Asian brands as well as North American.   
Chilton's manuals are a comparatively speaking affordable source of repair time 
data (at about €150 for a set of labor time manuals or a disk issue). However on 
closer investigation, the Chilton manuals are not altogether very specific when it 
comes to components and sub assemblies – most of the procedures described in 
Chilton are focused on repair, but not linked to actual removal and installation of 
components – for instance balancing tires, bleeding brakes, etc. Furthermore, the 
repair times given are quite bluntly estimated, relatively speaking.  
Mitchell International  
Mitchell International (headquartered in San Diego) is one of North America's 
largest providers of collision repair information for use in insurance estimation. 
Mitchell has long been known (founded 1946 by Glenn Mitchell) for their colli-
sion estimating guides published in paper format – their manuals are widely used 
by collision repair shops and insurance companies. The company continues to 
issue these paper guides annually, but they also upkeep an online database that 
presents the same data. (Mitchell 2011). 
Mitchell's guides are an excellent source of repair data in that it is precise (down 
to  tenths  of  an  hour),  cheap  (about  €120  for  3  months  of  access  to  their  online  
database) and wide – the manuals and the database cover both import and domes-
tic North American models from the late 1980s forward (much longer back than 
that, if you only look at domestic North American models).  
Motor Information Systems 
Motor Information Systems is another large North American supplier of automo-
tive data, headquartered in Montana. Founded in 1903, they focus on offering 
parts and labor data for repair estimating, service manuals and shop management 
software for business owners. In addition to their paper manuals and disc issues, 
Motor Information Systems has entered into an agreement with Alldata, providing 
access to a Motor/Alldata repair information database online. (Motor Information 
Systems 2011.) 
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The Motor Information Systems guides are very similar to the Mitchell's guides, 
but they are unfortunately not sold outside of North America. The Alldata infor-
mation database would be available for international use, but unfortunately at the 
same price as the original Alldata service, €1500.  
Tolerance data 
Tolerance A/S from Denmark is a European supplier of data solutions and tech-
nical vehicle data. They provide automotive repair data, testing equipment soft-
ware, circuit diagram data, trouble shooting for electrical systems, etc. While they 
do sell software and databases on disc for use in individual service shops, they 
focus on their online services and selling access to the different databases they 
offer. (Tolerance Data 2011.) 
Tolerance data provides perhaps the cheapest source of automotive data of the 
different alternatives (access to the online portal at about €40 per year). Unfortu-
nately, only European market cars are covered, leaving out the Oldsmobiles, 
Plymouths, etc. while covering the specifically European models such as those by 
Citroen, Renault, Seat etc. 
Vivid Automotive Data and Media 
Vivid Automotive Data and Media is a European software company focused on 
providing technical data for the automotive industry (headquartered in the Nether-
lands). The company is young compared to many of the other – they launched 
their first version of their main product Vivid Workshop data in 1996. The soft-
ware is available on disc and online, covering technical drawings, engine man-
agement systems, wiring diagrams and repair times. (Vivid). 
Vivid 's data is also of European origin, and omits several of the American mod-
els. The cost is somewhat high at about €600 per software issue.  
Final Choice – Mitchell 
In the end, after having reviewed the different choices, the Mitchell repair guides 
stood out as the winner. The reasoning behind this is mainly practical. Autodata, 
Tolerance data and Vivid Workshop data are not good choices given that we want 
to look at the American market specifically. Alldata is simply too expensive for a 
purely academic comparison – there are several sources that are much more af-
fordable  for  our  needs.  Motor  Information  Systems  will  not  sell  their  manuals  
outside of the United States. That leaves us with Mitchell International's guides 
and the Chilton guides.  
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Having purchased and looked at both, it is clear that the Mitchell collision esti-
mating guides are more suitable for the needs of this research – more specific 
repair time estimates, a higher degree of time variance between models (some-
thing which implies intimate knowledge of the models) and a very large amount 
of specific components and sub assemblies presented together with the time it will 
take to remove and install a new component.  
Using both of the guides together would have been possible: making a composite 
or average estimate of the repair times from both, to gain a stronger and more 
unbiased picture of the real world situation. However, the practical situation is 
that the different guides uses very different metrics (Chilton focusing on repair 
and tuning procedures, Mitchell focusing on the exchange of individual compo-
nents) – it is hard combine the two. Only about 20 subassembly exchange proce-
dures would have loosely matched both sets of guides, as opposed to 53 (44) suit-
able candidates available to us in the Mitchell guides only, as we will see in the 
later sections. 
Parts count and fastener types  
In the beginning of the data collection phase, the plan was still to also investigate 
other metrics of DFA in addition to repair times. It seemed possible, for instance, 
to study parts counts and fastener types from the same repair manuals already 
acquired. However, this proved to be impossible because of the inconsistent parts 
listings given in several of the repair manuals. For some models the manuals may 
list parts down to the nut-and-bolt level, while for others only the sub-assembly 
level is outlined. Even if the listings for one year were comparable (and this is 
rarely the case) the differences in detail level between years are significant 
enough to make the study of parts count and fastener types meaningless on the 
basis of this data.  
5.2 Car Model Selection 
To select the largest possible amount of viable, comparable cars for the selected 
years, we must begin by establishing what cars were in production during that 
year specifically and furthermore find a suitable method of classifying these cars 
so they truly are internally comparable.  
The second point is especially important. Naturally all cars will differ from com-
peting models in some way – otherwise the model would be nothing but an imita-
tion or a copy. This will of course also impact on our measurement results – we 
can never be truly sure whether the differences in repair time come from large 
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differences in the models' true build and structure, or whether they just come from 
simple small differences in the models' shape and styling. However, by only com-
paring cars that compete with each other in the same class segment, and that have 
a very similar profile in terms of physical size, drive, transmission, engine size 
and type, body size, etc. we can minimize the distorting effect of radically differ-
ent builds. We can ensure that the differences between cars in the same class will 
be mainly cosmetic on the outside and mainly component-level on the inside.  
Finding such comparable class segments is not easy. Choosing to restrict our-
selves to sedans only is of course a first step. But there are many different ways of 
classifying the cars – according to price, according to size, according to motor 
size, etc. A composite indicator of all these would of course be best, to ensure that 
we are not comparing cars that are clearly different in some aspect but not in oth-
ers.  
Finding a classification 
The first step in finding such a composite indicator would be to look at the car 
rental companies, since they are already using systems of car classifications on 
which the customers make their rental choices.  A few of the rental car companies 
have even created a joint classification system, represented by the Association of 
Car Rental Industry System Standards (or ACRISS for short). The system stand-
ard is a joint project of Avis, Budget, Europcar and Hertz started in 1989, and the 
stated  purpose  is  to  create  standards  of  rental  cars  to  "avoid misleading infor-
mation when making a car rental booking online or via electronic means". The 
classifications are performed by an independent automotive evaluator. (ACRISS 
2011a) 
The ACRISS members use a four character vehicle code to describe a vehicle, 
with each character representing a characteristic of the car. The first character 
stands for the vehicle category – based on size, cost, engine size and luxury fac-
tor, while the second character defines the car's chassis type (van, SUV, wagon, 
etc.) The third and fourth characters stand for transmission and drive (manu-
al/automatic, 2WD, 4WD, etc.) and fuel type (gasoline, hybrid, etc.) respectively. 
So  for  instance  we can  have  a  code  such  as  CCMN, which  stands  for  Compact  
Car – 2/4 Door – Manual Transmission – Gasoline, Non air-conditioned. Several 
car models fit  this description – the Ford Focus and Opel Astra are given as ex-
amples. (ACRISS 2011b) 
There is just one problem. These ACRISS classifications are not available freely 
– they are the intellectual property of the rental companies subscribing to the sys-
tem standard. An individual rental car franchise operator does not have access to 
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the oldest classifications – the codes of the models from the beginning of the 90s. 
Their databases only cover the more current models. The ACRISS secretariat will 
divulge the classifications of a few car models if asked, but do not hand out com-
plete listings to the outside individual.  
This means that some other type of classification system must be used. Fortunate-
ly there are several such sources of a more public nature: the new-car reviews of 
automobile magazines. Each year several periodicals publish issues where the 
coming year's car models are presented – new models are of course covered, but 
also already existing models and any possible modifications are presented – to 
provide a source of information and comparison data to the new car buyer. Are 
this year's models better than the old "trustworthy" models that we already know? 
The magazines review for us.  
Selecting the car magazines 
There are several car magazines that publish such a yearly model review at the 
moment. However, there are not equally many that have been doing so consistent-
ly since the late 1980s. This seems to be a natural barrier in the data – before the 
late 80s the car magazines are either unavailable or focus entirely on local car 
brands. An interesting fact in itself, but nevertheless an almost insurmountable 
hinder to research that goes farther back in time.  
Keeping this criterion in mind, five sources are found relatively easily: The Con-
sumer Reports' new car buying guide, Edmund's new cars, Road & Track Maga-
zine's new car buyers guide, Car and Driver Magazine's buyers guide and Motor 
Trend Magazine's new cars. The last three of these are magazines, which publish 
the new car reviews in addition to their monthly general issues. The first two are 
organizations that specifically focus on offering consumer advice. All five have 
been around for several decades. 
Rather than choose a single one of these to dictate the car's classification it seems 
prudent to gather data from all five. This is especially true because of the fact that 
all of them do not cover the exactly same cars, especially not during the earlier 
years. Furthermore, with several sets of price estimates and classification sugges-
tions it seems we can get a more complete picture of what type of car we are deal-
ing with at the moment.  
Consumer reports 
Consumer Reports is an American magazine published by the American Consum-
ers Union. Issued since 1936, the guides contain reviews and comparisons of con-
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sumer products based on tests performed by the Consumers Union test labs. The 
guides do not contain advertisements and the staff performs their tests on products 
bought retail to avoid the chance of positive bias towards a generous contributor. 
The annual Consumer Reports new car issue is released every April, and is con-
sidered a strong influence on the American car buyer's purchase decision. (An-
swers.com 2011e.)  
The Consumer Reports books are a good source of car data – even the 90s issues 
have a complete listing of the models on sale for those years. The 1990 and 1995 
guides divides the four door sedan models into "small cars", "compact cars", 
"medium-sized cars" and "large cars". In the 2000, 2005 and 2010 guides, the 
previous groups are remodeled into smaller, more specific listings: the four door 
sedan models are now "small cars", "large sedans", "family sedans", "luxury se-
dans" and "upscale cars". For all years, these guides offer detailed information on 
car specifications, characteristics, reliability and safety, prices, etc. 
Edmund's  
Edmunds car guides is a provider of car information, reviews, prices of new and 
used vehicles, tips on purchases and car ownership, etc. Edmunds was started in 
1966 as a publisher of printed booklets with automotive specifications meant to 
help car shoppers make their purchases. Their titles included Edmunds New Cars 
& Trucks Buyer's Guide, Edmunds Used Cars & Trucks Buyer's Guide and Ed-
munds Strategies for Smart Car Buyers. Presently Edmund's no longer publish 
printed works – they have completely migrated all their services and data to the 
web (www.edmunds.com). (Answers.com 2011d.) 
Edmund's new car guides are an equally good source of automobile specifications 
as  the  Consumer  Reports  guides,  and  are  even  more  specific  in  terms  of  equip-
ment listings. One problem is that the earliest guide used in this work (1990) only 
covers the American models, and thus only supplies a third of the data needed. 
This deficiency is corrected already by 1995, however. Also, the guides do not 
start classifying models by any kind of system (except the alphabetic) before 2005 
when the four door sedan models are divided according to price: "sedan under 
$15,000", "sedan under $25,000", "sedan under $35,000", "sedan under $45,000" 
and "sedan over $45,000".  
It should be mentioned, also, that the Edmund's guide from 1990 proved hard to 
find and because of this the 1991 issue is used instead. This means slight changes 
in prices of certain models, but not necessary any other problems. With the help 
of the other Magazine guides it is easy to determine what models were on the list 
in 1991 and not yet in 1990, choosing the correct models from the Edmund's 
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guide accordingly. Similarly, as of 2006, Edmund's no longer publishes the new 
car guides in paper format – the website www.edmunds.com offers the same in-
formation in electronic format. Therefore the data from 2010 is taken from this 
website.  
Road & Track 
Road & Track is an American car magazine, founded in 1947 in New York, mak-
ing it one of the longest running car magazine in America. (Answers.com 2011c) 
Road and Track Magazine annually publishes a special Car Buyers Guide issue – 
this issue, unlike the normal monthly numbers, deals exclusively with the com-
parison of the car models on sale that particular year. These guides are an excel-
lently regular data source, something which can also be seen from the data listings 
that will be presented later on in the text – the vehicle data and reviews are highly 
consistent over 20 years.  
The 1990 guide was unavailable, so the 1991 the guide is used instead. Around 
this time the four door sedans were divided into three different groups: "economy 
cars", "family cars" and "luxury cars". After this, the magazine drops the classifi-
cations and presents the cars in alphabetic order only. However, the 2005 and 
2010 issues do for each model list a number of comparable models, which more 
or less match the model in terms of price and performance.  
Motor Trend magazine 
Motor Trend is an American automobile magazine, operating since 1949 out of 
Los Angeles despite a varied chain of ownerships. Its new car issues are released 
every September and October: the September issue presents the upcoming car 
models for the next calendar year, while the October issue focuses on off-roaders, 
sport-utility vehicles and minivans. (Answers 2011b) 
The Motor Trend magazine's New Cars issue strives to present the years models 
in a brief and compact way – this means that there is not much room for vehicle 
specifications and similar, but the guides are completely sufficient and provide a 
better-than-average overview because of their brevity.  
The 1990 issue is not a complete car buyers guide – it is only a new car presenta-
tion, where about 10 to 15 models are presented that are new or improved for that 
particular year. For the other four years and listings are more complete. The com-
plete buyers’ guide for 2001 and 2002 is used instead of the 2000 issue. This is 
also the only issue where any kind of classification was attempted – a similar 
price driven classification as the Edmund's guides. The class range is "$16,000 & 
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under", "$16,000 to $20,000", "$20,000 to $30,000", "$30,000 to $4000", 
"$40,000 to $50,000" and "$50,000 & up". Otherwise only alphabetical order.  
Car and Driver magazine 
Car and Driver magazine (originally founded as Sports Cars Illustrated in 1955) 
has worked under its current brand name since 1961(Answers 2011a). Car and 
Driver magazine's new car issues are the hardest to use in terms of data collection.  
The 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 issues all follow the same structure – the model 
changes since a last year are verbally and briefly presented, mostly in terms of 
outlook changes and problem fixes, with a few select models presented and re-
viewed in greater detail. These select models are extremely well documented, 
however. Unfortunately this inconsistency means that we get a spotty image of 
the complete model lineup will offer.  
The 2010 issue breaks off from this trend, however, and present short reviews and 
specification lists for each model individually. The outlook is similar to that of the 
Road and Track issues. As an additional bonus a two page list of all sedan models 
is  presented,  with  the  most  important  data  (price,  fuel  consumption  etc.)  com-
pared. Here a similar prize classification is also used, with a class range of "under 
$18,000", "$18,000–$25,000", "$25,000–$40,000" and "over $40,000".  
A custom classification system 
As we can see the whole concept of classification is quite complex. None of the 
guides offer a single system of classification that is valid for the 20 year span that 
we are currently looking at. This is of course natural and understandable; the car 
models on offer vary with each year. Also, the current automotive industry trend 
has been one of diversification: while it might have been natural to talk about 
"economy cars", "family cars" and "luxury cars" during the late 80s and early 90s, 
we have later started seeing a plethora of difficult-to-classify car types such as the 
crossovers, the SUV:s, the hybrids, etc. Therefore those guides using a verbal 
classification system (Consumer Reports, for instance), have also been forced to 
expand their classification. 
The more simple system of assigning classes according to price has probably 
seemed the stable choice, and therefore we also see it used more often. However, 
we encounter problems even there. First of all inflation – the price classes do not 
stay constant over 20 years. The very popular Ford Taurus model cost on average 
about $22,000 in 1990, but 20 years later the average price was closer to $28,000. 
Some of these changes depend on model refits and upgrades, but in practice infla-
tion is a factor.  
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Secondly, none of the guides we have been investigating agreed on the same price 
scale; their classes are not exactly the same, if yet similar. While this is also un-
derstandable – each magazine wants to show individuality and not copy their 
competitors – it is a problem to consistency. Finally the third problem: the maga-
zines  do  not  agree  completely  on  the  price  span  off  the  model.  This  minimum-
maximum price span that depends on optional equipment, engine, service agree-
ments and probably the retailers profit margin, is different for each magazine, 
probably on the basis of different retailers' price quotes.  
In conclusion, there is no readily available single classification offered by these 
guides that will suffice for the comparison of models over 20 years. The verbal 
classifications depend mainly on popular opinion, and have furthermore evolved 
over the last decades. The price classifications cannot be used because of inflation 
and disagreement over what price a model really is.  It is clear therefore that we 
must create our own hybrid classification depending on the natural groups we see 
during data collection (based on price, engine type, luxury factor, etc.), supported 
of course by the classifications of the guides we have studied.   
5.3 Car Model Selection 
The classification finally used in the comparison is a verbal hybrid classification 
based on price, drive type, engine type, and of course body type. The reasons for 
choosing this specific classification are varied, but mainly based on observational 
evidence from the data collection phase. 
Class 1: Low-Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
Class 2: Mid-Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
Class 3: Mid-High-Price – Front Wheel Drive – V-engine – Sedans 
Class 4: High-Price – Rear Wheel Drive – V-engine – Sedans 
First of all, it seemed natural to omit any kind of hard numeric price boundaries 
between classes, inflation would render these meaningless. The next logical step 
would be to formulate three simple classes based on the relative price concepts: 
low-price, mid-price and high-price. These three are generalizations of the more 
specific terms economy, family and luxury – general enough that specific cus-
tomer opinions or value decisions do not play a large part.  
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However, during the process of data collection, certain obstacles were encoun-
tered. The mid-price class is large and varied – especially obvious is the break 
between the cheaper in-line (all cylinders in a line) engine models, and the more 
expensive v-engine models. The inliners are more a continuation of the low price 
car lineup, only with more equipment and larger in size to satisfy the more dis-
cernible (family) customer. The v-engine models on the other hand, with their 
stronger motors and higher prices definitely seem to cater to yet another class of 
customer. This problem is especially tangible in North America, where the v-
engine type is more common than in Europe and Asia. 
The price differences can be in the region of several thousands of dollars. But this 
is an unreliable metric since expensive inliners and cheap v-engines do exist. It 
would not, however, seem entirely prudent to compare both groups internally. 
The engine type does have an impact on several assemblies in terms of repair 
time. The V-engine motors are larger, their removal generally takes longer, and 
the assemblies connected to them also seem to take longer to remove than those 
of the in-line models.  
And, in addition, there is a clear distinction between the two groups when talking 
about transmissions. The V-engine models distinctly favor the automatic gearbox, 
while the in-line engines are almost always equipped with a manual gearbox. This 
will become obvious later on when the car model selection is presented.  
Since the mid-price group has such a large span – containing models that could 
not in good conscience be said to give exactly the same value proposition (a cus-
tomer  opinion  thing,  but  nevertheless)  at  both  ends  of  the  spectrum  –  it  seems  
natural to divide it into two.  
The fourth class (the high-price, rear wheel drive, v-engine sedans) differs from 
the others in that it features rear wheel drive models. Naturally it would be prefer-
able to only study cars that are completely similar in terms of drive, layout, etc. 
but the reality is simply that the high price front-wheel-drive models are few in 
between, almost nonexistent. When using more powerful engines, it is common 
knowledge that a vehicle's handling is negatively affected if both drive and steer-
ing are combined in the front of the car. Thus the more powerful and expensive 
models favor rear wheel drive.  
Because of this we must try to work around this problem by making a clear divi-
sion of classes, only comparing the same type of cars within a class, and trying to 
choose such assemblies to study that do not depend too heavily upon the drive or 
engine type (more about this in the next chapter).   
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At this point in time a small quirk of car development should be mentioned. Dur-
ing the last few years the designers of high-priced cars have moved on from rear 
wheel drive to all wheel drive (AWD). Like four-wheel drive (mainly used in 
connection with terrain vehicles and trucks), this type of system provides motive 
force on all four wheels, but is mainly used to provide a more smooth ride and 
better traction. As of 2010, the majority of luxury vehicles have switched to all-
wheel drive, and because of this we are forced to accept AWD as the defining 
feature of fourth class, for 2010 only.  
 
Guidelines to selecting the cars 
For a more general reasoning behind why certain cars were chosen and others not, 
let's look at the criteria that were used to make selections.  
1. Follow the classes as strictly as possible.  Only  allow  V-engine,  automatic  
transmission, front drive vehicles of a certain price range into the third class, for 
instance. There is a certain amount of leeway in this selection, however. The V-
engines  include  V6s,  V8s,  and  even  V12s  (number  of  cylinders)  –  most  of  the  
third class models only have a V6, and most of the fourth class models a V8, but 
exceptions occur. The style of the engine is the most important thing in terms of 
repair time. The transmission type should also match – automatic for the V-
engines – but towards the later years a few new items such as the continuously 
variable transmission (CVT) had to be allowed.  
Furthermore the cutoff points between what is considered low price and mid-price 
or mid-high price and high price are quite hard to define clearly. In most cases the 
guidance of the car guides proved sufficient, and a decision could be made on the 
basis of the recommendations. In other cases the decision was harder – but most 
often the complicated cases disqualified themselves because of their uniqueness. 
See the discussion on omitted models below.  
2. Choose the Base model whenever possible. The base model, the model with the 
least amount of optional packages and accessories is likely to be the model that is 
most comparable to other models. Less components to be detached before the 
"important" assemblies can be removed. In certain very rare cases, an optional 
model can be chosen if this means a better fit with one of the categories – an en-
gine upgrade for instance.  
3. No hybrids. Towards the end of the timescale, electric-gasoline hybrid cars 
begin to make their  presence known. These can not in any way be compared to 
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the  early  90s  models  or  even  the  2010  normal  models.  Therefore  they  must  be  
omitted from the comparison completely.  
4. No Subarus. Subaru Motor Company has consistently been using the flat boxer 
style engine type for several decades. Since a lot of the internal classification de-
pends on engine type such a unique solution cannot be used in the comparison.  
5. No ultra-luxury cars. In this comparison we have chosen a relatively moderate 
definition of "luxury" or high-priced cars. The highest price encountered in the 
cars chosen for analysis is $169,000, for a Mercedes-Benz S430. This is admitted-
ly  a  high  price,  but  the  majority  of  the  models  go  for  between  $35,000  and  
$80,000. On the other hand, if we start admitting Rolls-Royce, Maybach and 
Bentley into the comparison we multiply prices by several factors. Most of these 
brands are not covered in the guides or in the Mitchell manuals and those that do 
are certainly in a class of their own. In terms of repair times and equipment levels, 
these cars are not similar to those at the lower end of the high-price range. And 
since the majority of the class lies at the lower end of the scale it is easier to simp-
ly omit the "ultra-luxury" cars. 
6. Same transmission type. The models chosen for each class should have the 
same type of transmission, since this is an important difference between car 
builds. This type of differentiation comes almost naturally since each of the four 
chosen classes has a "normal" transmission type - class one manual, class two 
automatic, etc. But there are a few odd models that have to be left out because of 
this.  
In Table 12 we can see a small list of the sedans that were omitted from the 2010 
listing because of various invalidating reasons. From some of these examples it is 
clear  that  the  car  producing  regions  and  companies  do  not  always  work  in  sync  
with each other and use the same drive/engine/transmission combinations on their 
models – especially the European designers often make cars that are quite unique 
in their equipment combination. This is of course irritating to the researcher, but 
from the larger (consumer's choice) perspective quite a good thing.  
In  appendices  11  and  12,  we  can  see  the  cars  that  were  finally  chosen  for  the  
analysis. In appendix 11 the model specifications are presented – the model, the 
more specific model line, the drive layout, the length, width and height of the car, 
the weight, the engine type, the brake horsepower of the model, the engine's dis-
placement (cylinder displacement) and transmission type. Concepts and abbrevia-
tions are explained in the beginning of the appendix.  
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In appendix 12, the various prices and classifications of the models from the dif-
ferent guides are presented. The classifications are a little bit truncated, but the 
full class names are presented in the beginning of the appendix. The models are 
divided by year, class and region. 
Table 12. Incompatible models omitted from the 2010 comparison. 
Model Omitted 
from  
Reason 
Subaru All Boxer Engine 
Volvo S60 Class 2 Expensive inline-4 model, more suited for the 3rd (mid-high) 
price class 
Dodge Charger Class 3 Cheap RWD model, more suited for the 2nd (mid) price class 
Mercury Grand Marquis Class 3 Cheap RWD model, more suited for the 2nd (mid) price class 
Chrysler 300 Class 3 Cheap RWD model, more suited for the 2nd (mid) price class 
Saab 9–3 Class 3 AWD only, but too cheap for the 4th (high) price class 
Saab 9–5 Class 3 AWD only, but too cheap for the 4th (high) price class 
Volkswagen CC Class 3 AWD only, but too cheap for the 4th (high) price class 
Saab 9–3 Class 4 AWD only, but too cheap for the 4th (high) price class 
Mercedes-Benz CLS Class 4 RWD only, but too expensive for the 3rd (mid-high) price class 
Lincoln Town Car Class 4 RWD only, but too expensive for the 3rd (mid-high) price class 
Hyundai Genesis Class 4 RWD only, but too expensive for the 3rd (mid-high) price class 
Jaguar XF Class 4 RWD only, but too expensive for the 3rd (mid-high) price class 
Cadillac DTS Class 4 FWD only, but too expensive for the 3rd (mid-high) price class 
Lexus HS Class 4 Expensive inline-4 model 
Aston Martin Rapide Class 4 "Ultraluxury" 
Bentley Class 4 "Ultraluxury" 
Maserati  Class 4 "Ultraluxury" 
Maybach Class 4 "Ultraluxury" 
Rolls Royce Class 4 "Ultraluxury" 
Mercedes-Benz S-class Class 4 "Ultraluxury" 
5.4 Sub-Assembly Selection 
Selecting the sub assemblies is more a question of availability than a deliberate 
choice. The Mitchell guides' pages for each car model generally divide the parts 
and repair time registry into several general sections – these sections are present-
ed in Table 13. 
The aim is of course to find items and assemblies from as many of these sections 
as possible while at the same time striving to select only such items and assem-
blies that are general enough to be found on each of the car models we've chosen 
for the comparison.  
This forces us to make several omissions already from the beginning. Since all 
cars in the comparison will not have options such as an electric sunroof or an air 
conditioning device, no such assemblies can be chosen. Furthermore we must try 
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not to choose items and assemblies that will differ between the different classes. 
A good example would be the drive axle: the first three classes selected consist of 
front wheel drive cars, but the fourth class of rear wheel or all wheel drive cars. 
Thus we cannot in all conscience look at the repair time of either front or back 
drive axles – the two are not comparable, and whichever we would choose to ob-
serve, some class of car would not have the other one.  
Table 13. Mitchell collision estimation guides’, sections. 
1 A/C / Heater / Ventilation  16 Front door  31 Rear gate 
2 ABS/Brakes  17 Front drive axle  32 Rear lamps 
3 Airbag system  18 Front fender  33 Rear seat 
4 Air cleaner  19 Front lamps  34 Rear suspension 
5 Center console  20 Front seat  35 Rocker/pillars/floor 
6 Cooling  21 Front suspension  36 Roof 
7 Cowl & Dash  22 Fuel tank  37 Seat belts 
8 Cruise control system  23 Grille  38 Steering gear 
9 Electrical  24 Hood  39 Steering linkage 
10 Emission system  25 Instrument panel  40 Steering pump 
11 Engine/Trans  26 Quarter glass  41 Steering wheel/column 
12 Engine/Trans Mounts  27 Quarter panel  42 Sunroof 
13 Exhaust  28 Rear bumper  43 Trans oil cooler 
14 Frame  29 Rear door  44 Wheel 
15 Front bumper  30 Rear drive axle  45 Windshield 
As an additional problem to solve, we also have the fact that the Mitchell guides 
do not display exactly the same assemblies, items and procedures for each year 
and for every car model. While the sections displayed in Table 13 are generally 
present in all five year-sets of the manuals, especially the older manuals may 
sometimes vary a bit in section content and section division. Certain assemblies 
are presented in some of the manuals but not at all in the others. The larger as-
sembly procedures (discussed in the next section) are also more consistently dis-
played in the manuals from 2000 and forward.  
The conclusion of all these variances is that subassembly selection is a problemat-
ic and boundary restricted task. The only way to achieve a goodly selection of 
assemblies is to begin by choosing as large a possible amount of items to follow 
and gradually whittle down the list of assemblies when problems occur. If an as-
sembly is consistently presented and accounted for in several of the manuals but 
not in all, we should omit this assembly from the list. If an assembly is consistent-
ly presented and accounted for in even the most of the car models, but not in all, 
we may still have to omit the assembly. This process can only be done manually 
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by going through the steps of data collection and finding out what is left to com-
pare. Needless to say the remaining assemblies will all be extremely general in 
nature, and more or less present on any car everywhere.  
 
Mitchell manual outlook 
As already mentioned, the Mitchell collision estimating guides are mainly for the 
use of insurance estimators and repair shops, to estimate how much a certain re-
pair will eventually cost in total, before the actual repair is made. For each part 
and assembly presented in the manuals an estimated part's price and an estimated 
repair time is given. The part's price is a guideline to how much the spare part will 
cost, bought new from a licensed dealer. The estimated repair time, which we will 
mainly be looking at in this investigation, is a guideline to how long it will take to 
remove and replace said part at the repair shop.  
The repair times shown in the guides are given in hours and tenths of hours, thus 
0,1 hours represent six minutes. As is also explained in the guides  
“[the times] are for replacement with new undamaged parts from the vehicle 
manufacturer on a new undamaged vehicle… The actual time taken by individual 
repair facilities to replace collision damaged parts can be expected to vary due to 
severity of collision, vehicle condition, equipment used, etc.” (Collision Estimat-
ing Guide Imported 2005: P3). 
While this definition may in fact produce certain unrealistic estimates when talk-
ing about the repair of a severely damaged vehicle (bodywork skewed to jam 
bolts,  parts  deformed  to  hinder  removal)  it  is  strangely  enough  an  almost  ideal  
setting for assembly analysis. New undamaged parts on a new undamaged vehicle 
– a similar setting to that of the assembly line.  
The manuals' listing for one type of car model is most often about 15–20 pages 
long, divided into sections which we saw earlier in Table 13. Also most often, 
each section begins with a sort of summary of the larger procedures connected 
with the section. These larger procedures outline how long it will take to replace 
or overhaul an entire section of the car' machinery for body. For instance the front 
bumper section or subsection starts with estimates of how long it  will  take to 1) 
refinish bumper cover, 2) refinish upper filler 3) remove and install bumper as-
sembly and 4) overhaul bumper assembly (includes remove and install). Under 
the larger procedures there is a parts sketch – in Figure 16 we see a rendition of 
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the type Mitchell’s guides uses in its guides, the dashboard of a European car 
model from 2005.  
Most of the repair times given in the manuals will be for one of the three follow-
ing procedures: R&I (Remove and Install), O/H (Overhaul) or Refinish. The most 
commonly used is the Remove and Install procedure, but sometimes the Overhaul 
time estimate is given side-by-side since there is a certain difference to the two 
procedures. The Refinish procedure is mainly used when talking about sheet metal 
parts. The definitions of each of these procedures are presented below. 
 
 (Mitchell International 2005) 
Figure 16.  Instrumentation panel, Mitchell guide.  
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Under the parts sketch each part is listed with number, VIN code, replacement 
time and estimated parts cost: 
 Part name   VIN Time (H) Cost $ 
Panel Assy, Intrument 30722602–7  6,5 302,17 
 
Procedure definitions 
The definitions of the terms are stated in the collision estimating guides:  
“Remove and Install (R&I): Remove a part or assembly, set it aside and reinstall 
it later. The time shown includes the alignment that can be done by shifting the 
part or assembly.” (Collision Estimating Guide Imported 1991: P3). 
The term Remove and Replace (R&R) can be used almost synonymously, since in 
that case, the part is removed and replaced with a new replacement part. In both 
cases, there is no damage to the part being removed and installed.  
“Overhaul (O/H): Remove an assembly, disassemble, clean and visually inspect 
it, replace needed parts, reassemble and reinstall on the vehicle making any nec-
essary adjustments.” This is a more time consuming process than Remove & In-
stall, and certainly one where DFA should be apparent. 
And finally Refinish – the process where a certain panel is removed, prepared, 
repainted and re-installed on the vehicle. This is a procedure where the principles 
of DFA are not as clearly visible – most of the time goes not to removal and in-
stallation, but rather to the paint job – and as such should be considered an inferi-
or indicator to the other two. However, for comparable vehicles, there is a certain 
amount of information to be gleaned even here.  
In general, the ranking of the three indicators is such that Overhaul can be consid-
ered a better indicator of DFA than Remove and Install, which in turn is a better 
indicator better than Refinish. This because more time is actually used to disas-
semble parts and assemble them, and the basic design come into play – an assem-
bly designed to the principles of DFA should make this process faster.  
Final assembly selection 
Selecting as many subassemblies and items as possible, taking care to select only 
those that are most general and present on the largest amount of cars, we arrive at 
the list  of 53 possible assemblies.  However,  after the gradual whittling down of 
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the list to arrive at something that is commonly shared by all the selected car 
models, we arrive at a final selection of 44 subassemblies and items. These selec-
tions are presented in Table 14.  
Table 14. Final assembly selection. 
1 A/C/Heater/Ventilation; Motor, Blower 23 Front Suspension; Arm, Lower Control 
2 Air Cleaner; Housing, Air Cleaner 24 Front Suspension; Bar, Stabilizer 
3 Back Window; Glass, Back Window 25 Front Suspension; Hub Assy 
4 Center Console; Console Assy, Center 26 Front Suspension; R&I Suspension (One 
Side) 
5 Cooling; Fan, Cooling 27 Fuel Tank; Pump assy, Fuel 
6 Cooling; Radiator Assy 28 Fuel Tank; Tank, Fuel 
7 Electrical, Alternator 29 Grille; Grille Assy 
8 Engine/Trans; Pan Assy, Engine Oil 30 Hood; Cable, Hood Release 
9 Engine/Trans; Pulley, Crankshaft, R&I 31 Hood; Panel, Hood 
10 Engine/Trans; R&I Engine/Trans Assy 32 Instrument panel; Panel, Main Instrument  
11 Exhaust; Manifold, Exhaust 33 Quarter Panel/Side body; Panel, Outer 
Quarter 
12 Front Bumper; Cover, Front 34 Rear Body; Panel Assy, Rear Body 
13 Front Door; Panel Assy (Interior), Door 
Trim 
35 Rear Bumper; Cover, Rear 
14 Front Door; Panel, Door Repair 36 Rear Lamps; Lamp Assy, Combination 
15 Front Door; Shell Assy, Door 37 Rocker/Pillars/Floor; Pillar Assy, Hinge 
16 Front Fender; Fender (Left) 38 Roof; Headliner (w/o Sunroof) 
17 Front Inner Structure; Apron Assy 39 Roof; Panel, Roof (w/o Sunroof) 
18 Front Inner Structure; Crossmember, Front 
Suspension 
40 Seat Belts; Belt Assy, Seat 
19 Front Inner Structure; Support  Assy,  Ra-
diator 
41 Steering Wheel/Column; Column Assy, 
Steering 
20 Front Lamps; Lamp Assy, Combination 42 Windshield; Glass, Windshield 
21 Front Seat; Cushion, Seat Bottom 43 Windshield; Tank Assy, Washer 
22 Front Steering Linkage/Gear; Gear Assy, 
Steering 
44 Wiper System; Motor Wiper 
The assemblies omitted include highly common components such as steering 
pump, rear shock absorbers, muffler (exhaust), brake caliper, steering wheel as-
sembly, etc.  All are found on a majority of cars but are unfortunately not present-
ed in the manuals for certain models or simply presented as a part of different 
assemblies.  
If we look at the list of assemblies selected in Table 14 we can see that it is quite 
a diverse collection with parts and assemblies from all the sections of the car. Mo-
tor parts, suspension, cooling, lamps, sheet metal, interior, electrical equipment – 
as close as we can come to an overall representation of the car's parts in total, 
working within the boundaries and limitations of the data source and car selec-
tion. Most of these parts should in addition be relatively insensitive to the class of 
the car.  
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Now, it should of course be said that several of the subassemblies are quite simple 
in their design and as such can probably not benefit much from redesign with as-
sembly in mind. The stabilizing bar in the front suspension is an example of such 
a simple component. However, this is not necessarily the point of the whole exer-
cise. We must consider that to remove even this simple component other compo-
nents must be shifted, and for the larger collection of simple components there are 
still opportunities to implement DFA. Looking at the sum total of the time it takes 
to remove and install the whole number of individual components we should get 
an idea about the Design-for-Assembly level of car.  
5.5 Data collection and limitations of the data 
The data collected is naturally too large to present in this text – and is of course 
also the intellectual property of Mitchell International – but for the sake of the 
company level analysis of repair times, a summary table of the individual models' 
results will be presented in connection with the data analysis (Tables 16–20).  
Having selected the sources of data, the car models and the relevant assemblies, 
the actual data collection is easy but time consuming. 316 models, with 44 subas-
semblies each, plus several subassemblies that were later thrown out makes for 
close to 14,000 observations. Unfortunately, in terms of statistical analysis the 
data is not ideal, despite this large number of observations. 
The problem is the concept of the width versus depth. We must remember that 
despite the large number of actual observations we are only looking at a small 
amount of actual car models – 316 in total. Furthermore, this amount is divided 
by five since we are looking at five different years – only about 60 models per 
year. If we look at the other modes of division, we have about 80 cars per class or 
about 100 cars per production region. And if we finally combine these criteria, 
we're only looking at about 15 models for each class per year, and so on.  
Now, each of these models is being studied carefully, by observing the 44 differ-
ent subassemblies. These should (when combined) act as a relatively good indica-
tor of the vehicle's overall level of efficient design in terms of disassembly and 
assembly. In other words, the individual vehicle data is strong. But because of the 
small numbers of vehicles we are dealing with, the statistical analysis of the larger 
variables (such as yearly development, regional differences, etc.) will be relative-
ly weak.  
This should be kept in mind throughout the analysis, and the results should be 
viewed critically in turn. However, since reality rarely provides perfect sets of 
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data, it is not necessarily wise to ignore the results that even an imperfect set of 
data can show us. We should simply proceed with caution, and not take the results 
out of their proper context. 
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6 METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
In this chapter we will first analyze at the data statistically and later review it on a 
more individual basis. The statistical analysis will focus on investigating the dis-
tribution of three variables – year (five groups: 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010), 
class (four groups, see previous chapter) and production region (Asia, USA, Eu-
rope). The individual analysis will look at the models' successes on the corpora-
tion  level  –  GM will  be  compared  with  Toyota  and  Volkswagen,  etc.  By doing  
this we can hope to find an answer to the research questions stated at the begin-
ning:  
What are the trends in automotive assembly time, looking at the last 20 years?  
What companies consistently produce the cars with lowest (and highest) assembly 
times? 
The program used to statistically analyze the data is SPSS's PASW statistics 18.   
6.1 Statistical analysis 
There are several ways of conducting a statistical analysis on this type of data. 
However, the most common method when wishing to analyze the difference be-
tween several groups of scores is the ANOVA (ANalysis Of VAriance) method.  
The easiest way to simplify the data into something that can comfortably analyzed 
by  the  ANOVA  analysis  method  –  and  still  produce  numbers  that  have  a  real  
world meaning – is to summarize all the time measurements of a car model into 
one grand total. Now, this sum does not have a real world equivalent in practice – 
it is just the added value of time it takes to repair 44 more or less randomly se-
lected assemblies on a car – but it can nevertheless be seen as a proxy for the time 
it would take to overhaul a car. 
These figures, together with the columns indicating year, class, and production 
region are presented in Tables 16–20. The figures have been structured in such a 
way as to show the repair times ascending for each year and class: those cars with 
the lowest total repair times are at the top of each class and year 
The ANOVA assumptions 
According to Gamst, Meyers & Guarino (2008: 49–84) there are three main as-
sumptions that must be fulfilled to perform a successful ANOVA analysis on a set 
of data: “(a) the error components associated with the scores of the dependent 
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variable are independent of one another, (b) these errors are normally distribut-
ed, and (c) the variances across levels or groups of the independent variable are 
equal”.   
Independence of errors 
The first assumption is often the most overlooked of the three; it depends more on 
choosing the right kind of data and experimental setup than on anything else. It is 
also relatively hard to use statistical analysis to examine whether one's data is 
truly error independent. 
According to Stevens (2002) ignoring or dismissing the error independence can 
have the outcome of inflating the targeted alpha level “Just a small amount of 
dependence among the observations causes the actual alpha to be several times 
greater than that level of significance.“ The only way to really avoid violating 
error independence is to make sure that the data analyzed from comes from truly 
randomly selected sample cases. 
The car repair data gathered for this investigation is sure to suffer from violations 
of this assumption. Considering that a) many of the car models are built on pro-
duction platforms intended to produce other closely related models, b) that espe-
cially the American car producers share components and designs between many 
of their brands and badges and c) that the same car model can return in the analy-
sis during several different years with only minor modifications – it is simply not 
possible to assume perfect independence. However, there is no way around this 
problem, and as such it will have to be recognized and taken into consideration 
but not be allowed to hinder further analysis. We must simply acknowledge that 
the results of the analysis are correspondingly weakened, and that any measure of 
statistical significance should only be accepted if it is safely large – no border 
cases accepted.  
Normality of errors 
The error components of the analyzed variables should also be normally distribut-
ed for the ANOVA analysis to be valid.  This to make sure that no hidden influ-
ence has been forgotten in the analysis: if a statistically significant variable has 
been left out of the equation its regular influence will skew the distribution away 
from its normal, natural distribution. The most common reasons for irregular dis-
tributions are, however, more prosaic – the sample size is too small or there are 
outliers with extreme or unusual values skewing the results.  
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Because of the central limit theorem (with a sufficiently large sample size (n) the 
resulting sample mean will approximate a normal distribution) we can feel rea-
sonably content with the normality of errors in this analysis. All of the factor 
groups should have at least 50 observations in each and that should be enough for 
one-way ANOVA (where only one independent factor is used to explain the de-
pendent factor). If we find the opportunity to use a two- or three-way ANOVA, 
on the other hand, (with two or three independent factors explaining one depend-
ent factor) we may run into problems with too small a sample size. This because 
using more independent factors further divides the groups into smaller groups (if 
we choose a two-way ANOVA analysis with the independent factors Year and 
Region, we have not only one 1990 group, but 1990-Asia, 1990-USA and 1990-
Europe) and each of these groups should have a normal distribution to satisfy the 
ANOVA assumptions.  
If we observe difficult outliers, we will decide whether they will have to be re-
moved later on.  
Homogeneity of Variance 
The third ANOVA assumption dictates that the variances between groups should 
be homogeneous (homoscedastic). There are three main reasons why such an as-
sumption would be broken. Firstly, the classifying independent variable may have 
an inherently natural difference of variance (a gender variable, for instance, can 
easily have different variances for the two different groups). Secondly, outside 
manipulation of an experiment can bias the variables in one direction. And final-
ly, large differences in sample size can affect the homogeneity of variance nega-
tively.  
In our case, the data used is not naturally ideal. There may well be natural differ-
ences between groups – especially when we look at production regions this may 
become an issue. There should be no experimental bias in the data set, but factors 
such as the source of data (only one, North American repair time database used) 
could leave a mark. Even the third issue – unequal sample size – will play a role 
in especially the regional analysis (the European set of cars is much smaller than 
the rest). However, we will have to see what the numbers say during the analysis 
– it is possible that the assumptions will be fulfilled without any problems. 
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6.2.1 Exploring the data 
Variable ‘Year’ 
As we see from appendix 1, the 316 individual cases (or car models studied) are 
fairly equally distributed over the five years: the largest amount of models from 
2000 (69), the smallest amount from 1990 and 2010 (59). If we look at the de-
scriptives for the year variable, we see that the means of the yearly distributions 
seem to be steadily growing – from 139.920 hours in the year 1990, to 165.722 
hours in 2010 (an increase of about 18%). However, this is something we cannot 
classify as a trend before we have tested statistical significance of these differ-
ences.  
Moving on to the tests of normality, we see that the results are not looking prom-
ising if we intend to perform an ANOVA analysis. Since the number of cases (N) 
is  quite small,  the Shapiro-Wilk test  should give a more reliable result,  but both 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests indicate that the yearly distribu-
tion of cases cannot be said to be normally distributed, certainly not at a 5% sig-
nificance level (the null hypothesis of both tests is a normal distribution). The 
reason for this is obvious – we see clear evidence of both skewness and kurtosis 
in the descriptives.   
1990 Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,877 – DF: 59 – Sig.: 0,000 
1995 Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,776 – DF: 67 – Sig.: 0,000 
2000 Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,877 – DF: 69 – Sig.: 0,000 
2005 Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,911 – DF: 62 – Sig.: 0,000 
2010 Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,924 – DF: 59 – Sig.: 0,001 
This is especially clear, if we look at the collected histograms of the per year dis-
tribution in appendix 2.  Most of the histograms show peaks at  the far left  of the 
figure and a long sparsely populated tale towards the right. In many ways this is 
only logical. We could see already during the data collection phase that the three 
low-to-mid price classes contained many cars with similar time statistics. But the 
fourth,  high  price  class  clearly  contains  fewer  cars  and  more  cars  of  unusual  
build, something which results in a skewed distribution. What we are seeing in 
the histograms is probably evidence of this – normal “bulk” production cars form-
ing a coherent peak at the left, the more unusual higher price cars forming their 
own set of peaks at the right. 
The box and whisker diagram of the year distribution confirms this idea; the out-
liers that we can see towards the top of the chart are exclusively made up of class 
4 cars, the high-priced cars.  
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Returning to appendix 1, we take a look at the tests of homogeneity of variance. 
At a 5% level of significance, we can clearly accept the null hypothesis that the 
variances across the groups (years) are equal, irrelevant whether we look at mean, 
median or adjusted ditto. The third assumption for ANOVA analysis is thus ful-
filled but not the second.  
Levene stat. (based on mean): 1,379 – DF1: 4 – DF2: 311 – Sig.; 0,241 
Levene stat. (based on median): 1,160 – DF1: 4 – DF2: 311 – Sig.; 0,328 
 
Variable ‘Class’ 
The variable Class is not of equally great interest to us as the variables year and 
region. It is interesting mainly as a confirmation of the division of models along 
the lines that seemed natural at the start of the data gathering phase – but it is per-
haps not of academic interest: it would only seem natural that car models of high-
er cost involve more assembly work than those of low cost. But nevertheless, this 
is something that can be easily checked from the data at the same time. 
The case processing summary in appendix 1 tells us that the high-priced rear 
wheel drive sedans class is the smallest (N=60) and the low price front-wheel-
drive class is that largest (N=96). From the descriptive we can again find evidence 
of  a  growing  trend:  the  low  price  class  has  the  lowest  mean  repair  time  (136,8  
hours) and the high price class the highest mean repair time (181,948 hours) – a 
difference of about 33%.  
The tests of normality look better for this variable, but unfortunately not good 
enough. The low and high price classes are cleared for ANOVA analysis (we can 
perhaps accept the null hypothesis of normal distribution at a 5% level of signifi-
cance), but not the midprice classes.  
Class 1: Low-Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,977 – DF: 96 Sig.: 0,087 
Class 2: Mid-Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,960 – DF: 64 Sig.: 0,038 
Class 3: Mid-High-Price – Front Wheel Drive – V-engine – Sedans 
Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,910 – DF: 96 Sig.: 0,000 
Class 4: High-Price – Rear Wheel Drive – V-engine – Sedans 
Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,979 – DF: 60 Sig.: 0,375 
We can see evidence of why in appendix 2, the histograms: the midprice in-line 
class has two peaks, and the midprice v-motor class is strongly skewed to the left. 
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There is no easy explanation as to why this is so – probably this indicates that the 
class  division  is  not  entirely  natural.  If  the  two  classes  could  be  combined,  the  
resulting chart might more closely approximate a normal distribution. 
From the box and whisker diagram, we can clearly see that the fourth class, the 
high price class, is distinctly different from the other three with a greater variance 
and range. The highest outliers also come from this class.  
Returning to appendix 1 and the test of homogeneity of variance we see another 
obstacle to the ANOVA analysis here – at a 5% level of significance we must 
reject the null hypothesis of equal variance between the groups. Thus two of the 
ANOVA assumptions are not fulfilled.  
Levene stat. (based on mean): 16,592 – DF1: 3 – DF2: 312 – Sig.; 0,000 
Levene stat. (based on median): 15,546 – DF1: 3 – DF2: 312 – Sig.; 0,000 
 
Variable ‘Region’ 
When looking at the variable region, (appendix 1) we see that the Europe-group 
only has 50 valid cases, as opposed to the Asia and USA groups with over 100 
each. This reflects the situation of the chosen review area – the American car fleet 
is made up mainly by American and Asian car companies. European low-cost 
sedans are a rare sight in America – when buying a European car the choice often 
falls on a sports car or a luxury sedan.  
The descriptives show us that the Asian and American groups are close to each 
other in terms of average repair time (Asia 147,961 hours; USA 142,219 hours). 
The European cars have a markedly higher mean (179,038). The same thing is 
true of the groups’ variance (Asia 280,690 – USA 175,842 – Europe 927,081). As 
a result of this, the test of homogeneity of variance gets a negative result: the 
group's variances cannot be said to be equal. The American markets bias towards 
choosing more expensive European cars might be one of the reasons of this dif-
ference – as we saw in the previous paragraphs the higher cost cars seem to dis-
play higher repair time values.  
Levene stat. (based on mean): 42,883 – DF1: 2 – DF2: 313 – Sig.; 0,000 
Levene stat. (based on median): 40,942 – DF1: 2 – DF2: 313 – Sig.; 0,000 
In  terms  of  normal  distribution,  only  the  Europe  subgroup  can  be  said  to  show  
signs of normality.  If  we look at  the histograms in appendix 2 week we can say 
that the USA subgroup shows a leptokurtic distribution, with a far too high peak 
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to match a bell shaped curve. Looking at the box and whisker plot we again see 
that the Europe subgroup stands out completely in terms of mean and variance.  
Asia Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,972 – DF: 137 – Sig.: 0,007 
USA Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,970 – DF: 129 – Sig.: 0,006 
Europe Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,962 – DF: 50 – Sig.: 0,112 
6.1.2 Adapting the data to ANOVA analysis 
Since none of the three variables seem suited for an ANOVA analysis at the mo-
ment, an attempt should be made to adapt the data by means of mathematical 
transformations or by deleting disturbing outliers. Technically we could also at-
tempt to make use of a nonparametric test to see whether there are significant 
differences between the groups. The Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric test is often 
used as a possible replacement of the ANOVA in the cases where the normality 
assumption is violated in the variable. However, it should be noted that also the 
Kruskal-Wallis test assumes equal variances between groups. This means that 
only the Year-variable is eligible for such analysis.  
Since the nonparametric tests produce results that are less intuitively understand-
able and with less of a real-world equivalent than the normal ANOVA analysis, it 
would seem prudent to investigate whether the data can be made to fulfill the 
ANOVA assumptions. One way of achieving this would be to try out some of the 
“power family” of transformations, where each observation is replaced with x**p, 
where p is an integer or half integer: 
– –2 (reciprocal square) 
– –1 (reciprocal) 
– –0.5 (reciprocal square root) 
– 0 (log transformation) 
– 0.5 (square root) 
– 1 (leaving the data untransformed) 
– 2 (square) 
(Prophetweb 2009). 
Since the histograms do not show any specific indication of what transformations 
would be necessary to transform the values into a normal distribution, the easiest 
option is to apply all of these transformations and see under which transformation 
the values are most improved. In appendix 3 we can see the results of the Shapiro-
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Wilk test of normality and the Levene test of homogeneity of variance for each of 
the six transformations (and the original results for comparison).  
For the year variable, looking at the tests of normality, we can see that the recip-
rocal transformations produce the best results, especially the reciprocal quadratic 
transformation. Only under this transformation, all the year groups display normal 
distribution. 
The tests of homogeneity of variance did of course produce acceptable results 
already on the basis of the original values, but the transformations improved these 
test results too. The reciprocal transformations and especially the reciprocal quad-
ratic transformation produce extremely statistically significant results, with signif-
icance levels in excess of 0.90. This means that under a regime of reciprocal 
quadratic transformation the recorded repair time values can be used in ANOVA 
analysis.  
However, looking at the other variables Class and Region we can see that neither 
of these can be improved enough by applying transformations that they are made 
eligible for such analysis. The tests of normality for the Class variable always 
stumble on the mid-price V-motor sedans -class, which never rises above a 0,002 
significance level – it is simply not distributed in a way that can be made to ap-
proximate the normal distribution. The tests of homogeneity of variance never 
approach the point where the null hypothesis of homogenous variance can be ac-
cepted.  
In the case of the Region -variable, several of the transformations produce results 
that improve the variable’s normal distribution: the natural logarithmic transfor-
mation, the reciprocal transformation and the reciprocal square root transfor-
mation all produce results that indicate normal distribution. However, the tests of 
homogeneity of variance never produce acceptable results, and thus we cannot 
perform ANOVA analysis on this variable either. 
6.1.3 ANOVA analysis of Reciprocal Quadratic -transformed time 
 measurements 
Since it is possible to perform ANOVA analysis on at least one of the variables 
(the year variable) without resorting to cutting any of the measurements, but in-
stead only applying a transformation (the reciprocal quadratic transformation) we 
should do so. That analysis in question would be a one-way ANOVA analysis 
with the year variable as independent factor and the reciprocal quadratic trans-
formed time variable as dependent factor.  
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The results of this analysis can be seen in appendix 4. At a significance of 0,000, 
the ANOVA analysis shows that the groups’ means are not equal. We reject the 
null hypothesis of equal means between groups at a significant level of 5% and 
even at a significance level of 1%.  
ANOVA F(4, 311) = 17,096, Sig.: 0,000 
The Welch and Brown-Forsythe tests produce a more robust method of checking 
the equality of means between groups: if the homogeneity of variance assumption 
is broken or somewhat broken (as indicated by the Levene test) the Welch and 
Brown-Forsythe tests will display alternative versions of the F-statistic so that one 
may still be able to use the results. In this case however, since both assumptions 
of normal distribution and equality of variances between groups are fulfilled, we 
can focus on the normal ANOVA statistic.  
Having established that there is indeed a statistically significant difference in 
means between the different year groups, we can employ a post hoc test to see 
what groups are naturally formed out of the original factors. If all the means of 
the groups are clearly different from each other five separate groups will be 
formed, but if some groups are closer to each other, one can consider that they 
should in fact form a single group.  
The Tukey HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) post hoc test is a powerful and 
widely used test to further regroup the original groups. However, the Tukey test 
assumes equal group size (as well as equal group variances), and when this is not 
the case another test might be a better option. The Gabriel test explicitly allows 
for unequal group sizes and so does Hochberg’s GT2-test, which can be used 
when the group sizes are very different. (MicrobiologyBytes 2007).  
At the end of appendix 4, we can see the grouping results according to Gabriel. 
The test recognizes three different natural groups; the only point of uncertainty is 
the year 2005 – whether it should belong together with 2010 or with 2000.  
Either way, we can see that the early years (1990, 1995 and 2000) appear to form 
a natural group with similar means and thus no clear change or trend in between. 
The same can be said for 2000 and 2005, and possibly for 2005 and 2010.   This 
would seem to indicate that the rate at which significant change in the design of 
cars occurs used to be somewhat slower than 5–7 years that was suggested in 
Holweg & Pil (2004) – perhaps closer to 10 years. Possibly one could also infer 
that the rate of change is speeding up, but there are simply too few measurement 
years here to be able to say anything. 
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We can notice, however, that the rising trend in repair times that we observed 
earlier is indeed statistically significant. The numbers produced by the reciprocal 
quadratic transformation are hard to describe in terms of real-world applications 
but by proving that there are statistically significant differences between groups 
of transformed values, we can also say the same about the original values.  
Further analysis 
It is of course unfortunate that we were not able to use either ANOVA analysis or 
a nonparametric test to analyze the two other variables class and region – at least 
not on the basis of the original time measurements. Especially the Region variable 
would be interesting to investigate, to see whether anything conclusive can be 
said about regional expertise in Design for Assembly. Therefore it is a logical 
next step to look closer at the original data to see whether there are cases or 
groups that could be eliminated to improve the quality of the analysis material, 
since outliers or poorly motivated groups might worsen the chances of fulfilling 
the assumptions necessary to run tests.  
If we again look at the histograms and box whisker plots in appendix 2, we can 
see that most the irregularities are to be found on the higher end of the scale 
(longer  repair  times).  Most  of  the  histograms show evidence  of  positive  skew –  
the  main  body  of  the  measurements  are  at  the  left  side  of  the  histogram  with  a  
long tapering tail towards the right. During the data gathering phase, it became 
clear that the fourth class of the car models (high-price models) often displayed 
significantly higher repair times than the cheaper models. If we look at the box 
and whisker plot for the class -variable we notice that the fourth looks nothing 
like the other three: a higher mean, and a much greater variance than the other.  
This would suggest that we are looking at a subgroup that does not form a natural 
part of the greater data series. If we were to cut the fourth class entirely – omitting 
all the measurements of the high price, rear wheel drive sedans – what would we 
see change? The class does however provide 60 measurements, almost 20% of the 
total number of measurements. That is a disturbingly large amount of measure-
ments to drop from an already small amount observations. However in the interest 
of  seeing  all  the  data  can  reveal,  we  will  try  also  this  method.  We  remove  the  
fourth subgroup of the variable class and are left with 256 observations. 
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6.1.4 Exploring the smaller data 
Variable ‘Year’ 
As we see from appendix 5, the 256 cases are also now fairly equally distributed 
over the five years: the largest amount of models from 1995 and 2000 (57), the 
smallest  amount  from  2010  (42).  If  we  look  at  the  descriptives  we  see  that  the  
mean values of repair times are still growing – from 136.090 in the year 1990, to 
155.695 in 2010 (an increase of about 14%) – but that the means are lower with 
the fourth class omitted.  
In this variable the improvement of the data for future ANOVA analysis is obvi-
ous: the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality shows all subgroups conforming to the 
normal distribution (we accept the null hypothesis of normal distribution at a 5% 
level of significance, for all five years). Also the test of homogeneity of variances 
shows  a  reassuring  degree  of  equality.  On  the  basis  of  this  we  can  say  that  the  
omission of fourth class has at least improved this variable for analysis – no trans-
formations are necessary to run a normal ANOVA analysis on the year variable.  
1990 Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,967 – DF: 51 – Sig.: 0,167 
1995 Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,973 – DF: 57 – Sig.: 0,229 
2000 Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,983 – DF: 57 – Sig.: 0,581 
2005 Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,982 – DF: 49 – Sig.: 0,649 
2010 Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,992 – DF: 42 – Sig.: 0,988 
Levene statistic (based on mean): 1,598 – DF1: 4 – DF2: 251 – Sig.; 0,175 
Levene statistic (based on median): 1,586 – DF1: 4 – DF2: 251 – Sig.; 0,179 
Looking at the revised histograms in appendix 6 can see that they more closely 
approximate the normal distribution in almost all cases; certainly a lower degree 
of skew. The box and whisker diagram depicts the same thing: most of the previ-
ous extreme outliers are now gone and the quartile ranges have become a more 
unified in length. 
Variable ‘Class’ 
The case processing summary in appendix 5 tells us that the mid-priced inline 
engine sedans class is now the smallest (N=64). The growing trend is of course 
still unaffected: the low price class has the lowest mean repair time (136,799) and 
the mid-high v-engine price class the highest mean repair time (148,733).  
Now, removing one class will of course not have any kind of effect on the nor-
mality distributions of the other three classes. So the first two classes are still 
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more or less normally distributed, but the third class – mid-price v-motor engines 
– is not. The histogram of this class shows why: the distribution looks more like a 
ski slope than a bell curve, with its peak at the extreme left of the chart and a long 
tapering tail towards the right. Again we can only assume that the reason for this 
is an unnatural division of the mid-price cars into two classes.  
Class 1: Low-Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,977 – DF: 96 – Sig.: 0,087 
Class 2: Mid-Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,960 – DF: 64 – Sig.: 0,038 
Class 3: Mid-High-Price – Front Wheel Drive – V-engine – Sedans 
Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,910 – DF: 96 – Sig.: 0,000 
On the other hand, the tests for homogeneity of variance do show a positive im-
provement.  With the removal of the fourth class,  the remaining three classes are 
now sufficiently equal in variance that they satisfy the requirements for an ANO-
VA analysis or at least a non-parametric test of the same type. Equal variances, 
thus, but not normal distribution. 
Levene statistic (based on mean): 2,875 – DF1: 2 – DF2: 253 – Sig.; 0,058 
Levene statistic (based on median): 2,650 – DF1: 2 – DF2: 253 – Sig.; 0,073 
 
Variable ‘Region’ 
The descriptives for this variable show that the region most affected by omitting 
the fourth class is clearly Europe, which now only has 22 valid cases, as opposed 
to the Asia and USA -groups still  with over 100 each. However,  the regions are 
now much more similar in terms of means (Asia 144,641 – USA 139,924 – Eu-
rope 152,191). Interestingly enough, the largest variance now resides in the Asia 
group (Asia 215,419 – USA 126,488 – Europe 133,922). 
At least for this variable we see an improvement in the right direction. The re-
moval of the fourth class has resulted in a much more normal distribution of the 
three regional subgroups. In the tests of normality we can now accept the null 
hypothesis for all three (at a 5% level of significance).  
Asia Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,981 – DF: 119 – Sig.: 0,101 
USA Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,982 – DF: 115 – Sig.: 0,131 
Europe Shapiro-Wilk stat.: 0,969 – DF: 22 – Sig.: 0,684 
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The histograms show us a similar picture – the blockiness of the European distri-
bution despite its high rating in the test of normality is a result of the small num-
ber of observations from this region. In the fourth class we previously removed, 
the European cars were predominant and this regional group suffers in effect. 
However, in terms of variance Europe is no longer the most extreme. The box and 
whisker plot shows us that Asia has now taken over the position as most widely 
spread subgroup.  
The tests of homogeneity of variance for this variable also show an improvement, 
if yet quite weak. There is now a small degree of equality in variance but not 
enough to satisfy the assumptions of the ANOVA analysis (at a 5% level of sig-
nificance). Further modification or transformation is necessary to strengthen the 
equality of variance in this variable. 
Levene statistic (based on mean): 5,604 – DF1: 2 – DF2: 253 – Sig.; 0,004 
Levene statistic (based on median): 5,341 – DF1: 2 – DF2: 253 – Sig.; 0,005 
6.1.5 Adapting the smaller data to analysis 
In the previous paragraphs we could see that the omission of the fourth class did 
indeed improve the suitability of the data for ANOVA analysis. However, it is not 
yet good enough in its entirety that we can run a two or three way ANOVA analy-
sis on it – only one variable fulfills all of the necessary assumptions. Therefore it 
still seems prudent to try to work with the data more to see whether even stronger 
suitability can be achieved.  
Performing the same battery of power transformations data as we did on the orig-
inal data on this smaller set, we can check the tests of normality (Shapiro-Wilk) 
and the (Levene) tests of homogeneity of variance to see whether the situation has 
improved. A summary of the results are presented in appendix 7.  
The Year variable does not really need improvement as it is already acceptable in 
its original form, but we can observe that it shows its strongest results on the tests 
of normality under the square root transformation. In terms of homogeneity of 
variance, we see that almost all transformations produce acceptable results (ex-
cept for the quadratic transformation) but the strongest results are had under the 
reciprocal quadratic transformation.  
The Class variable on the other hand is a more complicated case. The third class, 
the mid-price v-motor models, can simply not be made more normal in its distri-
bution by application of any of these power transformations.  Under some of the 
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transformations, the results of the other two classes are improved, however. The 
homogeneity of variance is acceptable at the 5% level of significance in the origi-
nal form only.  
Finally we have the Region -variable. According to the tests of normality this 
group is normally distributed under most of the transformations including the 
original. However, the tests of homogeneity of variance indicate that this variable 
does not really show equality of variance between groups, not under any trans-
formation. This is at least true if we strictly adhere to the 5% level of significance 
-rule;  a  few  of  the  reciprocal  transformations  do  show  results  that  gets  close  to  
this level.  It  may be possible to perform an ANOVA analysis on this variable if  
we  look  more  closely  at  the  robust  tests  of  equality  of  means,  Brown-Forsythe  
and Welch.  
Further editing of the data  
As we could see, the transformations resulted in certain improvements in some 
cases: the regional variable should now be passable for ANOVA analysis, as is. 
The class variable does still not fulfill the assumptions of such analysis, however. 
So is there any way we could continue to improve on the data and fulfill the as-
sumptions? 
Yes and no. The class variable showed clear indications of being an artificial var-
iable. Especially it seems the division between classes two and three – midprice 
in-line motor models and midprice v-motor models – is ill-fitting and that the two 
classes could arguably be combined to form a more naturally distributed sub-
group. Doing so would of course not affect the results of the other two independ-
ent variables year and region – but it might improve the class variable. 
However, there would be some negative effects from all this too. In real world 
terms we would be combining two classes of cars that simply do not mix well – 
not unless we do a serious re-evaluation of all models in the two old classes. The 
cheapest in-line midprice cars are probably not wise to compare with the most 
expensive v-engine models, not unless we are seriously prepared to bend the cri-
teria on which we made the selection. We would then have to reconfigure the 
classes more seriously and discard the cheapest and most expensive cars off each 
original class to form a believable new entity. 
Secondly, we would knowingly be ignoring the fact that there is a systematic dif-
ference in the recorded time measurements between the two classes. Some of the 
sub-assemblies are strongly affected by the motor type. Exhaust manifold, alter-
nator, the removal and placement engine itself, the type of transmission (which is 
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now chosen on the basis of motor/class) – while these differences are taken into 
consideration by the current class division they would simply be hidden in the 
new class. A small difference but nevertheless a systematic error.  
Besides the option of combining the midprice classes, one could also see whether 
manual deletion of certain outliers would help improve normality of class varia-
ble. This was even tested: having printed up a list of the lowest and highest outli-
ers to be found in the class variable and deleting 10–15 possible candidates, the 
data was explored again. Unfortunately, this simple method did not produce any 
positive results in the terms of normal distribution. The homogeneity of variance 
did of course improved somewhat, but this was not expressly necessary.  
To go further into the issue and start deleting specific observations that hinder the 
data from displaying a normal distribution not be a scientifically trustworthy op-
tion. Transformation of the data is approved since it does not specifically change 
the internal relations between observations, but the manipulation of data by con-
scious deletion of observations simply because they do not fit one’s expectations 
is unethical research methodology.  
Nevertheless,  we  could  probably  improve  the  statistical  validity  of  the  data  by  
recombining the two mid-price classes, leaving us with only the low-price cars 
and the mid-price cars. Furthermore, when looking at the region variable, it is 
obvious  that  the  European  group  stands  out  quite  strongly  as  a  candidate  to  be  
dropped  from the  analysis.  The  European  group is  only  a  fraction  in  size  of  the  
Asian and North American groups, and is thereby making the comparison less 
reliable just by being present.  
These are both valid choices – they would leave us with a smaller data set (about 
200 models) but would produce a more statistically significant comparison. But 
narrowing the scope of the comparison so much would feel irritating – better to 
see what the (admittedly less dependable) results of the wider and more interna-
tional data set can tell us first. Cutting the data further can an option for later.  
6.1.6 2nd ANOVA analysis of the Year variable 
In appendix 8 can we see the ANOVA analysis for the smaller set  of data,  with 
the fourth class omitted. We perform this analysis on the untransformed data set – 
in appendix 7 we went through the normal power transformations and while the 
original data did not display the absolutely highest significance numbers on the 
tests of normality and homogeneity of variance, it did get completely acceptable 
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results on both. And since the untransformed figures still have a connection to 
real life applications, it is best to use them.  
Since both assumptions are fulfilled,  the normal test  statistic will  work. Also on 
this smaller set of data the result is a conclusive rejection of the null hypothesis: 
the year groups have different means on a statistically significant level. This is not 
surprising as the ANOVA analysis on the larger but transformed dataset showed 
that same result. The only difference can be seen in the post-hoc tests – the differ-
ent groupings now seem more conclusive. The first three years (1990, 1995, 
2000) are similar enough in their  means that they form one unit,  while the later 
two years (2005 and 2010) form two separate groups. Repair times are conclu-
sively going up with time and even more so in later years.  
ANOVA F(4, 251) = 20,584, Sig.: 0,000 
6.1.7 Kruskal-Wallis analysis of the Class variable 
Despite the class variable not being valid for ANOVA analysis – failing to fulfill 
the assumption of normal distribution – the removal of the fourth class did never-
theless improve the homogeneity of variance to the point that a non-parametric 
test can be performed on it instead. As mentioned earlier, the Kruskal-Wallis test 
performs as a nonparametric alternative to the one-way ANOVA analysis.  
According to a handbook of statistics (McDonald 2009) the The Kruskal-Wallis 
test performs its analysis on ranked data: the measurement observations are con-
verted to ranks in the total data set. The smallest value gets a rank of 1, the second 
a  rank  of  2,  etc.:  this  conversion  is  what  makes  the  test  less  powerful  than  the  
ANOVA analysis, since some data is lost and is not taken into account by the test.  
Also, the test produces results that are less intuitively understandable than its par-
ametric counterpart. The test is not for identical means or medians – instead it 
tests for equality of the central tendency of the populations.: “The null hypothesis 
is that the samples come from populations such that the probability that a random 
observation from one group is greater than a random observation from another 
group is 0.5.”. Another way to put it would be:  
H0: the samples come from identical populations. 
H1: The samples come from different populations sharing the same shape but 
with different central tendencies (Statisticssolutions 2011) 
140      Acta Wasaensia 
In Appendix 9 we can see the output of the Kruskal-Wallis test. The test is able to 
reject the null hypothesis of identical populations at a 5% level of statistical sig-
nificance. This would indicate that the classes are separate from each other even 
from a  statistical  point  of  view –  not  a  surprising  conclusion,  naturally.  We can  
suspect that the positive link between repair times and rising cost and class is val-
id despite the limited conclusions that can be drawn from the Kruskal-Wallis test: 
the more expensive cars are more time-consuming to repair. Not surprising. 
H: 37,989 – DF: 2 – Sig.: 0.000 
6.1.8 ANOVA analysis of the Region variable 
Earlier on we also saw that the region variable came relatively close to fulfilling 
the ANOVA assumptions. The different subgroups did not display a high enough 
level of homogeneity of variance to completely warrant success. However, using 
the robust tests of equality of means, Brown-Forsythe and Welch, we might be 
able to say something about the variable nevertheless. Furthermore there are sev-
eral post-hoc tests that function despite differing variances between groups, i.e. 
Tamhane, Dunnett T3, Games-Howell, Dunnett C. 
In  appendix  10  we  can  see  the  output  from  this  analysis.  The  ANOVA  gives  a  
rejection of the null hypothesis, which would indicate that the means of the dif-
ferent regions at different on a statistically significant level and the robust tests of 
normality support the test’s conclusion. The Brown-Forsythe and Welch tests 
both indicate that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that the groups’ means 
are the same.  
ANOVA  F(4, 253) = 9,667, Sig.: 0,000 
Welch  F(2, 60,770) = 11,809, Sig.: 0,000 
Brown-Forsythe F(2, 108,742) = 10,604, Sig.: 0,000 
All four post-hoc tests show similar results: the mean difference is significant at 
the 5% significance level between all three regions. That is to say, each individual 
region has its own statistically significant mean. The United States has the lowest 
mean repair time (139,924 hours) followed in turn by Asia (144,641 hours) and 
Europe (152, 191 hours). The differences are not large however, especially not 
between USA and Asia. 
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6.2 Company-level Analysis 
Having looked at the regional level of success in producing cars with low repair 
times, it will now be interesting to look more closely at the company level. What 
companies and corporations have produced the largest amount of good or bad cars 
in terms of repair (and assembly/disassembly) over the last 20 years?  
First of all we will group together the car models according to corporation. Sever-
al of the companies in this analysis are simply branches of a larger corporation – 
this is of course especially true of the North American producers (GM, Ford and 
Chrysler each own several brands), but also some of the Japanese automakers 
have split off their luxury car divisions into a separate company (Toyota's Lexus, 
Honda's Acura, and Nissan's Infinity). The reason to look at the corporation rather 
than the brand is simply to make the comparison smaller and easier to overlook.  
It  should of course be mentioned that changes always occur in the ownership of 
companies: presently Hyundai and Kia are in fact merged (since 1998) but since 
they start out separate it doesn't seem right to group them. As we saw earlier on, 
there are several similar examples: Renault owns a large share of Nissan, Ford has 
an interest in Mazda, Volkswagen owns shares in Suzuki, etc. In the comparison 
we more or less choose to ignore this, looking only at the more historical group-
ings of the automakers. 
In Table 15 we see the corporations and their different brands. Later on, in Table 
21 we can see if how many cars each corporation has had the comparison.   
Table 15. Corporate brands.  
  GM Buick   Toyota Toyota   Audi   
   Cadillac   Lexus  BMW   
   Chevrolet     Mercedes   
   GEO  Honda Honda  Volvo   
   Oldsmobile   Acura  Jaguar   
   Pontiac     Saab   
   Saturn  Nissan Nissan   Peugeot   
   GMC   Infiniti  Volkswagen   
           
  Ford Ford   Hyundai     
   Lincoln    Mazda     
   Mercury   Mitsubishi     
      Suzuki     
  Chrysler Chrysler   Kia     
   Dodge        
   Plymouth        
   Jeep        
    Eagle             
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Now to look closer at the performances of individual car models. In Tables 16–20 
we can see a summary list of all the car models in the comparison and how they 
performed  on  repair  times.  All  the  times  in  the  list  are  total  sums  of  a  model's  
individual subassembly repair times – the grand total of 44 measurements from 
various subassemblies. These totals have no real world equivalent – they are 
simply aggregates – but they can be seen as an indicator of the time it would take 
to take a car apart and assemble it again. And as we have discussed earlier on, this 
could also be seen as an indicator of how fast a model is to assemble.  
The list is divided by year, class and region, and each sub-section is sorted by 
value: the lowest repair times are at the top of each sub-section, and the highest at 
the bottom. The smallest and largest numbers of each subsection are highlighted 
for easier comparison: this way we can see directly what to car models were the 
fastest and slowest to repair for each year-class. 
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Table 16. Car model comparison, year 1990.  
Class 1: Low–Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
ASIA  USA  EUROPE  
Hyundai Excel              116,2 Eagle Summit               114,8 Volkswagen Jetta GL 
L4     
139,0 
Suzuki Swift               117,5 Pontiac LeMans             115,9 Volkswagen Fox             147,7 
Mitsubishi Mirage         121,4 Geo Prizm                  122,1   
Daihatsu Charade          122,2 Pontiac Sunbird            134,6   
Honda Civic                130,1 Mercury Topaz              136,4   
Toyota Corolla             138,4 Chevrolet Cavalier         138,5   
Nissan Sentra              139,4 Ford Tempo                 139,6   
Mazda Protegé              146,0     
      
 Class 2: Mid–Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans  
ASIA  USA  EUROPE  
Nissan Stanza              123,3 Chrysler LeBaron Sedan     122,1 Peugeot 405                139,6 
Mazda 626                  129,8 Plymouth Acclaim           122,4 Volkswagen Passat GL      148,7 
Hyundai Sonata             130,5 Dodge Spirit               130,5 Audi 80                    150,8 
Mitsubishi Galant          133,3 Ford Taurus                130,7   
Honda Accord               140,9 Pontiac Grand Am           131,7   
Toyota Camry               142,8 Oldsmobile Cutlass Calais  133,2   
Acura Integra              149,9 Chevrolet Corsica          135,9   
  Chevrolet Lumina           138,4   
      
 Class 3: Mid–High–Price – Front Wheel Drive – V–engine – Sedans 
ASIA  USA  EUROPE  
Nissan Maxima             135,4 Dodge Dynasty              135,4 N/A  
  Mercury Sable              135,6   
  Pontiac 6000               137,9   
  Eagle Premier              139,8   
  Dodge Monaco               140,4   
  Pontiac Grand Prix         141,6   
  Buick Skylark              141,7   
  Oldsmobile Cutlass Ciera   142,2   
  Buick Century              142,4   
  Pontiac Bonneville         142,5   
  Oldsmobile Cutlass Supre-
me 
144,5   
  Oldsmobile 88 Royale       144,9   
  Buick Regal                150,7   
  Buick LeSabre              150,9   
  Chrysler New Yorker Salon  160,4   
      
 Class 3: Mid–High–Price – Front Wheel Drive – V–engine – Sedans 
ASIA  USA  EUROPE  
Mazda 929                  127,5 Cadillac Brougham          149,5 Volvo 760                  141,9 
Infiniti Q45               171,5 Lincoln Town Car           157,0 BMW 750i                   183,2 
Lexus LS400                179,2   Mercedes–Benz 420         204,9 
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Table 17. Car model comparison, year 1995.  
 Class 1: Low–Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
ASIA  USA  EUROPE  
Suzuki Swift               118,3 Saturn SL                  114,2 Volkswagen Jetta III      133,5 
Honda Civic                125,8 Dodge Neon                 119,1   
Hyundai Elantra            126,5 Geo Metro                  120,8   
Hyundai Accent             127,8 Chevrolet Cavallier        126,8   
Mitsubishi Mirage          129,5 Eagle Sumit                129,9   
Nissan Sentra              131,0 Geo Prizm                  137,0   
Kia Sephia                 133,2 Ford Escort                140,0   
Toyota Tercel              133,5     
Toyota Corolla             138,3     
Mercury Tracer             140,0     
Acura Integra              143,2     
Mazda Protegé              143,8     
      
 Class 2: Mid–Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
ASIA  USA  EUROPE  
Mitsubishi Galant          129,2 Pontiac Sunfire            126,9 Volvo 850                  131,9 
Hyundai Sonata             135,4 Oldsmobile Achieva         134,3   
Nissan Altima              138,2 Pontiac Grand Am           137,3   
Mazda 626                  151,4 Ford Contour               139,2   
Infiniti G20               155,6 Mercury Mystique           139,4   
      
Class 3: Mid–High–Price – Front Wheel Drive – V–engine – Sedans 
ASIA  USA  EUROPE  
Nissan Maxima              144,0 Mercury Sable              133,8 Saab 9000                  138,0 
Honda Accord               145,2 Ford Taurus                136,9 Volkswagen Passat         150,1 
Mitsubishi Diamante        148,5 Chrysler Concorde          137,1 Audi A6                    158,0 
Lexus ES300                157,8 Eagle Vision               137,4 Audi 90                    163,1 
Toyota Camry               158,7 Pontiac Grand Prix         137,5   
Acura Legend               162,9 Oldsmobile Cutlass Sup-
reme 
138,4   
Toyota Avalon              164,6 Chevrolet Lumina           139,3   
  Dodge Intrepid             139,6   
  Oldsmobile Aurora          140,6   
  Buick Century              141,9   
  Oldsmobile Cutlass Ciera   142,6   
  Pontiac Bonneville         143,9   
  Buick LeSabre              145,0   
  Oldsmobile Eighty Eight    145,3   
  Buick Regal                147,7   
      
 Class 4: High–Price – Rear Wheel Drive – V–engine – Sedans 
ASIA  USA  EUROPE  
Mazda 929                  162,6 Cadillac Fleetwood         140,5 BMW 530 i                  173,5 
Infiniti J30               164,7 Lincoln Town Car           155,1 BMW 740                    192,3 
Infiniti Q45               172,5   Jaguar XJ12                214,3 
Lexus LS400                181,9   Mercedes–Benz E420        257,6 
 
 
 Acta Wasaensia     145 
  
Table 18. Car model comparison, year 2000.  
Class 1: Low–Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
ASIA   USA   EUROPE   
Kia Sephia                 124,0 Dodge Neon                 118,0 Volkswagen Jetta           146,2 
Mitsubishi Mirage          125,1 Saturn SL2                 119,3   
Hyundai Accent             125,2 Pontiac Sunfire            123,6   
Honda Civic                131,0 Chevrolet Cavalier         127,5   
Hyundai Sonata             132,8 Chevrolet Prizm            138,6   
Daewoo Leganza             133,9 Ford Escort                144,7   
Suzuki Esteem              134,5 Ford Focus                 145,6   
Daewoo Nubira              135,7     
Hyundai Elantra            136,5     
Acura Integra              138,1     
Daewoo Lanos               138,9     
Mazda Protegé              139,0     
Nissan Sentra              139,4     
Toyota Echo                139,7     
Nissan Altima              141,9     
Toyota Corolla LE          145,2     
Honda Accord               158,4     
      
Class 2: Mid–Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
ASIA   USA   EUROPE   
Acura Integra              139,0 Dodge Stratus              127,7 Volkswagen Passat          171,9 
Toyota Camry               144,1 Chrysler Cirrus            128,9   
Infiniti G20               148,0 Pontiac Grand Am           129,0   
Mazda 626                  159,3 Oldsmobile Alero           132,8   
      
 Class 3: Mid–High–Price – Front Wheel Drive – V–engine – Sedans 
ASIA   USA   EUROPE   
Mitsubishi Galant          136,4 Buick LeSabre              134,3 Audi A4                    166,7 
Acura 3.2 TL               140,4 Buick Century              134,5   
Mazda Millennia            145,7 Buick Regal                134,5   
Mitsubishi Diamante        146,8 Pontiac Bonneville         137,1   
Nissan Maxima              148,4 Chevrolet Malibu           137,4   
Infiniti I30               152,9 Oldsmobile Intrigue        140,9   
Toyota Avalon              162,7 Pontiac Grand Prix        141,1   
  Chevrolet Lumina           144,3   
  Ford Taurus                148,0   
  Mercury Sable              148,7   
  Chrysler 300M              150,1   
  Chrysler LHS               150,1   
  Chrysler Concorde          150,3   
  Dodge Intrepid             150,3   
  Chevrolet Impala           153,1   
      
 Class 4: High–Price – Rear Wheel Drive – V–engine – Sedans 
ASIA   USA   EUROPE   
Infiniti Q45               164,5 Cadillac Catera            141,3 Jaguar S–type              184,9 
Lexus GS 300               170,8 Lincoln Town Car           160,5 Mercedes Benz C280         186,2 
Lexus LS400                181,7 Lincoln LS series          161,5 BMW 540iA                  197,0 
    BMW 750iL                  198,8 
    Mercedes–Benz E430         206,9 
    Jaguar XJ8                 207,8 
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Table 19. Car model comparison, year 2005.  
 Class 1: Low–Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
ASIA   USA   EUROPE   
Kia Rio                    123,0 Saturn ION                 120,6 Volkswagen Jetta           151,2 
Hyundai Accent            126,3 Dodge Neon                 121,6   
Hundai Elantra            128,3 Chevrolet Aveo             136,8   
Kia Spectra                133,8 Ford Focus                 146,1   
Toyota ECHO               139,8 Chevrolet Cobalt           158,8   
Suzuki Aerio              142,4     
Kia Optima                143,1     
Suzuki Forenza            145,1     
Nissan Sentra             145,6     
Honda Civic               151,7     
Mitsubishi Lancer         152,7     
Mazda 3                    153,5     
Toyota Corolla            158,7     
      
 Class 2: Mid–Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
ASIA   USA   EUROPE   
Hyundai Sonata            134,2 N/A  Saab 9–3                   149,7 
Nissan Altima             150,2   Volvo S40                  157,0 
Mazda6                     153,5   Volkswagen Passat          160,9 
Acura TSX                 155,0     
Honda Accord              169,7     
Toyota Camry              171,2     
      
 Class 3: Mid–High–Price – Front Wheel Drive – V–engine – Sedans 
ASIA   USA   EUROPE   
Hyundai XG350             146,8 Buick LeSabre              136,5 Audi A4                    172,2 
Kia Amanti                149,2 Pontiac Bonneville         138,0   
Nissan Maxima             153,6 Chevrolet Malibu           139,0   
Mitsubishi Galant         161,8 Chrysler Sebring           139,9   
Lexus ES 330              166,0 Dodge Stratus              139,9   
Acura TL                   167,4 Buick Century              140,6   
  Buick LaCrosse             142,9   
  Pontiac G6                 143,1   
  Chevrolet Impala           144,4   
  Pontiac Grand Prix         149,3   
  Chrysler 300               149,6   
  Ford Taurus                154,3   
  Ford Five Hundred          154,5   
  Mercury Montego            155,4   
      
 Class 4: High–Price – Rear Wheel Drive – V–engine – Sedans 
ASIA   USA   EUROPE   
Infiniti Q45               163,0 Lincoln Town Car Signature 151,4 Jaguar S–Type              182,6 
Lexus LS 430              172,5 Lincolm LS                 158,1 Jaguar XJ8                 185,7 
Lexus GS 430              179,4 Cadillac CTS–V             170,5 Mercedes–Benz S430        202,1 
  Cadillac STS               176,4 BMW 545i                   213,3 
    Mercedes–Benz E500        215,0 
    BMW 745i                   216,9 
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Table 20. Car model comparison, year 2010.  
 Class 1: Low–Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
ASIA   USA   EUROPE   
Hyundai Accent             125,3 Chevrolet Aveo            139,9 N/A  
Kia Rio                    132,3 Chevrolet Cobalt          161,3   
Nissan Sentra              136,5 Ford Focus                 162,2   
Nissan Versa               141,8     
Kia Forte                  145,6     
Hyundai Elantra            145,9     
Honda Civic                146,9     
Toyota Yaris               148,3     
Mazda 3                    159,0     
Toyota Corolla             161,5     
Suzuki SX4                 162,8     
Mitsubishi Lancer          167,6     
      
 Class 2: Mid–Price – Front Wheel Drive – Inline (straight) engine – Sedans 
ASIA   USA   EUROPE   
Nissan Altima              130,4 Chevrolet Malibu          142,0 Volvo S40                  152,8 
Kia Optima                 138,6 Dodge Avenger             151,1 Volkswagen Jetta           153,5 
Hyundai Sonata             146,4 Chrysler Sebring           151,3 Volkswagen Passat          165,7 
Suzuki Kizashi             152,6 Mercury Milan              159,1   
Mazda 6                    158,8 Ford Fusion                160,2   
Mitsubishi Galant          164,6     
Honda Accord               165,6     
Toyota Camry               179,1     
      
 Class 3: Mid–High–Price – Front Wheel Drive – V–engine – Sedans 
ASIA   USA   EUROPE   
Hyundai Azera              158,8 Chevrolet Impala           145,7 N/A  
Acura TL                   167,2 Buick Lucerne              151,2   
Nissan Maxima              171,6 Buick Lacrosse             154,6   
Toyota Avalon              176,3 Lincoln MKZ                166,9   
Acura TSX                  178,3 Ford Taurus                174,5   
Lexus ES 350               185,4     
      
 Class 4: High–Price – All Wheel Drive – V–engine – Sedans 
ASIA   USA   EUROPE   
Infiniti M35               164,1 Lincoln MKS                165,6 Saab 9–5                   167,0 
Infiniti G37               165,7 Cadillac STS               179,6 Audi A6                    183,3 
Acura RL                   173,3 Cadillac CTS               187,9 Volvo S80                  192,8 
Lexus GS 350               180,8   Audi A8                    193,3 
Lexus IS 350               182,6   Audi S4                    193,3 
    BMW M3                     220,3 
    Mercedes–Benz C350         224,8 
    BMW M5                     229,5 
    Mercedes–Benz E350         234,5 
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Company ranking 
The tables are interesting to browse – we can see how well individual models 
have performed, and perhaps even developed over the years. Take for instance the 
example of the Ford Taurus. It is a popular model that has been a part of the com-
parison during all the five years. Furthermore it was the flagship of Ford's turna-
round – Ford's effort to show that they could compete with the Japanese automak-
ers in the end of the 80s (See for instance Womack et al. 1990; Maynard 2003, 
etc.) It is well known as an especially lean-designed model, with everything this 
entails. Observing it in the tables we see two problems – its repair time has dete-
riorated over the years, and its ranking has fallen. With each incremental rede-
sign, it seems that the car has become less and less easy to assemble/disassemble.  
However, despite their interesting points, the tables are still not providing us with 
an easy overview of what companies have "succeeded" or "failed" most often. To 
find  this  out  we  have  to  form  a  combination  ranking  system  that  allows  us  to  
weigh the companies against each other. 
An extremely simple way of doing this is to look only at the top and bottom re-
sults and see how often a company shows up in either category. We take the top 
three and bottom three of each year-class, and simply count how often a corpora-
tion has a model on either list. The models in the middle we do not look at; they 
are "run-of-the-mill" and we are interested only in the best and worst.  
In Table 21 we see the listing of how often each corporation has scored a model 
on either the top-three list or the bottom-three list. The most models by far have 
been produced by General Motors – this is only logical, since GM was for a long 
time the largest automaker in the world, producing the largest amount of cars. 
Ford, Chrysler and the Asian companies follow, and at the end of the list we see 
the European companies (only from the North American market perspective of 
course).  As  we  remember  from  earlier  on  in  the  analysis,  the  Asian  and  North  
American car companies have about the same amount of models in the compari-
son; the GM dominance might seem large but we must remember that their mod-
els are spread out over several brands. It is true that there are fewer European cars 
in the comparison – this is simply an effect of the choice of region to study. There 
are certainly more European sedans available, spread out over several more com-
panies not studied in this analysis. 
GM is at the top of the top-three list, but since we know that this corporations has 
a very large amount of models in the comparison, it is only natural to suspect that 
the reason the company is at the top is simply that they have such a large lineup 
that they inevitably have many "good" models and "bad" models in the mix.  
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The  best  way to  compensate  for  this  and  get  a  real  overview is  simply  to  make  
each  result  relative:  we  divide  each  corporation's  result  by  the  total  amount  of  
models the corporation has in the comparison. This way we have a percentage, 
something that shows how often a company succeeds or fails depending on how 
often they launch a new model. These relative values are displayed in Table 22.   
Table 21. Car model ranking lists, by corporation.  
Total no of cars   No of cars placing  No of cars placing    
in comparison   top-3 in category   bottom-3 in category 
GM 74 GM 20 Toyota 10 
Ford 30 Chrysler 9 BMW 7 
Toyota 28 Ford 7 Honda 6 
Nissan 26 Honda 5 Ford 6 
Chrysler 26 Nissan 5 Volkswagen 5 
Honda 21 Kia 3 Mazda 5 
Hyundai 16 Mazda 2 Mercedes 5 
Mazda 13 Hyundai 2 GM 4 
Mitsubishi 12 Mitsubishi 1 Audi 4 
Volkswagen 11 Suzuki 1 Nissan 2 
Kia 9 Volvo 1 Jaguar 2 
BMW 9 Peugeot 0 Mitsubishi 1 
Mercedes 8 Saab 0 Suzuki 1 
Audi 8 Mercedes 0 Chrysler 1 
Suzuki 7 BMW 0 Saab 0 
Volvo 5 Toyota 0 Volvo 0 
Jaguar 5 Volkswagen 0 Hyundai 0 
Saab 3 Jaguar 0 Kia 0 
Peugeot 1 Audi 0 Peugeot 0 
Table 22. Car model (relative) ranking lists, by corporation.  
%  of cars placing   %  of cars placing  
 top-3 in category bottom-3 in category 
Chrysler 35 % BMW 78 % 
Kia 33 % Mercedes 63 % 
GM 27 % Audi 50 % 
Honda 24 % Volkswagen 45 % 
Ford 23 % Jaguar 40 % 
Volvo 20 % Mazda 38 % 
Nissan 19 % Toyota 36 % 
Mazda 15 % Honda 29 % 
Suzuki 14 % Ford 20 % 
Hyundai 13 % Suzuki 14 % 
Mitsubishi 8 % Mitsubishi 8 % 
   Nissan 8 % 
   GM 5 % 
    Chrysler 4 % 
Looking  at  the  list  of  the  best  performing  companies  we  see  that  Chrysler,  Kia  
and GM top the list. Chrysler and Kia show impressive numbers – over a third of 
their cars are winners in terms of repair time.  GM is no longer first but third: they 
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have  had  a  lot  of  winners,  but  also  a  lot  of  models  that  haven't  made  the  top.   
Honda and Ford follow and surprisingly enough we also see Volvo. Despite hav-
ing few cars in the comparison, they had a lot of winners relatively speaking (one 
out  of  five).  The  rest  of  the  top  list  is  all  Asian  companies  –  but  Toyota  is  not  
among them. The South Korean companies Kia and Hyundai performed very well 
– none of their models are present on the list of worst-performing cars.  
Looking at  the list  of the worst  performing (in terms of repair  time) cars we see 
several European companies at the top of the list: BMW, Mercedes, Audi, 
Volkswagen and Jaguar. Perhaps we can chalk this up to different design cultures, 
different quality classes, unfamiliarity with these brands in an American repair 
shop setting (see the discussion on this in the 'Limitations' section) – but neverthe-
less the results are quite bad. We see the North American car companies on this 
list too, as well as many of the same the Asian (Japanese) car companies we saw 
on the top list. Toyota is only on the list of the worse performers, though. Over a 
third of their cars are amongst those slowest to repair. Because of Toyota's strong 
track  record  in  other  fields  of  production  and  design  this  throws  a  curious  light  
over the whole investigation. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
In summary – an intriguing analysis. We were able to draw several puzzling con-
clusions about the usage of assembly-friendly design from our comparison, con-
clusions that were not entirely expected at the outset. The North American exper-
tise in easily repairable/assemblable cars, the European bottom ranking in the 
same, Toyota's limited success – all of these must be discussed further. We will 
also see the answers to the original three research questions: 
1. What are the trends in automotive assembly time, looking at the last 
20 years? 
2. What companies consistently produce the cars with lowest (and 
highest) assembly times? 
3. Can DFA time data reliably be extrapolated from certain types of 
repair data?  
7.1 Possible conclusions 
In the following sections we go through the answers of the statistical analysis and 
the individual company comparison gave. We will look at each and try to inter-
pret the connections to the theory section and the implications to the real world 
industry.   
7.1.1 A rising trend in annual repair time 
As  we  could  see  during  the  analysis,  the  average  repair  times  have  been  rising  
steadily since 1990 – with about 10 hours between year groups since 2000, and 
with slightly less before that. Now this limits our conclusions to a few possibili-
ties. Firstly, that cars have grown more complex or simply more cramped since 
the beginning of the 90s – a very logical conclusion. However, despite what we 
might have assumed in the beginning, the knowledge of efficient Design for As-
sembly methods does not seem to have resulted in industry-wide reductions in 
repair/assembly times, at least not over the last two decades. This despite the fact 
that the methodology has been well known for at least double that time and de-
spite at least some of the automotive producers confessing to using the tech-
niques.  
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That the cars have grown more complex does not come as a surprise at all – we 
all know that a remarkable amount of new equipment has been added to the new 
basic car model over the last 20 years; options that were only present on the most 
expensive cars are now commonplace on the cheapest models. More stringent 
safety measures have worked their way into the industry standards, probably in-
creasing the amount of components included in a "normal" car.  
It  is  also  possible  to  assume that  size  has  had  something  to  do  with  the  issue  –  
perhaps cars were bigger in the beginning of the 90s and new design standards 
that incorporate fuel economy and better aerodynamics have produced cars 
somewhat smaller in dimensions. The really large sedan models may have found 
their successor in the SUVs and crossover models, both of which have been omit-
ted from this comparison. Weight doesn't seem to come into the equation on the 
other hand, there is nothing that says a heavier vehicle would be easier or harder 
to disassemble.  
There is also the option that certain assembly techniques have been taken into use 
that limit the possibility of opening up and repairing a car. The use of epoxy glue 
and snap fits that break when opened might certainly be two such techniques, and 
both are certainly used in automotive assembly today.   
Possible outcomes of our results 
We can loosely divide these possibilities into four groups:  
1) there is no link between repair and assembly,  
2) there is a link between repair and assembly, but Design for Assembly is simply 
not used in the automotive industry, at least not commonly,  
3) there is a link between repair and assembly, and Design for Assembly is used 
in the automotive industry, but the cars are growing more complex at such a rate 
that Design for Assembly cannot compensate – the cars' repair times are growing 
anyway  
4) the whole thing is a function of size – bigger cars are easier to repair and de-
sign doesn't really come into it.  
Let  us  go  through each  of  these  possibilities  and  try  to  prove  or  disprove  them,  
step by step, 
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Number 4 – size matters 
The fourth possibility is actually the easiest to disprove. In the appendices we 
have lists of the models’ performances in terms of repair time, but also lists of the 
cars’ dimensions: length, width and height. If we sum up these three or better yet 
multiply them, we gain a metric of size. Analyzing this metric using the same 
ANOVA measures used in the repair time comparison, it is possible to see that 
the average car size has actually grown over the last twenty years (statistically 
significant at the 0,05 level) an that the total (outer cube) volume of the average 
car has grown with almost a cubic meter since 1990. Furthermore, if we choose, 
we can easily test to see whether there is any correlation between size and high or 
low repair  time. Choosing to do so,  we see a correlation (Pearson) of 0,43. This 
relatively strong positive correlation indicates that the larger the size of a vehicle, 
the higher its  repair  time  –  not  lower!  This  follows  more  closely  to  our  "class"  
theory than to the big-is-easy-to-repair theory. The higher-priced models are often 
bigger than the economy models, but the higher-priced models are also harder to 
repair as we saw earlier on. This line of reasoning seems to be able to produce the 
positive correlation.  
Number 1 – no link 
The first  possibility,  on  the  other  hand,  it's  very  hard  to  disprove.  It  is  a  central  
assumption of this comparison that repair times and assembly time are indeed 
somewhat related – not a 1:1 relation certainly, but we assume that improving a 
vehicle's assemblability will also show up positively when trying to repair said 
vehicle.  
This work makes no attempts at numerically proving or disproving this hypothe-
sis, and given that the results of the analysis are unexpected we naturally have to 
take the assumption under consideration. However, at this point in time there is 
no possibility to further prove or disprove the assumption, not without additional 
research in other areas – more about this in the section on suggestions for future 
research. At the moment we will  just  have to take that assumption as given and 
consider what our results mean if we can assume it to be true. If future research 
proves the assumption false, we shall just have to discard the evidence from this 
analysis.  
Numbers 2 – 3 – some kind of link 
Conclusions number three and four are both interesting and mind provoking op-
tions, since they both have something to say about the automotive industry that 
we did not already know.  
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First of all conclusion three – that Design for Assembly is already in extensive 
use amongst automotive designers, but that the techniques cannot keep up with 
the pace of developing complexity in the cars. As our analysis showed, the cars 
are undoubtedly getting more complex (or at least more cramped for repair) and 
we know that at least Ford Motor Company, Chrysler and GM have said that they 
are using the Design for Assembly techniques (see Chapter 2.3). Since best prac-
tices tend to move swiftly between competitors, it is only natural to assume that 
other automakers have also acquainted themselves with the methodology in some 
form or the other.  
It is possible that the car is simply "too perfect" already – that no improvements 
can be made on the basic design already in use. We do know that the car has been 
in production for about 120 years already (from Gottlieb Daimler's and Carl 
Bentz' first creations late 1880s), and that the product has had a long time to ma-
ture. It is undoubtedly one of the most intensely developed products on earth. 
Perhaps all Design for Assembly modifications possible were made already dur-
ing the 70s and 80s.  
However, the two case studies presented in Chapter 3.3 – where Boothroyd-
Dewhurst Inc. redesigns an instrument panel and a car seat – seem relevant to this 
question.  If  we  compare  the  instrument  panel  with  for  instance  the  one  off  the  
European car model shown in Chapter 5,4 we see that there is quite a difference.  
In fact, the average instrumentation panel Remove&Install time in this compari-
son  is  6  hours  36  minutes.  If  we  loosely  consider  that  half  of  this  time  goes  to  
removal, half to installation (a probably incorrect assumption, but enough for a 
rough measure) that means 3 hours 18 minutes of assembly time. The assembly 
time of the truck instrument panel before redesign in Boothroyd-Dewhursts ex-
ample is 63 minutes. Even if we assume a generous measure of time for instru-
ment insertions, finish, etc. and even revise our assumption on how much time 
goes to removal in a repair shop – the average car is still nowhere near the rede-
signed, DFA assembly time of Boothroyd-Dewhurst's new instrument panel (12 
minutes).  
But the really interesting thing is that there are cars that come close. The lowest 
instrumentation  panel  repair  time in  the  comparison  goes  down to  as  low as  18  
minutes – a 2010 Asian model . If we halve this number we get 9 minutes assem-
bly/installation – very close to Boothroyd-Dewhurst's expected 12 minutes. A 
special case, but nevertheless an interesting thing to ponder. Perhaps Design for 
Assembly is not really as widely used as we had hoped.  
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Admittedly a truck's instrument panel may be somewhat simpler and more acces-
sible than that of a sedan model, but there is enough of a difference here to raise 
our suspicion. Would there really be so much to improve on an already perfect 
product? If a 93% percent reduction in assembly time of an instrument panel is 
possible between average and DFA "ideal" (from 3 hours 18 minutes to 12 
minutes) and that difference covers about a third of the average repair time in-
crease we noticed between years 2005 and 2010 (10,6 hours) – it seems very pos-
sible that redesigning other components in addition could bring us at least to a 
standstill against the rising complexity, perhaps even to a decreasing trend in re-
pair times.  
The pickup seat example corroborates this train of thought. The average seat bot-
tom Remove&Install time in this comparison is 42 minutes (which probably in-
cludes a certain degree of assembly and disassembly, since the seat bottom is not 
detachable right away). If we again loosely consider that half of this time goes to 
removal, half to installation, that means 21 minutes assembly/installation. The 
assembly time of the pickup seat before redesign in Boothroyd-Dewhursts exam-
ple is 24 minutes – very close, in fact.  
The lowest seat  bottom repair  times in the comparison go down to as low as 12 
minutes. If we halve this number we get 6 minutes assembly/installation – also 
very close to Boothroyd-Dewhurst's expected redesign example of 4,3 minutes. 
22 car models (out of 316) have 12 minute seat bottom repair times. So we can 
only conclude – some are better than others at DFA. The maximum seat repair 
time is 6 hours…   
This leads us to consider possibility number three – that Design for Assembly is 
simply not used to its fullest extent in the automotive industry. Being an old and 
widely accepted methodology (at least in North America) this seems curious. As 
we saw earlier on in Chapter 3.3, assembly labor makes up about 10–20% percent 
of the product's price. Considering the automakers previous efforts to automatize 
their production – robotic welding, robotic spray painting, etc. – it seems odd that 
they would not strive to minimize the amount of labor needed to install the more 
complicated components towards the end of the process.  
Human dexterity is necessary for such jobs, but why not minimize the efforts nec-
essary? Especially considering that the established automakers are being chal-
lenged by companies in countries with lower wages. Perhaps the reason for not 
using Design for Assembly to its fullest extent simply lies elsewhere – the reason 
may be a balancing act between multiple considerations.  
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The strong automotive suppliers 
In practice, a manufacturer of a complex product will rely upon the components 
offered by a subcontractor, or several subcontractors. This puts a whole range of 
considerations on the board: will the sub-contractors want to (or be allowed to) 
take part in the product design? Are they large enough (or small enough) to par-
ticipate on the desired level? Are they in fact so large that they have no wish to 
modify their designs in a way more beneficial to the manufacturer, and if they are, 
at what price? Will the gains from the redesign outweigh the financial benefits of 
using an over-the-counter model of the component?  
According to Maxton & Wormald 2004: 131–163, the automotive designer must 
walk a difficult path – pushing for innovation, while at the same time respecting 
the constraints of the marketplace. There is the inherent conservatism of the aver-
age customer take into account, but also the conservatism of the supplier market.  
At the moment, only about a fourth (25%) of the value added on a car is done at 
the automotive assembly plant. The closest suppliers (Tier 1) stand for 38% value 
added, second tier 26% and third tier 11%. 75% of the cost of the vehicle was 
bought in from suppliers in 1995, as opposed to only 25% in 1955. (Maxton & 
Wormald 2004: 144). A clear shift from vertical integration to outsourcing.  
The Japanese automakers probably led the way, focusing on close cooperation 
instead of forming mammoth corporations, and choosing to use the Just-in-Time 
system to integrate the suppliers more closely (most often) than an American 
company. The Keiretsu/Zaibatsu form of close company governance and equity 
ties supported this integration.  
The subsequent Lean manufacturing explosion brought the ideas of Just-in-time 
production and supplier involvement to the international stage. For various rea-
sons, the outsourcing of still more important assemblies and design choices be-
came an important trend in the automotive industry. It is a question of the car 
companies choosing to focus on core competencies, of course, but also a question 
of inviting/forcing the suppliers to shoulder a greater responsibility for the suc-
cess of new models.  
Look for instance at German company Bosch, providing fuel injection systems 
and electronic systems internationally. American Visteon, Japanese Denso, Cana-
dian Magna, Swedish SKF – all of these and several more are good examples of 
first tier supplier that started out as local suppliers for the "home brands" but are 
now multi-billion dollar enterprises who supply not only the local companies, but 
work internationally without boundaries. In Europe this trend became especially 
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clear when the European Union single market broke down barriers between the 
former national car industries and created an even playing field. Now there are 
Bosch electric systems in a significant part of the European cars, and SKF bear-
ings as well. 
Taking this development into consideration – how in-charge are the automotive 
engineers really of their own creation? What can an automotive engineer really 
design? The international strength of the largest suppliers, the suppliers own mo-
tivation to produce larger series of products to achieve economies of scale and on 
top of this, the automotive companies' wishes to reuse solutions in so-called prod-
uct families – the automotive engineer is quite limited to specific set of solutions. 
Design for Assembly is at its most effective when radical changes can be made, in 
shape, material use and functionality. Perhaps the automotive industry is simply 
too rigid to become as cost effective as it could?   
7.1.2 North American cars are the fastest to repair 
The  second  surprising  conclusion  of  the  analysis  was  that  North  America  as  a  
region performed better in the comparison than Asia (if yet by a thin margin). 
Since the 80s, the Lean production methodologies of the Japanese automakers 
have been considered the best available and it has become the new industry 
standard for efficient productivity. However, in this particular comparison, the 
North American brands display a (somewhat) better result – an average of 142 
hours versus an average of 148 hours.  
Now, first of all we must look at the most obvious possibility: that there is not a 
strong connection between fast repair times and skill in Lean methods. This 
would be a somewhat surprising conclusion. The Japanese car manufacturers 
achieved their fame through the usage of efficient production methods, and have 
after that strived to achieve further success by utilizing Lean design (see (Cusu-
mano & Nobeoka 1998) for as closer view on the Japanese Lean design practic-
es). We could easily assume, therefore, that a company striving to achieve Lean 
design methods will tend towards adapting Design for Assembly techniques of 
some kind. This does not seem to be the case – if we assume that the Japanese 
producers are the only experts in Lean production. 
It is possible that what we are looking at is simply a more level playing field after 
the Japanese dominance during the 70s and 80s. Lean production methods is the 
industry standard now and achieving lean design is the prerogative of everyone. 
The American automakers have as good a chance as anyone to achieve this – per-
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haps even better considering that they struggled hard to overcome their deficien-
cies against the Japanese earlier on.  
Be this how it may, it is clearly possible to conclude that there is no real link be-
tween Design for Assembly and overall company success in the automotive mar-
ket. The North American automakers faced possible bankruptcy several times 
during the last decades, especially in the wake of oil price shocks (see for instance 
Maynard 2003 for a closer look on the ups and downs of the American auto in-
dustry). Also, we also saw that Toyota – the company that grew to usurp GM's 
place as the biggest car producer of the world – is nowhere to be seen in the list of 
fastest repair times. This is something we'll discuss more below.   
7.1.3 Chrysler and Kia produce the most repair/assembly friendly cars 
Overall the American car companies do very well in the analysis. Looking at the 
individual companies, we see that the American Big Three are all in the top five. 
They are joined there by Kia and Honda. Chrysler and Kia are in fact the big win-
ners with over a third of their cars being at the top of the fastest repair time com-
parison.   
That Chrysler (first) and Honda (fourth) are present at the top is understandable. 
According to Cusumano & Nobeoka (1998: 78–79) Honda has a reputation for 
innovative product designs among the Japanese automakers. They have a history 
of strong project managers, strategic component sharing between models and a 
corporate structure that is very suitable for concurrent engineering – the prerequi-
site of DFA. And Chrysler (According to Jones 1995) when faced with bankrupt-
cy in the early 1980’s (temporarily saved by a Government rescue package) 
turned to Honda for help on reviving its design culture. Honda taught Chrysler its 
product development technique, based around platform teams, which operated on 
a concurrent engineering principle. Chrysler was able to produce a new model, 
the Neon – that was developed fast (31 months compared to the usual 60), with 
less manpower (about 700 engineers instead of 1400) and that was also faster to 
manufacture. It included fewer parts and manufacturing steps, and the man hours 
needed to weld, paint and assemble the car fell from a normal 35 hours/per car to 
22 hours/per car. Interestingly enough, though, Honda has almost equally many 
cars on the bottom list, making their performance less strong overall. Chrysler 
only has one car on the bottom list.  
Also interesting is South Korean Kia on the second place in the list – a mere up-
start compared to the North American and Japanese car companies. The some-
what older Hyundai (tenth) is also present on the top list, but with nowhere near 
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as  good results.  Of  course,  since  1998,  the  two companies  are  part  of  the  same 
corporation, but the two brands have been allowed to continue without much in-
ter-mixing, so the strong result of Kia still stands on its own.  
Kia has no cars on the bottom list. This is quite a mean feat, in many ways. Ac-
cording to Griffiths (2006), Rechtin (2005) and Jackson (2007) Kia models have 
had a utilitarian reputation – good vehicles with good content, but nothing that 
turns heads on the street. This might reflects the relative youth of Kia's exports 
(US introduction in 1994), or simply a difference in value culture. But Kia models 
are by no means tin boxes, they are have everything their competitors offer (plus 
a 10-year warranty) mostly at a lower price. Design for Assembly does not equal 
basic products – Chrysler's, GM's, and Honda's rankings disprove that theory. But 
apparently Kia has managed to combine DFA with overall company success – 
something its fellow top list companies have not done equally well. A company to 
study closer, certainly.  
Ford's fifth place in the top list we can almost discount, because they have an 
equally large presence on the bottom list – basically about 20% of their cars are 
very good, and about 20% of their cars are very bad (at least in terms of re-
pair/assembly). They simply have an uneven performance record. It is also worth 
noting that their bad and good performances have come evenly dispersed 
throughout the last two decades. According to Jones (1995) a similar story to 
Chrysler's is true for Ford, with its Taurus model that was developed under an 
experiment with cross-functional platform teams in 1985. Ford too faced bank-
ruptcy in 1981, but the success of the Taurus, which ranked very high on manu-
facturability (see the comparison with GM’s Grand Prix model in Section 2.4), 
gave them a chance to recover. Afterwards, however, the old organizational struc-
ture returned, with the problematic product development processes that entailed. 
According to Maynard (2003) the tradition of strong leaders that occasionally re-
shuffle the entire production deck has meant the American Big Tree have a 
somewhat irregular history of success and failure.  
GM's third place is, in comparison, more impressive. They've produced by far the 
largest amount of different models (74 sedans in the comparison) and neverthe-
less close to a third of them have been winners in terms of repair/assembly. Fur-
thermore, a very few of their products have gone to the bottom of the list (about 
5%).  
More unexpectedly, we see Volvo at sixth place. Sure enough, they only have five 
cars comparison, and one winner is enough to secure a place on the top list. But 
on the other hand none of Volvo's cars are on the bottom of the list either. A 
strong performance from a small manufacturer. The rest of the top list is made up 
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of the large Japanese car companies, all of which have some good models and 
some bad models.   
7.1.4 European cars (and Toyota’s) are the slowest to repair 
Focusing instead on the bottom list, we can clearly see that it is dominated by the 
European brands. BMW, Mercedes, Audi, Volkswagen and Jaguar have the dubi-
ous honor of being the bottom five of the bottom list. This is no surprise; the re-
gional comparison showed that the European brands performed worst by far when 
compared to North America and Asia (179 hours on average, compared with 142 
and 148 respectively). In BMWs case seven of their nine cars in the comparison 
ended up on the bottom list, resulting in a "loss rate" of almost 80%. The runners-
up do not fare well either – Mercedes at about 60%, Audi at about 50%, 
Volkswagen at 45% and Jaguar at 40%. 
Womack et al. 1990:118 showed that the European automaker were no better than 
their American counterparts in the art of lean design (in the mid 80s), looking at 
such indicators as average engineering hours per new car, average development 
time per new car, number of body types per new car, return to normal productivi-
ty after new model, return to normal quality after new model, etc. The Japanese 
automakers were better than both. There is no way to directly link these finding to 
those we have seen in this comparison, however.  
An alternative explanation that could probably explain the poor results of the Eu-
ropean brands could be the subjective nature of the source data. Using only one, 
North American source of repair data could have a negative impact on the Euro-
pean models. Most of the Asian models are in fact very common in North Ameri-
ca (see Figures 6 and 15, showing the mix of the car fleet in North America), and 
some of them are even produced domestically. The European brands on the other 
hand are mostly imported and are markedly more unusual than the Asian and 
North  American  brands.  It  may be  that  some of  the  time differential  can  be  ex-
plained by unfamiliarity with the brands – the repair shops that have supplied data 
for the repair guides will naturally be less proficient at repairing uncommon and 
unusual. In the case of the Asian cars, such an unfamiliarity cannot be said to ex-
ist (by 1990 and forwards).   
7.1.5 High Quality and Repair/Assembly might not mix  
It  is  strange to notice that two of the world's  brands most noted for their  quality 
and dependability – Toyota and Mercedes – end up so low on the list. Ten out of 
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28 Toyota models end up on the bottom list, and for Mercedes it's five out of 
eight. Interestingly enough, even though we may have previously combined the 
Toyota and Lexus models under one brand, it's only the normal Toyota models 
that  end  up  on  the  bottom  list.  The  "higher  class"  Lexus  models  could  under-
standably be harder to repair, as the Kruskal-Wallis test of the Class-factor indi-
cated.  
Why does Toyota have no models on the top list while the other Japanese compa-
nies do? Honda performs much better in comparison. We are forced towards a 
strange conclusion: that Toyota would use design methods that perform worse on 
repair (assembly), possibly because Toyota focuses more on other factors (detri-
mental to ease of assembly).  
This conclusion seems quite counterintuitive. Toyota has been a star producer of 
high quality affordable vehicles during the last decades – it is only during the last 
few years some concerns have surfaced in connection with Toyota cars, more 
specifically the jamming gas pedals models that were recalled during 2009–2010. 
Before that (and still now) Toyota has had a cast-iron solid reputation for good 
design and generally performed very well in the market. They rose to become the 
largest producer of cars in the world in 2008; a company with bad design tech-
niques could hardly achieve something like that.  
However, we did find earlier on that success in this comparison has very little to 
do with overall company success. It is possible that Design for Assembly is not in 
prominent use at Toyota, but that their other successful business practices might 
compensate for any hypothetical "loss" from slow assembly. It is well known that 
Toyota favors conservative, well-proved technology solutions in its models – this 
is something even old Taichi Ohno himself dictated (Ohno 1988:63; Liker 
2003:31). That could be a reason why extensive redesign according to Design for 
Assembly would not be favored by Toyota. But as we remember from Sections 2 
and 4, Design for assembly is in fact supposed to improve product quality. Fur-
thermore, concurrent engineering is certainly being used at Toyota and there is no 
reason why ease of assembly would not be taken into consideration under such a 
regimen.  
In fact, this whole last possible result of the analysis stands on very unsteady legs. 
Any possible link between quality and DFA would have to be investigated much 
more closely to be able to say anything tangible at all. Results that are so counter-
intuitive that they would force you to re-evaluate the data itself rather than accept 
the results are generally speaking not good results. It is possible that Toyota's re-
sults are more a fluke than anything else, and we already stated that the most 
probable reason for the poor European results is the skewed, small sample. There-
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fore we leave this conclusion as unsubstantiated in the wait for more material to 
study.  
7.2 Limitations 
In this section we look at the limitations in our methods, sources and analysis.  
Single source of data 
One limitation that springs readily to mind is the choice of one single source of 
data. The Mitchell International Collision Estimating Guides are an excellent 
source of data with a high degree of detail and reliability. They are, however, 
based in a certain environment. They are North American guides, giving esti-
mates of how long it will take to repair a car in an American workshop. A work-
shop recommended by the car manufacturer, a brand approved workshop, but 
nevertheless an American workshop.  
Therefore there is the possibility that such American workshops will have a great-
er  amount  of  experience  in  dealing  with  cars  of  North  American  origin  –  the  
models produced by the American Big Three. This is not a foregone conclusion, 
of course – we know that the North American market has long been open to ex-
tensive import from both Asia and Europe and that a significant part of the Amer-
ican car fleet consists of non-American brands (see the beginning of Chapter 5 for 
a breakdown of the American car market).   
In effect, the North American perspective may or may not have an influence on 
the data, but there is a slight chance that the good results of the North American 
brands come in part from a higher degree of familiarity – the repair shops asked 
to evaluate how long a certain repair will take might give a lower quote for a 
model that they are highly familiar with. And a higher quote for an unfamiliar car. 
It only seems logical.  
However, the only way to really make sure that this effect has not played a part in 
the analysis would be to repeat the analysis with sources from other countries, or 
alternatively to perform similar analyses for the European and Asian markets, 
looking only at sources relevant to those markets.  
It  is  quite possible that the latter option is the only possible one,  given what we 
saw in the data selection chapter: European sources of repair data tend to focus on 
the European market and the American sources on the American market. There 
are probably similar sources of repair data for the Asian markets, but it is doubtful 
 Acta Wasaensia     163 
  
whether these sources are translated to other languages. Again, we must be flexi-
ble when facing practical difficulties in the research. 
Different time concepts for repair and assembly 
One of the things that cannot be measured without access to more detailed assem-
bly time data is whether the time concepts of the repair manuals approximate that 
actual assembly. There is a certain value difference between the two sectors. The 
repair  shop  bills  the  customer  by  time  spent  on  the  vehicle,  and  might  tend  to  
overestimate time requirements. Assembly lines on the other hand are mainly 
interested in producing as many cars as possible and might therefore focus on 
speed. On the other hand, we might as well consider that this is a systematic bias 
that will even out for the entire data set – even if repair times are inflated com-
pared to assembly times, that should not form a problem if only all times are in-
flated equally. But best not to consider the repair times an exact source of assem-
bly time data.  
Small data sample 
The data that we looked at was undoubtedly small (316 models), and furthermore 
divided into several year groups and/or classes. In some classes, some regions did 
not produce any suitable models, some years. The European models were fur-
thermore always in minority when compared to the Asian and American models. 
It would have been beneficial to have a) a larger set of data and b) a more uniform 
set of data, with more similar sized groups. 
However, the dataset was the biggest possible, given our standards of comparabil-
ity. There were simply no more sedan type models of a comparable 
type/price/drive to add to the comparison for each year, when only looking at the 
American market. Historically, only about 70–80 different four-door sedan mod-
els have ever been on offer from the larger automakers (on the North American 
market) at any given year. The only way to expand the dataset would be to relax 
some constrictions, the easiest of which would probably be the market chosen for 
study.    
DFA-DFD link assumption 
This shortcoming has been discussed in previous sections and it is without doubt 
a problem to be solved. However, rather than discuss problems further, we will 
focus more on the issue in the next section – suggestions for future research.  
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7.3 Suggestions for future research 
A European comparison 
To solve the problems of small data sample size and of a subjective data source, 
the best option would probably be to repeat the experiment for the European mar-
ket, using one or several of the databases that handle more of the European brands 
(Renault, Citroen, etc.) as opposed to the North American brands (Plymouth, 
Oldsmobile, etc.). To a large extent, the two comparisons would probably feature 
the same cars, but the different data sources and any possible differences in "pre-
ferred workshop make" – faster repairs on well-known brands – should make the 
European analysis an interesting addition. A new set of car models would have to 
be collected from European car guides, the best European sources of repair data 
determined and time data collected for a suitable amount of subassemblies. None 
of these tasks are in any way impossible.  
In the interest of fairness, a similar investigation should probably be made for the 
Asian car markets, but because of the language issue this seems a difficult task. A 
joint venture with other researchers interested in the same issues might solve the 
problem, however.  
Investigating the Design for Assembly/Disassembly/Repair link 
A more complex but much more pressing issue would be to quantify the link be-
tween fast  assembly and fast  disassembly. With only one empirical  study on the 
correlation between DFA and DFD (limited to quite small consumer products) we 
cannot be sure of the link. However, if the link between fast assembly and fast 
repair can be numerically proven, the results of this work are certainly interesting 
on a wider scale, together with the fact that the link itself might have strong re-
percussions on the field of efficient industrial design.  
Such a relationship could even prove interesting to automotive companies. If it 
could be shown that efficient assembly goes hand-in-hand with easy-to-
disassemble car models, this could revitalize the industry's interest in DFA tech-
niques. The need to create greener, "made-for-recycling" cars would no longer be 
an additional burden, but rather a side-effect of an already desirable design meth-
od.  
However, to prove this relationship could be difficult. The repair data is easy to 
obtain, but assembly time data is most often a closely guarded secret of the auto-
motive industry companies. Securing such data could be very problematic. How-
ever, it may not be impossible, given that the research in question could prove 
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beneficial to the automakers themselves in the longer run. Employees of several 
of the global automotive companies have published studies on Design for Disas-
sembly (Hartman, Hernborg & Malmsten 2000; Paul, Chung & Raney 2004; 
Gwon, Hong, Hong & Cho 2007) and even on integrated Design for Assembly 
and Disassembly (Koganti, Zaluzec, Chen & Defersha 2006).  
It might be possible that some car company would even be willing to do an actual 
assembly/disassembly comparison of some of their own models.  In the SAE (So-
ciety of Automotive Engineers) article Actual Recyclability of Selected Honda 
Vehicles (2004), Richard Paul (and automotive recycling consultant), Dennis 
Chung  (of  Honda  R&D  Americas,  Inc)  and  David  Raney  (of  American  Honda  
Motor Co.) outline their actual disassembly of several Honda vehicles to find 
their level of DFD readiness. A similar cooperation between University and Car 
Company may well be possible for the DFA/DFD link too.  
In the unfortunate event that no actual assembly data can be found from the auto-
motive industry, some other source of data could possibly act as a proxy. A suffi-
ciently large and complex mechanical vehicle should show some similar tenden-
cies when you consider assembly and repair. Motorcycles would be a prime 
choice, but also tractors, combine harvesters, forest machines etc. could prove a 
natural source of comparison data. For all of these, repair data is relatively easy to 
get, and assembly data might be more forth-coming. The objective would be to 
achieve an average correlation figure (if a product is fast to produce how much 
faster can we expect that it is to repair?) and vice versa. 
This type of investigation is the natural next step and should be undertaken as 
soon as possible to complete the validity of this work. 
7.4 Research contribution 
Despite these limitations, the findings from this analysis prove an interesting ad-
dition to the very scarce supply of investigations around the usage of "design for" 
methods made to date. First of all, this analysis is an attempt to bring more objec-
tivity into the field of automotive industry best practices -research.  
As we could see earlier on, not many academic surveys have been done to meas-
ure the usage of certain design practices in the automotive industry. This is entire-
ly natural, since this type of information is a secret of the companies in the auto-
motive industry. The information may be available to some degree outside the 
automobile producing companies, for instance in certain industry organizations 
that specialize in comparing and benchmarking the practices of the automotive 
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industry. Such data will unfortunately be restricted either by membership in the 
organization or by high costs.  
Using information that is available relatively freely to infer the status of a compa-
ny's practices in another process is  an uncertain affair.  But if  performed with all  
due diligence and interpreted skeptically, such an analysis will undoubtedly be 
quite objective, since there is no prestige at stake in the issue. The repair data that 
we have used in this comparison is hardly subject to intense debate – rather it is a 
tool only for professionals in an almost completely unrelated sector. When look-
ing at industry organization surveys or automotive company surveys we cannot be 
sure that brand loyalty or preconceptions do not play a part.  
Secondly, this investigation is an attempt to establish where best practices can be 
found. As is the case with benchmarking, it is important to compare many differ-
ent companies to establish where to look for advice and guidance in certain fields. 
Now – the conclusions of the comparison may have been surprising (that the cars 
with the most efficient design in terms of repair/assembly are found in America, 
for instance) but the results may nevertheless be of help in future studies and even 
to the automotive industry companies themselves.  
A company doesn't have to be the most successful in the industry to be the leader 
in certain areas – production, design, marketing, etc. However, without the help 
of closer comparisons such as those offered by benchmarking organizations or by 
institutions of academic research it is hard to know who is best at what. One 
might stare blindly at the company with the largest market share and never think 
to look elsewhere for even better practices in a certain field. This comparison can 
be a part of that advice. 
 Acta Wasaensia     167 
  
8 CONCLUSION 
In the close future, the established car companies of the older industrialized coun-
tries will certainly be challenged by the new car companies of especially China 
and India. As we saw in Chapter 3.3, the move from local production to exports is 
logical, and we also established that the new car companies will probably attack 
the low end of the market, by providing cheap, but quite dependable compact cars 
for the international markets. Faced with this competition, established car compa-
nies can choose to retreat up-market (only providing more expensive, luxury 
models) and slowly see their former market share eroded. Alternatively, they can 
choose to fight for the low-end car market – and given that automotive production 
demands huge investments and large production runs to be profitable, this is 
probably the path they must take.  
However, in challenging the Chinese and Indian automakers with their low as-
sembly costs throughout the supply chain, the established car companies must 
find a method of achieving similarly low costs of assembly. While current day 
technology (robotic assembly) can only do so much, and is furthermore common-
ly used throughout the auto industry to a high degree – an alternative is offered by 
Design for Assembly. Changing a product so that it demands less in terms of as-
sembly and material costs while keeping the same functionality, may allow the 
established car companies to compete.  
The comparison of different car models in this work showed that the American 
manufacturers  seem  to  be  the  best  at  producing  DFA  cars,  something  which  is  
surprising considering their recent troubles with profitability. It seems that the 
American Big Three were indeed focusing strongly on Design for Assembly at 
one point in time – and they continue to be experts in this area – but their current 
financial troubles are the result of different shortcomings. A problematic lack of 
foresight when it comes to fuel efficiency and model popularity, for instance.  
However, as the automotive interviews indicated, Design for Assembly is not 
being stressed in today's automotive industry. Rather other design methodologies 
(such as Design for Disassembly) are taking over as leading philosophy. This, 
coupled with the fact that the modular and platform strategies that the automotive 
industry companies have been adopting over the last few decades have started to 
shift a substantial part of the design work to the suppliers, seems to predict the 
demise of Design for Assembly in the automotive industry.  
But let us turn the whole argument around. If only about 25% of vehicle's value is 
added at the OEMs factory these days, and the rest is being produced by the sup-
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pliers (Maxton & Wormald 2004:144), it is clearly in the suppliers' ranks that 
Design for Assembly must be promoted in the future.  
It is unclear whether the automotive industry's large suppliers have studied and 
implemented Design-for methodologies to the same extent as the OEMs – aca-
demic literature is scarce on this subject. Certainly it seems that the automotive 
suppliers outside of America have less interest and experience of DFA than those 
in America, and have only started seeing the Design-for methodologies' benefits 
rather recently, as a result of several automotive manufacturers’ campaigns on 
improving recyclability (Design for Disassembly).  
It is clear then what must happen – the whole supply chain of the old established 
car companies must undergo a DFA overhaul. These important techniques must 
be implemented already at the module stage, ensuring that the final cost of the 
vehicle stays on a reasonable level when compared to the vehicles produced in 
countries with lower assembly costs. Spread these practices throughout the supply 
chain, and significant cost reductions to the end product can be had.  
It is also clear where the expertise lies. The American car companies in general, 
and specific companies that perform well on assembly (for instance Hyundai-Kia 
Motors) should be the teachers and mentors of the automotive supply industry in 
implementing leaner, faster and more assembly-friendly design practices. The 
expertise of companies should be recognized and held up as an example, much in 
the same way that the Japanese expertise in lean production was recognized and 
promoted in the 1990s.  
Implementing Design for Assembly for an entire industry is not an easy task, 
however. The automotive supply chains are among the most complex in the 
world, with companies ranging from small to global supplying several thousand 
parts and modules for each new car model produced. A gradual implementation 
from the top down seems a feasible way forward. The largest automotive suppli-
ers, with their responsibility for large modules and their global customer markets, 
are well set-up to lead the way for the rest of the industry. Piloting the implemen-
tation of lean design methods together with the automotive manufacturers should 
provide the proof of concept and experience needed to start the process. The 
smaller  automotive  suppliers  can  in  turn  become  the  "system  suppliers"  of  the  
module suppliers – the first tier suppliers of a new type of OEM.  
 In this way, a new renaissance of automotive supply chain savings seems possi-
ble: a way for the automotive industries of the older industrialized countries to not 
only survive but actively take up the challenge of the Chinese and Indian au-
tomakers. It is time to move away from islands of excellence in the supply chain – 
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even when it comes to efficient design. The managers of the established car com-
panies must take the issue of DFA to discussion with their module suppliers, point 
out the benefits and cost reductions that are possible with these methods and ana-
lyze especially the American car models’ solutions for inspiring designs.  
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Appendix 1. Explore Time Data
YEAR
N Percent N Percent N Percent
1990 59 100,0% 0 ,0% 59 100,0%
1995 67 100,0% 0 ,0% 67 100,0%
2000 69 100,0% 0 ,0% 69 100,0%
2005 62 100,0% 0 ,0% 62 100,0%
2010 59 100,0% 0 ,0% 59 100,0%
Statistic Std. Error
139,920 2,1076
Lower Bound 135,702
Upper Bound 144,139
138,529
139,000
262,074
16,1887
114,8
204,9
90,1
14,4
1,569 ,311
4,358 ,613
145,431 2,7060
Lower Bound 140,029
Upper Bound 150,834
142,988
139,600
490,609
22,1497
114,2
257,6
143,4
17,9
2,616 ,293
10,135 ,578
147,538 2,4099
Lower Bound 142,729
Upper Bound 152,346
145,914
141,900
400,713
20,0178
118,0
207,8
89,8
18,5
1,365 ,289
1,724 ,570
Skewness
Std. Deviation
Sum of time 
measurements
Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Kurtosis
2000
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
1995 Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Case Processing Summary
Year Cases
Valid Missing Total
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Sum of time 
measurements
Descriptives
Year
1990 Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Kurtosis
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
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Appendix 1. Continued...
Statistic Std. Error
155,029 2,6557
Lower Bound 149,719
Upper Bound 160,340
153,558
151,550
437,283
20,9113
120,6
216,9
96,3
21,8
1,176 ,304
1,808 ,599
165,722 3,0187
Lower Bound 159,679
Upper Bound 171,765
164,193
162,800
537,643
23,1871
125,3
234,5
109,2
27,2
1,086 ,311
1,556 ,613
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
1990 ,158 59 ,001 ,877 59 ,000
1995 ,204 67 ,000 ,776 67 ,000
2000 ,184 69 ,000 ,877 69 ,000
2005 ,138 62 ,005 ,911 62 ,000
2010 ,146 59 ,003 ,924 59 ,001
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 1,379 4 311 ,241
Based on Median 1,160 4 311 ,328
Based on Median 
with adjusted df
1,160 4 291,263 ,329
Based on trimmed 
mean
1,257 4 311 ,287
Sum of time 
measurements
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
Test of Homogeneity of Variance
2010 Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Kurtosis
Tests of Normality
Year Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk
Sum of time 
measurements
Year
Sum of time 
measurements
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Descriptives
2005 Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
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YEAR
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Class 1 96 100,0% 0 ,0% 96 100,0%
Class 2 64 100,0% 0 ,0% 64 100,0%
Class 3 96 100,0% 0 ,0% 96 100,0%
Class 4 60 100,0% 0 ,0% 60 100,0%
Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Class 4: High-Price - Rear Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Statistic Std. Error
136,779 1,2689
Lower Bound 134,260
Upper Bound 139,298
136,488
137,550
154,562
12,4323
114,2
167,6
53,4
18,6
,281 ,246
-,384 ,488
144,416 1,7205
Lower Bound 140,978
Upper Bound 147,854
143,981
141,450
189,442
13,7638
122,1
179,1
57,0
20,6
,452 ,299
-,598 ,590
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Kurtosis
2. Mid-Price - 
Front Wheel Drive 
- Inline (straight) 
engine - Sedans
Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Case Processing Summary
Class Cases
Valid Missing Total
Std. Deviation
Sum of time 
measurements
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Sum of time 
measurements
Descriptives
Class
1. Low-Price - 
Front Wheel Drive 
- Inline (straight) 
engine - Sedans
Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
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Statistic Std. Error
148,733 1,1614
Lower Bound 146,428
Upper Bound 151,039
147,925
145,500
129,485
11,3791
133,8
185,4
51,6
14,4
1,047 ,246
,584 ,488
181,948 3,2573
Lower Bound 175,431
Upper Bound 188,466
181,222
180,200
636,589
25,2307
127,5
257,6
130,1
31,5
,533 ,309
,485 ,608
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Class 1 ,064 96 ,200* ,977 96 ,087
Class 2 ,121 64 ,021 ,960 64 ,038
Class 3 ,126 96 ,001 ,910 96 ,000
Class 4 ,100 60 ,200* ,979 60 ,375
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 16,592 3 312 ,000
Based on Median 15,546 3 312 ,000
Based on Median 
with adjusted df
15,546 3 189,044 ,000
Based on trimmed 
mean
16,445 3 312 ,000
Sum of time 
measurements
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
Test of Homogeneity of Variance
Sum of time 
measurements
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Tests of Normality
Class Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk
Kurtosis
4. High-Price - 
Rear Wheel Drive - 
V-engine - Sedans
Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
3. Mid-High-Price - 
Front Wheel Drive 
- V-engine - 
Sedans
Sum of time 
measurements
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Descriptives
Class
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REGION
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Asia 137 100,0% 0 ,0% 137 100,0%
USA 129 100,0% 0 ,0% 129 100,0%
Europe 50 100,0% 0 ,0% 50 100,0%
Statistic Std. Error
147,961 1,4314
Lower Bound 145,130
Upper Bound 150,791
147,632
145,600
280,690
16,7538
116,2
185,4
69,2
27,3
,316 ,207
-,755 ,411
142,219 1,1675
Lower Bound 139,908
Upper Bound 144,529
141,777
140,600
175,842
13,2605
114,2
187,9
73,7
14,6
,535 ,213
1,024 ,423
179,038 4,3060
Lower Bound 170,385
Upper Bound 187,691
178,014
178,050
927,081
30,4480
131,9
257,6
125,7
51,7
,400 ,337
-,600 ,662Kurtosis
Europe
Minimum
Maximum
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Sum of time 
measurements
Descriptives
Region
Sum of time 
measurements
Asia Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Kurtosis
USA Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Case Processing Summary
Region Cases
Valid Missing Total
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Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Asia ,080 137 ,032 ,972 137 ,007
USA ,086 129 ,019 ,970 129 ,006
Europe ,099 50 ,200* ,962 50 ,112
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 42,883 2 313 ,000
Based on Median 40,942 2 313 ,000
Based on Median 
and adjusted df
40,942 2 249,158 ,000
Based on trimmed 
mean
42,706 2 313 ,000
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
Test of Homogeneity of Variance
Sum of time 
measurements
Tests of Normality
Region Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk
Sum of time 
measurements
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YEAR
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Appendix 3. Transformation results
YEAR
Test of Normality
Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig.
1990 ,877 59 ,000 ,925 59 ,001 ,813 59 ,000 ,903 59 ,000
1995 ,776 67 ,000 ,870 67 ,000 ,662 67 ,000 ,826 67 ,000
2000 ,877 69 ,000 ,922 69 ,000 ,825 69 ,000 ,901 69 ,000
2005 ,911 62 ,000 ,951 62 ,015 ,856 62 ,000 ,933 62 ,002
2010 ,924 59 ,001 ,963 59 ,069 ,870 59 ,000 ,945 59 ,010
Test of Normality
Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig.
1990 ,955 59 ,028 ,942 59 ,007 ,966 59 ,103
1995 ,935 67 ,002 ,906 67 ,000 ,971 67 ,126
2000 ,955 69 ,015 ,940 69 ,002 ,977 69 ,224
2005 ,975 62 ,228 ,965 62 ,077 ,980 62 ,394
2010 ,984 59 ,625 ,976 59 ,285 ,986 59 ,755
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance
Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 1,379 4 311 ,241 ,693 4 311 ,597
Based on 
Median
1,160 4 311 ,328 ,596 4 311 ,666
Based on 
Median, adj. df
1,160 4 291,3 ,329 ,596 4 299,6 ,666
Based on 
trimmed mean
1,257 4 311 ,287 ,625 4 311 ,645
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance
Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 2,162 4 311 ,073 1,024 4 311 ,395
Based on 
Median
1,682 4 311 ,154 ,871 4 311 ,481
Based on 
Median, adj. df
1,682 4 278,2 ,154 ,871 4 296,0 ,481
Based on 
trimmed mean
1,867 4 311 ,116 ,932 4 311 ,445
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean ,247 4 311 ,912 ,427 4 311 ,789 ,221 4 311 ,927
Based on 
Median
,203 4 311 ,936 ,363 4 311 ,835 ,194 4 311 ,942
Based on 
Median, adj. df
,203 4 303,9 ,936 ,363 4 302,2 ,835 ,194 4 303,9 ,942
Based on 
trimmed mean
,203 4 311 ,937 ,372 4 311 ,829 ,212 4 311 ,931
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Reciprocal Trans. (x**-1) Reciprocal Square Root Trans. (x**-0.5)
Reciprocal Quadratic 
Trans. (x**-2)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Reciprocal Trans. 
(x**-1)
Rec. Square Root 
Trans. (x**-0.5)
Rec. Quadratic 
Trans. (x**-2)
Year
Shapiro-Wilk
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Original Natural Logarithm Trans. (x**0)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Quadratic Trans. (x**2) Square Root Trans. (x**0.5)
Original Natural Logarithm Trans. (x**0)
Quadratic Trans. 
(x**2)
Square Root Trans. 
(x**0.5)
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Year
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
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CLASS
Test of Normality
Year
Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig.
Class 1 ,977 96 ,087 ,981 96 ,185 ,967 96 ,016 ,980 96 ,143
Class 2 ,960 64 ,038 ,968 64 ,097 ,949 64 ,010 ,965 64 ,064
Class 3 ,910 96 ,000 ,927 96 ,000 ,890 96 ,000 ,919 96 ,000
Class 4 ,979 60 ,375 ,992 60 ,973 ,947 60 ,012 ,988 60 ,817
Test of Normality
Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig.
,980 96 ,158 ,981 96 ,191 ,974 96 ,057
,972 64 ,157 ,971 64 ,131 ,973 64 ,166
,942 96 ,000 ,935 96 ,000 ,953 96 ,002
,987 60 ,779 ,992 60 ,969 ,962 60 ,062
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance
Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 16,59 3 312 ,000 8,319 3 312 ,000
Based on 
Median
15,55 3 312 ,000 8,074 3 312 ,000
Based on 
Median, adj. df
15,55 3 189,0 ,000 8,074 3 245,7 ,000
Based on 
trimmed mean
16,44 3 312 ,000 8,415 3 312 ,000
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance
Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 28,27 3 312 ,000 11,94 3 312 ,000
Based on 
Median
24,25 3 312 ,000 11,44 3 312 ,000
Based on 
Median, adj. df
24,25 3 136,3 ,000 11,44 3 218,6 ,000
Based on 
trimmed mean
26,43 3 312 ,000 11,98 3 312 ,000
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 4,816 3 312 ,003 5,896 3 312 ,001 6,111 3 312 ,000
Based on 
Median
4,554 3 312 ,004 5,743 3 312 ,001 5,308 3 312 ,001
Based on 
Median, adj. df
4,554 3 278,8 ,004 5,743 3 266,6 ,001 5,308 3 276,4 ,001
Based on 
trimmed mean
4,844 3 312 ,003 5,988 3 312 ,001 6,076 3 312 ,000
Reciprocal Quadratic 
Trans. (x**-2)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Class 1
Class 3
Class 4
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Original Natural Logarithm Trans. (x**0)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Quadratic Trans. (x**2) Square Root Trans. (x**0.5)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Reciprocal Trans. (x**-1) Reciprocal Square Root Trans. (x**-0.5)
Reciprocal Trans. 
(x**-1)
Rec. Square Root 
Trans. (x**-0.5)
Class 2
Quadratic Trans. 
(x**2)
Square Root Trans. 
(x**0.5)
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Rec. Quadratic 
Trans. (x**-2)
Year
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Original Natural Logarithm Trans. (x**0)
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
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REGION
Test of Normality
Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig.
Asia ,972 137 ,007 ,980 137 ,040 ,959 137 ,000 ,977 137 ,019
USA ,970 129 ,006 ,981 129 ,064 ,948 129 ,000 ,977 129 ,026
Europe ,962 50 ,112 ,970 50 ,237 ,942 50 ,017 ,968 50 ,187
Test of Normality
Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig.
Asia ,982 137 ,061 ,981 137 ,059 ,977 137 ,021
USA ,980 129 ,059 ,982 129 ,084 ,970 129 ,006
Europe ,967 50 ,180 ,970 50 ,233 ,955 50 ,056
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance
Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 42,88 2 313 ,000 24,49 2 313 ,000
Based on 
Median
40,94 2 313 ,000 23,93 2 313 ,000
Based on 
Median, adj. df
40,94 2 249,2 ,000 23,93 2 293,6 ,000
Based on 
trimmed mean
42,71 2 313 ,000 24,49 2 313 ,000
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance
Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 62,86 2 313 ,000 33,16 2 313 ,000
Based on 
Median
57,99 2 313 ,000 32,07 2 313 ,000
Based on 
Median, adj. df
57,99 2 181,2 ,000 32,07 2 275,6 ,000
Based on 
trimmed mean
62,14 2 313 ,000 33,10 2 313 ,000
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 11,67 2 313 ,000 17,29 2 313 ,000 4,833 2 313 ,009
Based on 
Median
11,49 2 313 ,000 17,00 2 313 ,000 4,630 2 313 ,010
Based on 
Median, adj. df
11,49 2 309,8 ,000 17,00 2 304,3 ,000 4,630 2 312,1 ,010
Based on 
trimmed mean
11,68 2 313 ,000 17,31 2 313 ,000 4,756 2 313 ,009
Year
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Quadratic Trans. 
(x**2)
Square Root Trans. 
(x**0.5)
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Original Natural Logarithm Trans. (x**0)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Reciprocal Trans. (x**-1) Reciprocal Square Root Trans. (x**-0.5)
Reciprocal Quadratic 
Trans. (x**-2)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Original Natural Logarithm Trans. (x**0)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Quadratic Trans. (x**2) Square Root Trans. (x**0.5)
Reciprocal Trans. 
(x**-1)
Rec. Square Root 
Trans. (x**-0.5)
Rec. Quadratic 
Trans. (x**-2)
Year
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
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Low Bound Up Bound
1990 59 0,0000528 0,0000106 0,0000014 0,0000501 0,0000556 0,0000238 0,0000759
1995 67 0,0000497 0,0000112 0,0000014 0,0000470 0,0000524 0,0000151 0,0000767
2000 69 0,0000481 0,0000109 0,0000013 0,0000455 0,0000507 0,0000232 0,0000718
2005 62 0,0000436 0,0000104 0,0000013 0,0000410 0,0000463 0,0000213 0,0000688
2010 59 0,0000383 0,0000096 0,0000013 0,0000358 0,0000408 0,0000182 0,0000637
Total 316 0,0000466 0,0000116 0,0000007 0,0000453 0,0000479 0,0000151 0,0000767
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
,221 4 311 ,927
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between 
Groups
,000 4 ,000 17,096 ,000
Within 
Groups
,000 311 ,000
Total ,000 315
Statistica df1 df2 Sig.
Welch 18,487 4 154,851 ,000
Brown-
Forsythe
17,202 4 309,617 ,000
Maximum
Descriptives
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
ANOVA
Robust Tests of Equality of Means
Reciprocal Quadratic (time)
Reciprocal Quadratic (time)
Reciprocal Quadratic (time)
a. Asymptotically F distributed.
Reciprocal Quadratic (time)
N Mean
95% Conf. Interval
Minimum
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
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POST HOC TESTS
(I) Year (J) Year
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound
1995 0,00000315 0,00000189 0,635 -0,00000218 0,00000848
2000 0,00000475 0,00000188 0,113 -0,00000055 0,00001004
2005 0,00000922* 0,00000193 0,000 0,00000379 0,00001466
2010 0,00001451* 0,00000195 0,000 0,00000901 0,00002001
1990 -0,00000315 0,00000189 0,635 -0,00000848 0,00000218
2000 0,00000160 0,00000182 0,991 -0,00000353 0,00000672
2005 0,00000607* 0,00000187 0,013 0,00000081 0,00001134
2010 0,00001136* 0,00000189 0,000 0,00000603 0,00001670
1990 -0,00000475 0,00000188 0,113 -0,00001004 0,00000055
1995 -0,00000160 0,00000182 0,991 -0,00000672 0,00000353
2005 0,00000448 0,00000185 0,151 -0,00000075 0,00000970
2010 0,00000976* 0,00000188 0,000 0,00000447 0,00001506
1990 -0,00000922* 0,00000193 0,000 -0,00001466 -0,00000379
1995 -0,00000607* 0,00000187 0,013 -0,00001134 -0,00000081
2000 -0,00000448 0,00000185 0,151 -0,00000970 0,00000075
2010 0,00000529 0,00000193 0,062 -0,00000014 0,00001072
1990 -0,00001451* 0,00000195 0,000 -0,00002001 -0,00000901
1995 -0,00001136* 0,00000189 0,000 -0,00001670 -0,00000603
2000 -0,00000976* 0,00000188 0,000 -0,00001506 -0,00000447
2005 -0,00000529 0,00000193 0,062 -0,00001072 0,00000014
Homogeneous Subsets
1 2 3
2010 59 0,0000383
2005 62 0,0000436 0,0000436
2000 69 0,0000481 0,0000481
1995 67 0,0000497
1990 59 0,0000528
Sig. ,053 ,169 ,117
Mean Diff. (I-
J)
Year
N
Subset for alpha = 0.05
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
Gabriela,b
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 62,936.
Multiple Comparisons
Sig.
Reciprocal Quadratic (time) Gabriel
Type I error levels are not guaranteed.
Std. Error
Reciprocal Quadratic (time)
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. 
95% Confidence Interval
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Appendix 5. Explore Time Data (4th class omitted)
YEAR
N Percent N Percent N Percent
1990 51 100,0% 0 ,0% 51 100,0%
1995 57 100,0% 0 ,0% 57 100,0%
2000 57 100,0% 0 ,0% 57 100,0%
2005 49 100,0% 0 ,0% 49 100,0%
2010 42 100,0% 0 ,0% 42 100,0%
Statistic Std. Error
136,090 1,4382
Lower Bound 133,201
Upper Bound 138,979
136,204
138,400
105,497
10,2711
114,8
160,4
45,6
11,9
-,289 ,333
-,197 ,656
139,104 1,4747
Lower Bound 136,149
Upper Bound 142,058
138,967
138,300
123,966
11,1340
114,2
164,6
50,4
12,0
,301 ,316
,198 ,623
140,670 1,4853
Lower Bound 137,695
Upper Bound 143,646
140,330
139,400
125,749
11,2138
118,0
171,9
53,9
13,9
,406 ,316
,397 ,623Kurtosis
2000
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Std. Deviation
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Case Processing Summary
Year
Cases
Valid Missing Total
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Sum of time 
measurements
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Sum of time 
measurements
Descriptives
Year
1990 Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Kurtosis
1995
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Statistic Std. Error
147,447 1,7785
Lower Bound 143,871
Upper Bound 151,023
147,564
149,200
154,987
12,4494
120,6
172,2
51,6
14,9
-,145 ,340
-,124 ,668
155,695 2,1381
Lower Bound 151,377
Upper Bound 160,013
155,766
156,700
192,002
13,8565
125,3
185,4
60,1
19,8
-,048 ,365
-,352 ,717
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
1990 ,101 51 ,200* ,967 51 ,167
1995 ,099 57 ,200* ,973 57 ,229
2000 ,072 57 ,200* ,983 57 ,581
2005 ,066 49 ,200* ,982 49 ,649
2010 ,089 42 ,200* ,992 42 ,988
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 1,598 4 251 ,175
Based on Median 1,586 4 251 ,179
Based on Median 
with adjusted df
1,586 4 248,462 ,179
Based on trimmed 
mean
1,606 4 251 ,173
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
Test of Homogeneity of Variance
Sum of time 
measurements
Sum of time 
measurements
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
2010 Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Kurtosis
Tests of Normality
Year
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk
2005 Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Descriptives
Year
Sum of time 
measurements
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CLASS
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Class 1 96 100,0% 0 ,0% 96 100,0%
Class 2 64 100,0% 0 ,0% 64 100,0%
Class 3 96 100,0% 0 ,0% 96 100,0%
Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Class 4: High-Price - Rear Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Statistic Std. Error
136,779 1,2689
Lower Bound 134,260
Upper Bound 139,298
136,488
137,550
154,562
12,4323
114,2
167,6
53,4
18,6
,281 ,246
-,384 ,488
144,416 1,7205
Lower Bound 140,978
Upper Bound 147,854
143,981
141,450
189,442
13,7638
122,1
179,1
57,0
20,6
,452 ,299
-,598 ,590
148,733 1,1614
Lower Bound 146,428
Upper Bound 151,039
147,925
145,500
129,485
11,3791
133,8
185,4
51,6
14,4
1,047 ,246
,584 ,488
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
2. Mid-Price - 
Front Wheel Drive 
- Inline (straight) 
engine - Sedans
Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Descriptives
Class
Sum of time 
measurements
1. Low-Price - 
Front Wheel Drive 
- Inline (straight) 
engine - Sedans
Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
3. Mid-High-Price - 
Front Wheel Drive 
- V-engine - 
Sedans
Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Sum of time 
measurements
Case Processing Summary
Minimum
Maximum
Class
Cases
Valid Missing Total
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Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Class 1 ,064 96 ,200* ,977 96 ,087
Class 2 ,121 64 ,021 ,960 64 ,038
Class 3 ,126 96 ,001 ,910 96 ,000
Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Class 4: High-Price - Rear Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 2,875 2 253 ,058
Based on Median 2,650 2 253 ,073
Based on Median 
with adjusted df
2,650 2 252,245 ,073
Based on trimmed 
mean
2,950 2 253 ,054
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
Test of Homogeneity of Variance
Sum of time 
measurements
Tests of Normality
Class
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk
Sum of time 
measurements
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
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CLASS
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Asia 119 100,0% 0 ,0% 119 100,0%
USA 115 100,0% 0 ,0% 115 100,0%
Europe 22 100,0% 0 ,0% 22 100,0%
Statistic Std. Error
144,641 1,3455
Lower Bound 141,977
Upper Bound 147,306
144,225
143,200
215,419
14,6772
116,2
185,4
69,2
19,8
,417 ,222
-,277 ,440
139,924 1,0488
Lower Bound 137,847
Upper Bound 142,002
139,849
139,800
126,488
11,2467
114,2
174,5
60,3
11,2
,070 ,226
,445 ,447
152,191 2,4673
Lower Bound 147,060
Upper Bound 157,322
152,200
151,000
133,922
11,5725
131,9
172,2
40,3
16,9
,035 ,491
-,654 ,953Kurtosis
Europe
Minimum
Maximum
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Sum of time 
measurements
Descriptives
Region
Sum of time 
measurements
Asia Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Kurtosis
USA Mean
95% Conf. 
Interval
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Case Processing Summary
Region
Cases
Valid Missing Total
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Appendix 5. Continued...
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Asia ,069 119 ,200* ,981 119 ,101
USA ,082 115 ,053 ,982 115 ,131
Europe ,091 22 ,200* ,969 22 ,684
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 5,604 2 253 ,004
Based on Median 5,341 2 253 ,005
Based on Median 
with adjusted df
5,341 2 245,658 ,005
Based on trimmed 
mean
5,498 2 253 ,005
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
Test of Homogeneity of Variance
Sum of time 
measurements
Tests of Normality
Region
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk
Sum of time 
measurements
	 Acta	Wasaensia						223	
Appendix 6. Histograms & Boxplots (4th class omitted)
YEAR
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Appendix 6. Continued...
YEAR
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Appendix 6. Continued...
YEAR
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Appendix 6. Continued...
CLASS
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Appendix 6. Continued...
CLASS
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Appendix 6. Continued...
REGION
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Appendix 6. Continued...
REGION
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Appendix 7. Transformation results (4th class omitted)
YEAR
Test of Normality
Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig.
1990 ,967 51 ,167 ,957 51 ,063 ,973 51 ,290 ,963 51 ,108
1995 ,973 57 ,229 ,979 57 ,403 ,961 57 ,065 ,977 57 ,331
2000 ,983 57 ,581 ,990 57 ,911 ,969 57 ,153 ,987 57 ,796
2005 ,982 49 ,649 ,975 49 ,371 ,983 49 ,692 ,979 49 ,530
2010 ,992 42 ,988 ,988 42 ,927 ,990 42 ,966 ,990 42 ,975
Test of Normality
Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig.
1990 ,944 51 ,017 ,951 51 ,034 ,927 51 ,004
1995 ,978 57 ,368 ,979 57 ,418 ,970 57 ,166
2000 ,991 57 ,939 ,991 57 ,948 ,986 57 ,731
2005 ,961 49 ,109 ,969 49 ,219 ,942 49 ,018
2010 ,978 42 ,593 ,984 42 ,802 ,963 42 ,189
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance
Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 1,598 4 251 ,175 ,608 4 251 ,657
Based on 
Median
1,586 4 251 ,179 ,611 4 251 ,655
Based on 
Median, adj. df
1,586 4 248,5 ,179 ,611 4 250,0 ,655
Based on 
trimmed mean
1,606 4 251 ,173 ,613 4 251 ,654
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance
Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 3,060 4 251 ,017 1,040 4 251 ,387
Based on 
Median
3,023 4 251 ,018 1,037 4 251 ,388
Based on 
Median, adj. df
3,023 4 242,8 ,019 1,037 4 249,7 ,388
Based on 
trimmed mean
3,075 4 251 ,017 1,046 4 251 ,384
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean ,133 4 251 ,970 ,307 4 251 ,873 ,131 4 251 ,971
Based on 
Median
,117 4 251 ,976 ,307 4 251 ,873 ,038 4 251 ,997
Based on 
Median, adj. df
,117 4 247,8 ,976 ,307 4 249,3 ,873 ,038 4 242,7 ,997
Based on 
trimmed mean
,126 4 251 ,973 ,307 4 251 ,873 ,095 4 251 ,984
Reciprocal Quadratic 
Trans. (x**-2)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Reciprocal Trans. (x**-1) Reciprocal Square Root Trans. (x**-0.5)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Shapiro-WilkShapiro-Wilk
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Original Quadratic Trans. (x**2)
Square Root Trans. 
(x**0.5)
Natural Logarithm 
Trans. (x**0)
Rec. Square Root 
Trans. (x**-0.5)
Original
Reciprocal Trans. 
(x**-1)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Rec. Quadratic 
Trans. (x**-2)
Year
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Quadratic Trans. (x**2) Square Root Trans. (x**0.5)
Natural Logarithm Trans. 
(x**0)
Year
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
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Appendix 7. Continued...
CLASS
Test of Normality
Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig.
Class 1 ,977 96 ,087 ,981 96 ,185 ,967 96 ,016 ,980 96 ,143
Class 2 ,960 64 ,038 ,968 64 ,097 ,949 64 ,010 ,965 64 ,064
Class 3 ,910 96 ,000 ,927 96 ,000 ,890 96 ,000 ,919 96 ,000
Test of Normality
Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig.
Class 1 ,980 96 ,158 ,981 96 ,191 ,974 96 ,057
Class 2 ,972 64 ,157 ,971 64 ,131 ,973 64 ,166
Class 3 ,942 96 ,000 ,935 96 ,000 ,953 96 ,002
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance
Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 2,875 2 253 ,058 4,100 2 253 ,018
Based on 
Median
2,650 2 253 ,073 3,880 2 253 ,022
Based on 
Median, adj. df
2,650 2 252,2 ,073 3,880 2 251,3 ,022
Based on 
trimmed mean
2,950 2 253 ,054 4,245 2 253 ,015
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance
Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 2,591 2 253 ,077 3,345 2 253 ,037
Based on 
Median
2,114 2 253 ,123 3,170 2 253 ,044
Based on 
Median, adj. df
2,114 2 245,9 ,123 3,170 2 253,0 ,044
Based on 
trimmed mean
2,550 2 253 ,080 3,475 2 253 ,032
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 6,438 2 253 ,002 5,130 2 253 ,007 9,886 2 253 ,000
Based on 
Median
5,861 2 253 ,003 4,781 2 253 ,009 8,447 2 253 ,000
Based on 
Median, adj. df
5,861 2 239,5 ,003 4,781 2 246,8 ,009 8,447 2 218,6 ,000
Based on 
trimmed mean
6,544 2 253 ,002 5,267 2 253 ,006 9,849 2 253 ,000
Reciprocal Quadratic 
Trans. (x**-2)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Quadratic Trans. (x**2) Square Root Trans. (x**0.5)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Reciprocal Trans. (x**-1) Reciprocal Square Root Trans. (x**-0.5)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Year
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Year
Original Natural Logarithm Trans. (x**0)
Reciprocal Trans. 
(x**-1)
Rec. Square Root 
Trans. (x**-0.5)
Rec. Quadratic 
Trans. (x**-2)
Original Natural Logarithm Trans. (x**0)
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Quadratic Trans. 
(x**2)
Square Root Trans. 
(x**0.5)
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Appendix 7. Continued...
REGION
Test of Normality
Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig.
Asia ,981 119 ,101 ,990 119 ,573 ,966 119 ,004 ,987 119 ,299
USA ,982 115 ,131 ,979 115 ,073 ,977 115 ,048 ,982 115 ,119
Europe ,969 22 ,684 ,968 22 ,672 ,966 22 ,626 ,969 22 ,687
Test of Normality
Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig. Stat. df Sig.
Asia ,993 119 ,782 ,992 119 ,755 ,988 119 ,401
USA ,969 115 ,009 ,975 115 ,031 ,952 115 ,000
Europe ,965 22 ,590 ,967 22 ,639 ,958 22 ,453
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance
Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 5,604 2 253 ,004 4,668 2 253 ,010
Based on 
Median
5,341 2 253 ,005 4,647 2 253 ,010
Based on 
Median, adj. df
5,341 2 245,7 ,005 4,647 2 249,2 ,010
Based on 
trimmed mean
5,498 2 253 ,005 4,659 2 253 ,010
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance
Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 6,560 2 253 ,002 5,124 2 253 ,007
Based on 
Median
5,972 2 253 ,003 4,998 2 253 ,007
Based on 
Median, adj. df
5,972 2 239,3 ,003 4,998 2 247,8 ,007
Based on 
trimmed mean
6,364 2 253 ,002 5,058 2 253 ,007
Levene Test of Homogeneity 
of Variance Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig. Stat. df1 df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 3,911 2 253 ,021 4,274 2 253 ,015 3,373 2 253 ,036
Based on 
Median
3,968 2 253 ,020 4,301 2 253 ,015 3,377 2 253 ,036
Based on 
Median, adj. df
3,968 2 249,6 ,020 4,301 2 249,8 ,015 3,377 2 247,6 ,036
Based on 
trimmed mean
3,942 2 253 ,021 4,286 2 253 ,015 3,395 2 253 ,035
Reciprocal Quadratic 
Trans. (x**-2)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Original Natural Logarithm Trans. (x**0)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Quadratic Trans. (x**2) Square Root Trans. (x**0.5)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Reciprocal Trans. (x**-1) Reciprocal Square Root Trans.(x**-0.5)
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Square Root Trans. 
(x**0.5)
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Reciprocal Trans. 
(x**-1)
Rec. Square Root 
Trans. (x**-0.5)
Original
Year
Shapiro-Wilk
Sum of time 
measure-
ments
Quadratic Trans. 
(x**2)
Rec. Quadratic 
Trans. (x**-2)
Year
Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Wilk
Natural Logarithm 
Trans. (x**0)
Shapiro-Wilk
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Appendix 8. ANOVA Analysis by Factor 'Year' on Time Measurements (4th class omitted)
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
1990 51 136,090 10,2711 1,4382 133,201 138,979 114,8 160,4
1995 57 139,104 11,1340 1,4747 136,149 142,058 114,2 164,6
2000 57 140,670 11,2138 1,4853 137,695 143,646 118,0 171,9
2005 49 147,447 12,4494 1,7785 143,871 151,023 120,6 172,2
2010 42 155,695 13,8565 2,1381 151,377 160,013 125,3 185,4
Total 256 143,171 13,4180 ,8386 141,520 144,823 114,2 185,4
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
1,598 4 251 ,175
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Between 
Groups
11340,421 4 2835,105 20,584 ,000
Within 
Groups
34570,325 251 137,730
Total 45910,746 255
Sum of time measurements
Descriptives
Sum of time measurements
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
95% Conf. Interval
Minimum Maximum
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
Sum of time measurements
ANOVA
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Appendix 8. Continued...
POST HOC TEST
(I) Year (J) Year
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
1995 -3,0133 2,2621 ,866 -9,397 3,371
2000 -4,5800 2,2621 ,359 -10,964 1,804
2005 -11,3567* 2,3476 ,000 -17,984 -4,729
2010 -19,6050* 2,4454 ,000 -26,501 -12,709
1990 3,0133 2,2621 ,866 -3,371 9,397
2000 -1,5667 2,1983 ,998 -7,773 4,640
2005 -8,3434* 2,2863 ,003 -14,794 -1,893
2010 -16,5917* 2,3865 ,000 -23,310 -9,873
1990 4,5800 2,2621 ,359 -1,804 10,964
1995 1,5667 2,1983 ,998 -4,640 7,773
2005 -6,7768* 2,2863 ,032 -13,227 -,327
2010 -15,0251* 2,3865 ,000 -21,743 -8,307
1990 11,3567* 2,3476 ,000 4,729 17,984
1995 8,3434* 2,2863 ,003 1,893 14,794
2000 6,7768* 2,2863 ,032 ,327 13,227
2010 -8,2483* 2,4678 ,009 -15,210 -1,286
1990 19,6050* 2,4454 ,000 12,709 26,501
1995 16,5917* 2,3865 ,000 9,873 23,310
2000 15,0251* 2,3865 ,000 8,307 21,743
2005 8,2483* 2,4678 ,009 1,286 15,210
Homogeneous Subsets
1 2 3
1990 51 136,090
1995 57 139,104
2000 57 140,670
2005 49 147,447
2010 42 155,695
Sig. ,404 1,000 1,000
Multiple Comparisons
Gabriel 1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Dependent Variable:Sum of time measurements
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Gabriela,b
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 50,549.
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are 
Sum of time measurements
Year
N
Subset for alpha = 0.05
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Appendix 9. Kuskal-Wallis Analysis by Factor 'Class' on Time Measurements (4th class omitted)
N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Sum of time 
measurements
256 143,171 13,4180 114,2 185,4
Class 256 2,00 ,868 1 3
Kruskal-Wallis Test
N Mean Rank
96 94,40
64 132,30
96 160,07
256
Sum of time 
measuremen
ts
Chi-Square 37,989
df 2
Asymp. Sig. ,000
Descriptive Statistics
Ranks
Sum of time 
measurements
Test Statisticsa,b
a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: Class
Class
1. Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
2. Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
3. Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Total
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Appendix 10. ANOVA Analysis by Factor 'Region' on Time Measurements (4th class omitted)
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
Asia 119 144,641 14,6772 1,3455 141,977 147,306 116,2 185,4
USA 115 139,924 11,2467 1,0488 137,847 142,002 114,2 174,5
Europe 22 152,191 11,5725 2,4673 147,060 157,322 131,9 172,2
Total 256 143,171 13,4180 ,8386 141,520 144,823 114,2 185,4
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
5,604 2 253 ,004
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Between 
Groups
3259,288 2 1629,644 9,667 ,000
Within 
Groups
42651,458 253 168,583
Total 45910,746 255
Statistica df1 df2 Sig.
Welch 11,809 2 60,770 ,000
Brown-
Forsythe
10,604 2 108,742 ,000
Sum of time measurements
a. Asymptotically F distributed.
Descriptives
Sum of time measurements
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
95% Conf. Interval
Minimum Maximum
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
Sum of time measurements
ANOVA
Sum of time measurements
Robust Tests of Equality of Means
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Appendix 10. Continued...
POST HOC TESTS
(I) Region (J) Region
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
USA 4,7168* 1,7059 ,018 ,612 8,821
Europe -7,5497* 2,8103 ,033 -14,598 -,501
Asia -4,7168* 1,7059 ,018 -8,821 -,612
Europe -12,2666* 2,6809 ,000 -19,057 -5,476
Asia 7,5497* 2,8103 ,033 ,501 14,598
USA 12,2666* 2,6809 ,000 5,476 19,057
USA 4,7168* 1,7059 ,018 ,613 8,820
Europe -7,5497* 2,8103 ,032 -14,584 -,515
Asia -4,7168* 1,7059 ,018 -8,820 -,613
Europe -12,2666* 2,6809 ,000 -19,040 -5,493
Asia 7,5497* 2,8103 ,032 ,515 14,584
USA 12,2666* 2,6809 ,000 5,493 19,040
USA 4,7168* 1,7059 ,017 ,691 8,742
Europe -7,5497* 2,8103 ,029 -14,429 -,670
Asia -4,7168* 1,7059 ,017 -8,742 -,691
Europe -12,2666* 2,6809 ,000 -18,886 -5,647
Asia 7,5497* 2,8103 ,029 ,670 14,429
USA 12,2666* 2,6809 ,000 5,647 18,886
USA 4,7168* 1,7059 ,667 8,767
Europe -7,5497* 2,8103 -14,539 -,561
Asia -4,7168* 1,7059 -8,767 -,667
Europe -12,2666* 2,6809 -18,964 -5,569
Asia 7,5497* 2,8103 ,561 14,539
USA 12,2666* 2,6809 5,569 18,964
Asia
Europe
Games-
Howell
Asia
USA
Europe
Dunnett C
USA
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Mean Diff. 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable:Sum of time measurements
USA
Europe
Dunnett T3 Asia
USA
Europe
Tamhane Asia
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Appendix 11. Car Specifications
Glossary
inline-4  = an engine with the pistons in a row, the number of pistons being four
V6  = an engine with the pistons i a v-shape, two opposite, six pistons in all
16V  = the total number of valves on the engine, often four per cylinder
SOHC  = Single OverHead Cam-axle - single cam (for raising valves) top of engine
DOHC  = Double OverHead Cam-axle - double cams (for raising valves) top of engine
OHV  = OverHead Valve, cam inside cylinder block, uses pushrods to raise valves
bhp  = Break HorsePower, a measurment of power, equivalent to 735,5-750 watts
FF  = Front engine, Front drive
F/R  = Front engine, Rear drive
FAWD  = Front drive, All Wheel Drive 
5M  = 5 Manual - manual gearbox with 5 gears
4A  = 4 Automatic - automatic gearbox with 4 gears
CVT  = Continuously Variable Transmission, gearbox with an infinite number of ratios
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1990 Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Daihatsu Charade Base 4-door sedan FF 405 162 138 1024 16V SOHC inline-4 80 1,3 5M
Honda Civic DX 4-door sedan FF 429 169 136 1026 16V SOHC inline-4 70 1,4 5M
Hyundai Excel Base 4-door sedan FF 421 163 127 992 SOHC inline-4 81 1,5 5M
Mazda Protegé SE 4-door sedan FF 436 167 137 1101 16V DOHC inline-4 125 1,8 5M
Mitsubishi Mirage Base 4-door sedan FF 403 167 132 1017 SOHC inline-4 81 1,5 5M
Nissan Sentra Base 4-door sedan FF 433 167 137 1096 16V DOHC inline-4 110 2,0 5M
Suzuki Swift GA 4-door sedan FF 371 159 133 849 SOHC inline-4 70 1,3 5M
Toyota Corolla Base 4-door sedan FF 437 167 126 1090 16V DOHC inline-4 102 1,6 5M
USA
Chevrolet Cavalier VL 4-door sedan FF 435 171 134 1187 SOHC inline-4 93 2,2 5M
Eagle Summit Base 4-door sedan FF 403 167 132 1017 12V SOHC inline-4 92 1,5 5M
Ford Tempo GL 4-door sedan FF 450 173 134 1174 OHV inline-4 98 2,3 5M
Geo Prizm Base 4-door sedan FF 434 166 133 1135 16V DOHC inline-4 102 1,6 5M
Mercury Topaz GS 4-door sedan FF 450 173 134 1174 OHV inline-4 98 2,3 5M
Pontiac LeMans LE 4-door sedan FF 416 166 136 1044 12V SOHC inline-4 74 1,6 5M
Pontiac Sunbird Base 4-door sedan FF 435 171 134 1187 SOHC inline-4 96 2,0 5M
EUROPE
Wolkswagen Fox GL 4-door sedan FF 415 160 136 976 SOHC inline-4 81 1,8 5M
Volkswagen Jetta GL L4 GL 4-door sedan FF 435 17 141 1028 SOHC inline-4 100 1,8 5M
1990 Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Acura Integra RS 4-door sedan FF 439 171 133 1158 16V DOHC  inline-4 130 1,8 5M
Honda Accord DX 4-door sedan FF 469 172 137 1244 16V SOHC  inline-4 125 2,2 5M
Hyundai Sonata GL 4-door sedan FF 468 175 141 1287 16V SOHC  inline-4 116 2,4 5M
Mitsubishi Galant Base 4-door sedan FF 467 169 136 1180 SOHC inline-4 103 2,0 5M
Nissan Stanza XE 4-door sedan FF 457 170 137 1296 SOHC inline-4 138 2,4 5M
Toyota Camry 2.0 4-door sedan FF 463 171 137 1401 16V SOHC  inline-4 115 2,0 5M
Mazda 626 DX 4-door sedan FF 455 169 141 1283 SOHC inline-4 110 2,2 5M
USA
Chevrolet Corsica Base 4-door sedan FF 466 173 143 1244 SOHC inline-4 95 2,0 5M
Chevrolet Lumina Base 4-door sedan FF 504 182 135 1471 OHV inline-4 110 2,5 5M
Chrysler LeBaron Sedan Base 4-door sedan FF 460 173 136 1292 SOHC inline-4 100 2,5 5M
Dodge Spirit Base 4-door sedan FF 460 173 136 1292 SOHC inline-4 100 2,5 5M
Ford Taurus L 4-door sedan FF 479 180 137 1385 OHV 8V Inline4 105 2,5 5M
Oldsmobile Cutlass Calais Base 4-door sedan FF 454 169 133 1144 OHV inline-4 110 2,3 5M
Plymouth Acclaim Base 4-door sedan FF 460 173 136 1292 SOHC inline-4 100 2,5 5M
Pontiac Grand Am LE 4-door sedan FF 457 169 133 1283 OHV inline-4 110 2,3 5M
EUROPE
Audi 80 2.0E 4-door sedan FF 447 172 138 1439 SOHC inline-4 110 2,0 5M
Peugeot 405 Gri  4-door sedan FF 451 171 140 1233 SOHC inline-4 110 2,0 5M
Volkswagen Passat GL GL 4-door sedan FF 457 170 143 1185 16V DOHC  inline-4 134 2,0 5M
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1990 Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Nissan Maxima GXE 4-door sedan FF 477 176 140 1432 SOHC V6 160 3,0 4A
USA
Buick Century Custom V6 4-door sedan FF 480 176 138 1122 OHV V6 160 3,3 4A
Buick LeSabre Custom 4-door sedan FF 499 184 139 1485 OHV V6 165 3,8 4A
Buick Regal Custom 4-door sedan FF 488 184 135 1505 OHV V6 140 3,1 4A
Buick Skylark Base V6 4-door sedan FF 457 169 132 1178 OHV V6 160 3,3 3A
Chrysler New Yorker Salon 4-door sedan FF 488 174 139 1357 OHV V6 147 3,3 4A
Dodge Dynasty Base V6 4-door sedan FF 488 174 139 1360 OHV V6 147 3,3 4A
Dodge Monaco LE 4-door sedan FF 490 178 139 1401 SOHC V6 150 3,0 4A
Eagle Premier LX 4-door sedan FF 490 178 139 1401 SOHC V6 150 3,0 4A
Mercury Sable GS 4-door sedan FF 479 180 138 1421 OHV V6 140 3,0 4A
Oldsmobile Cutlass Ciera SL V6 4-door sedan FF 480 176 138 1122 OHV V6 160 3,3 4A
Oldsmobile Cutlass Supr. Base V6 4-door sedan FF 488 179 139 1462 OHV V6 140 3,1 4A
Oldsmobile 88 Royale Base 4-door sedan FF 499 184 139 1485 OHV V6 165 3,8 4A
Pontiac 6000 LE V6 4-door sedan FF 491 183 137 1498 OHV V6 140 3,1 4A
Pontiac Bonneville LE 4-door sedan FF 505 183 141 1612 OHV V6 165 3,8 4A
Pontiac Grand Prix LE 4-door sedan FF 493 180 134 1455 OHV V6 140 3,1 4A
1990 Class 4: High-Price - Rear Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Infiniti Q45 Base 4-door sedan F/R 507 183 143 1793 32V DOHC V8 278 4,5 4A
Lexus LS400 Base 4-door sedan F/R 500 182 140 1707 32V V8 250 4,0 4A
Mazda 929 Base 4-door sedan F/R 493 172 138 1625 DOHC V6 190 3,0 4A
USA
Cadillac Brougham Base 4-door sedan F/R 561 194 144 1943 OHV V8 170 5,0 4A
Lincoln Town Car Standard 4-door sedan F/R 556 198 144 1832 SOHC V8 190 5,0 4A
EUROPE
BMW 750i V12 4-door sedan F/R 502 184 141 1741 SOHC 24V V-12 296 5,0 4A
Mercedes-Benz 420 SEL 4-door sedan F/R 529 182 144 1777 SOHC V8 201 4,2 4A
Volvo 760 GLE V6 4-door sedan F/R 484 176 141 1540 SOHC V6 170 2,9 4A
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1995 Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Acura Integra Base 4-door sedan FF 452 170 133 1210 16V DOHC inline-4 142 1,8 5M
Honda Civic DX  4-door sedan FF 439 170 131 1153 16V SOHC inline-4 102 1,5 5M
Hyundai Accent Base 4-door sedan FF 411 163 139 1021 SOHC inline-4 92 1,5 5M
Hyundai Elantra Base 4-door sedan FF 440 168 139 1145 DOHC inline-4 113 1,6 5M
Kia Sephia RS  4-door sedan FF 436 169 139 1076 SOHC inline-4 88 1,6 5M
Mazda Protegé DX  4-door sedan FF 445 170 138 1194 16V DOHC inline-4 92 1,5 5M
Mercury Tracer Base 4-door sedan FF 434 169 134 1134 SOHC inline-4 88 1,9 5M
Mitsubishi Mirage S  4-door sedan FF 250 168 131 947 SOHC inline-4 113 1,8 5M
Nissan Sentra E 4-door sedan FF 432 169 138 1135 16V DOHC inline-4 115 1,6 5M
Suzuki Swift GA 4-door sedan FF 409 159 138 831 SOHC inline-4 70 1,3 5M
Toyota Corolla Standard 4-door sedan FF 442 169 138 1096 16V DOHC inline-4 105 1,6 5M
Toyota Tercel DX  4-door sedan FF 412 165 135 997 16V DOHC inline-4 93 1,5 5M
USA
Chevrolet Cavallier Base 4-door sedan FF 460 165 139 1255 SOHC inline-4 120 2,2 5M
Dodge Neon Base 4-door sedan FF 436 171 134 1158 16V SOHC inline-4 132 2,0 5M
Eagle Sumit LX  4-door sedan FF 250 168 131 947 SOHC inline-4 113 1,8 5M
Ford Escort LX 4-door sedan FF 432 169 134 1165 SOHC inline-4 88 1,9 5M
Geo Metro Base 4-door sedan FF 417 160 141 899 SOHC inline-4 70 1,3 5M
Geo Prizm Base 4-door sedan FF 439 168 135 1140 16V DOHC inline-4 105 1,6 5M
Saturn SL SL 4-door sedan FF 448 172 133 1110 SOHC inline-4 100 1,9 5M
EUROPE
Volkswagen Jetta III GL  4-door sedan FF 440 169 143 1342 SOHC inline-4 115 2,0 5M
1995 Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Hyundai Sonata Base 4-door sedan FF 470 177 140 1405 16V DOHC inline-4 137 2,0 5M
Infiniti G20 Base 4-door sedan FF 445 169 136 1301 16V DOHC inline-4 140 2,0 5M
Mazda 626 DX  4-door sedan FF 468 175 137 1298 16V DOHC inline-4 118 2,0 5M
Mitsubishi Galant S 4-door sedan FF 463 173 139 1373 16V SOHC inline-4 141 2,4 5M
Nissan Altima XE  4-door sedan FF 458 170 142 1344 16V DOHC inline-4 150 2,4 5M
USA
Ford Contour GL 4-door sedan FF 467 176 138 1321 16V DOHC inline-4 125 2,0 5M
Mercury Mystique GS 4-door sedan FF 466 176 138 1412 16V DOHC inline-4 125 2,0 5M
Oldsmobile Achieva Series I S  4-door sedan FF 477 174 136 1319 DOHC inline-4 150 2,3 5M
Pontiac Grand Am SE  4-door sedan FF 476 174 136 1378 16V DOHC inline-4 150 2,3 5M
Pontiac Sunfire SE  4-door sedan FF 462 171 139 1216 OVH inline-4 120 2,2 5M
EUROPE
Volvo 850 850 Level I  4-door sedanFF 466 176 141 1429 20V DOHC inline-5 168 2,4 5M
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1995 Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Acura Legend 4-door sedan FF 495 181 140 1589 24V SOHC V6 200 3,2 4A
Honda Accord DX 4-door sedan FF 467 178 140 1296 SOHC V6 130 2,2 4A
Lexus ES300 Base 4-door sedan FF 477 178 137 1526 DOHC V6 188 3,0 4A
Mitsubishi Diamante ES 4-door sedan FF 483 178 134 1556 DOHC V6 202 3,0 4A
Nissan Maxima GXE 4-door sedan FF 491 182 148 1367 24V DOHC V6 190 3,0 4A
Toyota Avalon XL 4-door sedan FF 483 179 142 1532 24V DOHC V6 192 3,0 4A
Toyota Camry LE V6 4-door sed. FF 463 169 144 1336 24V DOHC V6 185 3,0 4A
USA
Buick Century Custom 4-door sedan FF 480 176 136 1350 OVH V6 160 3,1 4A
Buick LeSabre Base 4-door sedan FF 508 190 141 1566 OVH V6 170 3,8 4A
Buick Regal Custom Sedan 4-door FF 492 184 138 1569 OHV V6 160 3,1 4A
Chevrolet Lumina Base 4-door sedan FF 510 184 140 1541 OVH V6 160 3,1 4A
Chrysler Concorde Base 4-door sedan FF 512 189 143 1533 OVH V6 161 3,3 4A
Dodge Intrepid Base 4-door sedan FF 513 189 143 1503 OVH V6 161 3,3 4A
Eagle Vision ESi 4-door sedan FF 512 189 143 1547 OVH V6 161 3,3 4A
Ford Taurus GL 4-door sedan FF 488 181 137 1416 OVH V6 140 3,8 4A
Mercury Sable GS 4-door sedan FF 488 181 138 1419 OVH V6 140 3,0 4A
Oldsmobile Aurora Base 4-door sedan FF 522 189 141 1816 32V DOHC V8 250 4,0 4A
Oldsmobile Cutlass Ciera Series II SL 4-door s. FF 483 177 137 1286 OVH V6 160 3,1 4A
Oldsmobile Cutlass Supr. Series I S 4-door sedan FF 492 180 139 1530 OVH V6 160 3,1 4A
Oldsmobile Eighty Eight LSS 4-door sedan FF 509 188 141 1544 OVH V6 205 3,8 4A
Pontiac Bonneville Bonneville SE 6 Cyl FF 507 189 141 1564 OVH V6 205 3,8 4A
Pontiac Grand Prix Base 4-door sedan FF 497 183 143 1472 OVH V6 160 3,1 4A
EUROPE
Audi A6 S 4-door sedan FF 480 181 145 1546 SOHC V6 172 2,8 4A
Audi 90 S 4-door sedan FF 458 169 140 1532 SOHC V6 172 2,8 4A
Saab 9000 CDE  4-door sedan FF 479 176 142 1487 DOHC V6 210 2,5 4A
Volkswagen Passat GLX 4-door sedan FF 461 171 143 1444 SOHC V6 172 2,8 4A
1995 Class 4: High-Price - Rear Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Infiniti J30 Base 4-door sedan FR 486 177 139 1601 DOHC V8 210 3,0 4A
Infiniti Q45 Base 4-door sedan FR 507 183 137 1834 DOHC V8 278 4,5 4A
Lexus LS400 Base 4-door sedan FR 500 183 142 1658 32V DOHC V8 270 4,0 4A
Mazda 929 Base 4-door sedan FR 492 180 139 1633 24V DOHC V6 195 3,0 4A
USA
Cadillac Fleetwood L Fleetwood 4-d. FR 572 198 145 2033 DOHC V8 260 5,7 4A
Lincoln Town Car Executive 4-door sedan FR 556 195 145 1834 SOHC V8 210 4,6 4A
EUROPE
BMW 530 i Base 4-door sedan FR 472 175 141 1668 32V DOHC V8 215 3,0 4A
BMW 740 740i  4-door sedan FR 498 186 144 1882 DOHC V8 282 4,0 5A
Jaguar XJ12 Base 4-door sedan FR 502 180 135 1771 SOHC V12 301 6,0 4A
Mercedes-Benz E420 E420 4-door sedan FR 475 174 143 1703 32V DOHC V8 275 4,2 4A
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2000 Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Acura Integra LS 4-door sedan FF 452 171 137 1231 16V DOHC inline-4 140 1,8 5M
Daewoo Lanos S 4-door sedan FF 424 168 143 1145 16V DOHC inline-4 105 1,6 5M
Daewoo Leganza SE 4-door sedan FF 467 178 144 1408 16V DOHC inline-4 131 2,2 5M
Daewoo Nubira SX 4-door sedan FF 446 170 143 1165 16V DOHC inline-4 129 2,0 5M
Honda Accord DX 2.3 4-door sedan FF 480 179 145 1331 16V SOHC inline-4 135 2,3 5M
Honda Civic DX 4-door sedan FF 445 170 139 1062 16V SOHC inline-4 106 1,6 5M
Hyundai Accent GL 4-door sedan FF 412 162 139 962 SOHC inline-4 92 1,5 5M
Hyundai Elantra GLS 4-door sedan FF 442 170 139 1162 16V DOHC inline-4 140 2,0 5M
Hyundai Sonata Base 4-door sedan FF 471 182 141 1395 16V DOHC inline-4 149 2,4 5M
Kia Sephia LS Base 4-door sedan FF 443 170 141 1125 16V DOHC inline-4 125 1,8 5M
Mazda Protegé DX 4-door sedan FF 442 170 141 1112 16V DOHC inline-4 105 1,6 5M
Mitsubishi Mirage DE 4-door sedan FF 441 169 136 1010 SOHC inline-4 92 1,5 5M
Nissan Altima XE 4-door sedan FF 466 176 142 1298 16V DOHC inline-4 155 2,4 5M
Nissan Sentra XE 4-door sedan FF 435 169 138 1080 16V DOHC inline-4 125 1,8 5M
Suzuki Esteem GL 1.6 4-door sedan FF 422 168 137 1011 16V DOHC inline-4 122 1,8 5M
Toyota Corolla LE VE 4-door sedan FF 442 169 138 1099 16V DOHC inline-4 125 1,8 5M
Toyota Echo Base 4-door sedan FF 415 166 151 922 16V DOHC inline-4 108 1,5 5M
USA
Chevrolet Cavalier Base 4-door sedan FF 459 172 139 1215 OHV inline-4 115 2,2 5M
Chevrolet Prizm Base 4-door sedan FF 443 169 136 1089 16V DOHC inline-4 125 1,8 5M
Dodge Neon Highline 4-door sedan FF 443 189 142 1165 16V SOHC inline-4 132 2,0 5M
Ford Escort LX 4-door sedan FF 445 171 133 1125 16V SOHC inline-4 110 2,0 5M
Ford Focus LX 4-door sedan FF 444 170 143 1120 DOHC inline-4 110 2,0 5M
Pontiac Sunfire SE 4-door sedan FF 462 172 139 1212 16V DOHC inline-4 150 2,4 5M
Saturn SL2 SL 4-door sedan FF 449 169 140 1059 16V DOHC inline-4 124 1,9 5M
EUROPE
Volkswagen Jetta GL 4-door sedan FF 438 173 145 1304 SOHC inline-4 115 2,0 5M
2000 Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Acura Integra LS 4-door sedan FF 452 171 137 1231 16V DOHC inline-4 140 1,8 5M
Infiniti G20 Luxury 4-door sedan FF 451 169 140 1333 16V DOHC inline-4 145 2,0 5M
Mazda 626 LX 4-door sedan FF 476 176 140 1300 16V DOHC inline-4 130 2,0 5M
Toyota Camry CE 4-door sedan FF 479 178 141 1441 16V DOHC inline-4 136 2,2 5M
USA
Dodge Stratus SE 4-door sedan FF 472 180 137 1322 16V SOHC inline-4 132 2,0 5M
Chrysler Cirrus LX 4-door sedan FF 472 180 137 1322 16V SOHC inline-4 150 2,4 5M
Oldsmobile Alero GX 4-door sedan FF 474 178 138 1372 16V DOHC inline-4 150 2,4 5M
Pontiac Grand Am SE 4-door sedan FF 473 179 140 1392 16V DOHC inline-4 150 2,4 5M
EUROPE
Volkswagen Passat GLS 4-door sedan FF 468 174 146 1417 20V turboDOHC i-4 150 1,8 5M
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2000 Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Acura 3.2 TL Base 4-door sedan FF 490 179 141 1586 24V DOHC V6 225 3,2 5A
Infiniti I30 Luxury 4-door sedan FF 492 178 144 1517 24V DOHC V6 227 3,0 4A
Mazda Millennia Base 4-door sedan FF 482 177 139 1471 24V DOHC V6 170 2,5 4A
Mitsubishi Diamante Base 4-door sedan FF 493 179 137 1562 24V SOHC V6 210 3,5 4A
Mitsubishi Galant ES V6 4-door sedan FF 477 174 141 1426 24V DOHC V6 195 3,0 4A
Nissan Maxima GXE 4-door sedan FF 484 179 144 1507 24V DOHC V6 222 3,0 4A
Toyota Avalon XL 4-door sedan FF 487 179 144 1516 24V DOHC V6 210 3,0 4A
USA
Buick Century Custom 4-door sedan FF 494 185 144 1529 OHV V6 175 3,1 4A
Buick LeSabre Custom 4-door sedan FF 510 189 141 1563 OHV V6 205 3,8 4A
Buick Regal LS 4-door sedan FF 498 185 144 1609 OHV V6 200 3,8 4A
Chevrolet Impala Base 4-door sedan FF 508 185 146 1539 OHV V6 180 3,4 4A
Chevrolet Lumina Base 4-door sedan FF 510 184 139 1512 OHV V6 175 3,1 4A
Chevrolet Malibu Base 4-door sedan FF 484 176 144 1385 OHV V6 170 3,1 4A
Chrysler 300M Base 4-door sedan FF 502 189 142 1619 24V SOHC V6 253 3,5 4A
Chrysler Concorde LX 4-door sedan FF 531 189 142 1567 24V DOHC V6 200 2,7 4A
Chrysler LHS Base 4-door sedan FF 528 189 142 1629 24V SOHC V6 253 3,5 4A
Dodge Intrepid Base 4-door sedan FF 517 190 142 1554 24V DOHC V6 202 2,7 4A
Ford Taurus LX 4-door sedan FF 502 185 142 1512 OHV V6 153 3,0 4A
Mercury Sable GS 4-door sedan FF 507 185 141 1499 OHV V6 153 3,0 4A
Oldsmobile Intrigue GX 4-door sedan FF 498 187 144 1569 24V DOHC V6 215 3,5 4A
Pontiac Bonneville SE 4-door sedan FF 514 184 144 1628 OHV V6 205 3,8 4A
Pontiac Grand Prix SE 4-door sedan FF 499 185 139 1550 OHV V6 175 3,4 4A
EUROPE
Audi A4 2.8 V6 4-door sedan FF 452 173 142 1436 30V DOHC V6 200 2,8 5A
2000 Class 4: High-Price - Rear Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Infiniti Q45 Base 4-door sedan FR 507 182 145 1768 32V DOHC V8 266 4,1 4A
Lexus GS 300 Base 4-door sedan FR 481 180 142 1652 24V DOHC V6 220 3,0 5A
Lexus LS400 Base 4-door sedan FR 500 183 144 1766 32V DOHC V8 290 4,0 5A
USA
Cadillac Catera Base 4-door sedan FR 493 179 143 1712 24V DOHC V6 200 3,0 4A
Lincoln LS series V8 Auto 4-door sedan FR 493 186 142 1676 32V DOHC V8 252 3,9 5A
Lincoln Town Car Executive 4-door sedan FR 547 199 147 1823 SOHC V8 205 4,6 4A
EUROPE
BMW 540iA Base 4-door sedan FR 478 180 144 1702 32V DOHC V8 282 4,4 5A
BMW 750iL Base 4-door sedan FR 512 186 142 1725 32V DOHC V8 282 4,4 5A
Jaguar S-type 3.0 V6 4-door sedan FR 486 182 141 1657 24V DOHC V6 240 3,0 5A
Jaguar XJ8 4.0 V8 4-door sedan FR 515 180 135 1791 32V DOHC V8 290 4,0 5A
Mercedes Benz C280 Base 4-door sedan FR 451 172 142 1505 SOHC V6 194 2,8 5A
Mercedes-Benz E430 RWD 4-door sedan FR 481 180 144 1653 SOHC V8 275 4,3 5A
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2005 Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Honda Civic DX 4-door sedan FF 443 171 144 1099 16V SOHC inline-4 115 1,7 5M
Hyundai Accent GLS 4-door sedan FF 423 167 139 1035 16V DOHC inline-4 104 1,6 5M
Hundai Elantra GLS 4-door sedan FF 452 172 142 1196 16V DOHC inline-4 138 2,0 5M
Kia Optima LX 4-door sedan FF 472 182 141 1393 16V DOHC inline-4 138 2,4 5M
Kia Spectra LX 4-door sedan FF 448 173 147 1226 16V DOHC inline-4 138 2,0 5M
Kia Rio Base 4-door sedan FF 424 168 144 1091 16V DOHC inline-4 104 1,6 5M
Mazda 3 Base 4-door sedan FF 453 176 147 1224 16V DOHC inline-4 148 2,3 5M
Mitsubishi Lancer ES 4-door sedan FF 451 170 137 1201 16V SOHC inline-4 120 2,0 5M
Nissan Sentra 1.8 4-door sedan FF 451 171 141 1141 16V DOHC inline-4 126 1,8 5M
Suzuki Aerio S 4-door sedan FF 435 172 154 1215 16V DOHC inline-4 155 2,3 5M
Suzuki Forenza S 4-door sedan FF 450 172 145 1226 16V DOHC inline-4 126 2,0 5M
Toyota Corolla CE 4-door sedan FF 453 170 146 1137 16V DOHC inline-4 130 1,8 5M
Toyota ECHO Base 4-door sedan FF 419 166 151 924 16V DOHC inline-4 108 1,5 5M
USA
Chevrolet Aveo LS 4-door sedan FF 423 167 150 1076 16V DOHC inline-4 103 1,6 5M
Chevrolet Cobalt Base 4-door sedan FF 458 172 145 1302 16V DOHC inline-4 145 2,2 5M
Dodge Neon SE 4-door sedan FF 443 171 142 1172 16V SOHC inline-4 132 2,0 5M
Ford Focus ZX4 S 4-door sedan FF 445 169 144 1224 16V DOHC inline-4 136 2,0 5M
Saturn ION Base 4-door sedan FF 470 172 142 1260 16V DOHC inline-4 140 2,2 5M
EUROPE
Volkswagen Jetta GL 4-door sedan FF 441 173 149 1377 SOHC inline-4 115 2,0 5M
2005 Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Acura TSX Base 4-door sedan FF 466 176 146 1466 16V DOHC inline-4 200 2,4 6M
Honda Accord DX 4-door sedan FF 481 182 145 1386 16V DOHC inline-4 160 2,4 5M
Hyundai Sonata GL 4-door sedan FF 475 182 142 1444 16V DOHC inline-4 138 2,4 5M
Mazda6 6i 4-door sedan FF 474 178 144 1382 16V DOHC inline-4 160 2,3 5M
Nissan Altima 2.5S 4-door sedan FF 488 179 147 1362 16V DOHC inline-4 175 2,5 5M
Toyota Camry Standard 4-door sedan FF 481 180 149 1411 16V DOHC inline-4 160 2,4 5M
EUROPE
Saab 9-3 Linear 4-door sedan FF 464 173 144 1441 16V turboDOHC i-4 175 2,0 5M
Volkswagen Passat GLS 1.8t 4-door sedan FF 470 174 146 1458 16V turboDOHC i-4 170 1,8 5M
Volvo S40 2.4i 4-door sedan FF 447 177 145 1400 20V DOHC inline-5 168 2,4 5M
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2005 Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Acura TL Base 4-door sedan FF 473 183 144 1580 24V SOHC V6 270 3,2 5A
Hyundai XG350 Base 4-door sedan FF 487 183 142 1658 24V DOHC V6 216 3,5 5A
Kia Amanti Base 4-door sedan FF 483 185 149 1826 24V DOHC V6 200 3,5 5A
Lexus ES 330 Base 4-door sedan FF 485 181 146 1576 24V DOHC V6 225 3,3 5A
Nissan Maxima 3.5 SE 4-door sedan FF 491 182 148 1560 24V DOHC V6 265 3,5 5A
USA
Buick Century Base 4-door sedan FF 494 185 144 1517 OHV V6 175 3,1 4A
Buick LaCrosse CX 4-door sedan FF 503 185 146 1587 24V DOHC V6 200 3,8 4A
Buick LeSabre Custom 4-door sedan FF 508 187 145 1619 OHV V6 205 3,8 4A
Chevrolet Impala Base 4-door sedan FF 508 185 146 1573 OHV V6 180 3,4 4A
Chevrolet Malibu Base 4-door sedan FF 478 178 146 1441 OHV V6 200 3,5 4A
Chrysler 300 Base 4-door sedan FF 500 188 148 1689 24V DOHC V6 190 2,7 4A
Chrysler Sebring Touring 4-door sedan FF 484 179 139 1441 24V DOHC V6 200 2,7 4A
Dodge Stratus SXT 4-door sedan FF 486 179 139 1441 24V DOHC V6 200 2,7 4A
Ford Five Hundred SE 4-door sedan FF 510 189 156 1663 24V DOHC V6 203 3,0 6A
Ford Taurus SE 4-door sedan FF 502 185 141 1498 OHV V6 153 3,0 4A
Mercury Montego Luxury fwd 4-door s. FF 510 189 156 1671 DOHC V6 203 3,0 6A
Mitsubishi Galant DE 4-door sedan FF 484 184 147 1521 24V DOHC V6 230 3,8 4A
Pontiac G6 Base 4-door sedan FF 480 179 145 1535 OHV V6 200 3,5 4A
Pontiac Grand Prix Base 4-door sedan FF 504 187 142 1579 OHV V6 200 3,8 4A
Pontiac Bonneville SE 4-door sedan FF 515 188 144 1630 OHV V6 205 3,8 4A
EUROPE
Audi A4 3.2 FSI 4-door sedan FF 459 177 143 1426 24V DOHC V6 255 3,1 6A
2005 Class 4: High-Price - Rear Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Infiniti Q45 Base 4-door sedan FR 510 184 149 1839 32V DOHC V8 340 4,5 5A
Lexus GS 430 Base 4-door sedan FR 481 180 142 1657 32V DOHC V8 300 4,3 5A
Lexus LS 430 Base 4-door sedan FR 501 183 149 1811 32V DOHC V8 290 4,3 6A
USA
Cadillac CTS-V Base 4-door sedan FR 483 179 144 1621 OHV V8 400 5,7 5A
Cadillac STS V-8 4-door sedan FR 499 184 146 1751 32V DOHC V8 320 4,6 5A
Lincolm LS  V-8 Ultimate FR 494 186 142 1671 32V DOHC V8 280 3,9 5A
Lincoln Town Car Sign. Signature 4-door sedan FR 549 199 150 1973 SOHC V8 239 4,6 4A
EUROPE
BMW 545i Base 4-door sedan FR 484 185 147 1556 32V DOHC V8 325 4,4 6A
BMW 745i Base 4-door sedan FR 503 190 149 1987 32V DOHC V8 325 4,4 6A
Jaguar S-Type  4.2 4-door sedan FR 490 182 142 1712 32V DOHC V8 294 4,2 6A
Jaguar XJ8 Base 4-door sedan FR 509 186 145 1709 32V DOHC V8 294 4,2 6A
Mercedes-Benz E500 Base 4-door sedan FR 482 181 145 1452 SOHC V8 302 5,0 5A
Mercedes-Benz S430 Base 4-door sedan FR 517 186 145 1889 SOHC V8 275 4,3 7A
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2010 Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Honda Civic DX 4-door sedan FF 450 175 144 1194 16V SOHC inline-4 140 1,8 5M
Hyundai Accent GLS 4-door sedan FF 405 169 147 1074 16V DOHC inline-4 110 1,6 5M
Hyundai Elantra Blue 4-door sedan FF 451 178 148 1236 16V DOHC inline-4 132 2,0 5M
Kia Forte LX 4-door sedan FF 448 177 140 1229 16V DOHC inline-4 156 2,0 5M
Kia Rio Base 4-door sedan FF 424 169 147 1074 16V DOHC inline-4 110 1,6 5M
Mazda 3 i SV 4-door sedan FF 459 176 147 1302 16V DOHC inline-4 148 2,0 5M
Mitsubishi Lancer DE 4-door sedan FF 457 176 149 1326 16V DOHC inline-4 152 2,0 5M
Nissan Sentra 2.0 4-door sedan FF 457 179 151 1299 16V DOHC inline-4 140 2,0 5M
Nissan Versa 1.6 4-door sedan FF 430 169 153 1223 16V DOHC inline-4 107 1,6 5M
Suzuki SX4 Base 4-door sedan FF 451 173 154 1236 16V DOHC inline-4 150 2,0 5M
Toyota Corolla Base 4-door sedan FF 454 176 147 1236 16V DOHC inline-4 132 1,8 5M
Toyota Yaris Base 4-door sedan FF 383 169 153 1042 16V DOHC inline-4 106 1,5 5M
USA
Chevrolet Aveo LS 4-door sedan FF 431 171 151 1166 16V DOHC inline-4 108 1,6 5M
Chevrolet Cobalt Base 4-door sedan FF 458 172 141 1262 16V DOHC inline-4 155 2,2 5M
Ford Focus S 4-door sedan FF 445 172 149 1176 16V DOHC inline-4 143 2,0 5M
2010 Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Honda Accord LX 4-door sedan FF 493 185 148 1466 16V DOHC inline 4 177 2,4 5A
Hyundai Sonata GLS door sedan FF 480 183 147 1495 16V DOHC inline 4 168 2,4 5A
Kia Optima LX 4-door sedan FF 480 181 148 1433 16V DOHC inline 4 175 2,4 5A
Mazda 6 i SV 4-door sedan FF 492 184 147 1480 16V DOHC inline 4 170 2,5 5A
Mitsubishi Galant ES 4-door sedan FF 485 184 147 1581 16V DOHC inline 4 160 2,4 4A
Nissan Altima 2.5 4-door sedan FF 482 180 147 1428 16V DOHC inline 4 175 2,5 CVA
Suzuki Kizashi Base 4-door sedan FF 465 182 148 1471 16V DOHC inline 4 185 2,4 CVA
Toyota Camry Base 4-door sedan FF 481 182 147 1481 16V DOHC inline 4 169 2,5 6A
USA
Chevrolet Malibu LS 4-door sedan FF 487 179 145 1550 16V DOHC inline 4 169 2,4 4A
Chrysler Sebring LX 4-door sedan FF 484 181 152 1503 16V DOHC inline 4 173 2,4 4A
Dodge Avenger SXT 4-door sedan FF 485 182 150 1546 16V DOHC inline 4 173 2,4 4A
Ford Fusion S 4-door sedan FF 484 183 145 1491 16V DOHC inline 4 175 2,5 6A
Mercury Milan Base 4-door sedan FF 480 183 145 1502 16V DOHC inline 4 175 2,5 6A
EUROPE
Volkswagen Jetta S 4-door sedan FF 455 178 146 1466 20V DOHC inline-5 170 2,5 6A
Volkswagen Passat Base 4-door sedan FF 478 182 147 1518 16V DOHC inline 4 200 2,0 6PSM
Volvo S40 2.4i 4-door sedan FF 448 177 145 1487 20V DOHC inline-5 168 2,4 5A
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2010 Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Acura TL Base 4-door sedan FF 496 188 145 1683 24V SOHC V6 280 3,5 5A
Acura TSX V6 4-door sedan FF 473 184 144 1544 24V SOHC V6 280 3,5 5A
Hyundai Azera GLS 4-door sedan FF 489 185 149 1648 24V DOHC V6 234 3,3 5A
Lexus ES 350 Base 4-door sedan FF 485 182 145 1625 24V DOHC V6 272 3,5 6A
Nissan Maxima 3.5 S 4-door sedan FF 484 186 147 1614 24V DOHC V6 290 3,5 CVT
Toyota Avalon XL 4-door sedan FF 502 185 149 1591 24V DOHC V6 268 3,5 6A
USA
Buick Lacrosse CX V6 4-door sedan FF 500 186 150 1793 24V DOHC V6 255 3,0 6A
Buick Lucerne CX 4-door sedan FF 516 187 147 1709 OHV V6 227 3,9 4A
Chevrolet Impala LS 4-door sedan FF 509 185 149 1614 OHV V6 207 3,5 4A
Ford Taurus SE 4-door sedan FF 515 194 154 1823 24V DOHC V6 263 3,5 6A
Lincoln MKZ Base 4-door sedan FF 482 183 145 1629 24V DOHC V6 263 3,5 6A
2010 Class 4: High-Price - Rear Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Specific model
Drive layout
Length, cm 
Width, cm
Height, cm
Curb weight, kg
Engine
Horsepower, bhp
Displacement, l
Transmission
ASIA
Acura RL AWD 4-door sedan FAWD 497 185 145 1854 24V SOHC V6 300 3,7 5A
Infiniti G37 AWD 4-door sedan FAWD 475 177 145 1626 24V DOHC V6 328 3,7 7A
Infiniti M35 M35 4-door sedan FAWD 489 180 151 1760 24V DOHC V6 303 3,5 7A
Lexus GS 350 350 4-door sedan FAWD 485 182 142 1723 24V DOHC V6 303 3,5 6A
Lexus IS 350 AWD 4-door sedan FAWD 458 180 142 1569 24V DOHC V6 306 3,5 6A
USA
Cadillac CTS AWD 4-door sedan FAWD 487 184 147 1746 24V DOHC V6 270 3,0 6A
Cadillac STS Luxury Sport  4-door s. FAWD 499 184 146 1751 24V DOHC V6 302 3,6 6A
Lincoln MKS AWD 4-door sedan FAWD 518 193 156 1874 24V DOHC V6 273 3,7 6A
EUROPE
Audi A6 Premium AWD 4-door FAWD 491 181 146 1737 24V DOHC V6 265 3,2 6A
Audi A8 AWD 4-door sedan FAWD 506 189 145 1961 32V DOHC V8 350 4,2 6A
Audi S4 S4 Premium Plus FAWD 470 183 143 1606 24V Super V6 333 3,0 6A
BMW M3 M3 AWD 4-door s. FAWD 454 182 142 1526 32V DOHC V8 414 4,0 6A
BMW M5 M5 AWD 4-door s. FAWD 485 185 147 1591 40V DOHC V10 500 5,0 6A
Mercedes-Benz C350 C350 AWD FAWD 463 177 145 1616 24V DOHC V6 268 3,5 7A
Mercedes-Benz E350 E350 AWD FAWD 487 207 147 1737 24V DOHC V6 268 3,5 7A
Saab 9-5 AWD 4-door sedan FAWD 501 187 147 1578 24V T-DOHC V6 300 2,8 6A
Volvo S80 V8 AWD FAWD 485 186 149 1498 32V DOHC V8 311 4,4 6A
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Appendix 12. Car Prices
1. The first five columns give the trim line price span of the models - 
the lowest and highest prices cited by each new-car guide. 
2. The following five columns display the different classifications 
of the five new-car guides:
Road&Track Edmund's Consumer Reports Motor Trend Car & Driver
1990 Economy Small cars
Family car Compact cars
Sports & GT Medium-size car
Luxury car Large car
1995 Small car
Medium car
Large car
Luxury car
2000 Small car $16000 and under
Family car $16000 to $20000
Large car $20000 to $30000
Upscale car $30000 to $40000
Luxury car $40000 to $50000
$50000 & Up
2005 S. under 15,000 Small Car
S. under 25,000 Family Sedan
S. under 35,000 Upscale Sedan
S. under 45,000 Large Sedan
S. over $45000 Luxury Sedan
2010 S. less than $15,000 Small Sedan S. under $18000
S. $15,000 - $25,000 Entry-level Family S. S. $18000-$25000
S. $25,000 - $35,000 Family Sedans S. $25000-$40000
S. $35,000 - $45,000 Compact Sports S. S. over $40000
S. $45,000 - $55,000 Upscale Sedans
Luxury Sedans
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1990 Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Daihatsu Charade Min 6900 N/a N/a N/a N/a Econ. N/a N/a N/a N/a
Max
Honda Civic Min 6895 N/a 9440 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 11145
Hyundai Excel Min 6275 N/a 6999 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 8479
Mazda Protegé Min 9359 N/a 9339 N/a 11250 Econ. N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 11239
Mitsubishi Mirage Min 7029 N/a 8559 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 9509
Nissan Sentra Min 7999 N/a 9249 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Small N/a N/a
Max
Suzuki Swift Min 6399 N/a 7399 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 8599
Toyota Corolla Min 8998 N/a 8748 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 10928
USA
Chevrolet Cavalier Min 7699 7799 7777 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 8270 8820
Eagle Summit Min 8995 7765 8895 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 8618 11257
Ford Tempo Min 9920 8768 9633 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 9691 11331
Geo Prizm Min 9680 8906 10125 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 9680 11900
Mercury Topaz Min 10448 9248 10164 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 10222 12567
Pontiac LeMans Min 7574 8054 8904 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 8754
Pontiac Sunbird Min 7699 8108 8899 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 8784
EUROPE
Wolkswagen Fox Min 7500 N/a 8310 N/a N/a Econ. N/a Small N/a N/a
Max
Volkswagen Jetta GL L4 Min 10195 N/a 10295 N/a N/a Family N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 13750
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1990 Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Acura Integra Min 11950 N/a 12850 N/a N/a Sports N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 15950
Honda Accord Min 12345 N/a 12345 17000 N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 16595
Hyundai Sonata Min 10700 N/a 9999 N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 12349
Mitsubishi Galant Min 10999 N/a 10989 N/a N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 16369
Nissan Stanza Min 11900 N/a 11650 N/a N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 14975
Toyota Camry Min 11948 N/a 11588 N/a N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 16648
Mazda 626 Min 12009 N/a 12459 N/a N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 13929
USA
Chevrolet Corsica Min 10070 8993 9495 N/a N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 10070 12795
Chevrolet Lumina Min 12670 11107 12140 15250 N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 12870 14040
Chrysler LeBaron Sedan Min 16450 14562 15595 16000 N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 16450
Dodge Spirit Min 10925 9784 10495 N/a N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 10925 13205
Ford Taurus Min 13717 11548 12640 N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 13352 16180
Oldsmobile Cutlass CalaisMin 10295 9502 9995 N/a N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 10295 14995
Plymouth Acclaim Min 10825 9696 10395 N/a N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 10825 13865
Pontiac Grand Am Min 10174 9575 10744 N/a N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 10374 15194
EUROPE
Audi 80 Min 20200 N/a 18900 N/a N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 22800
Peugeot 405 Min 15300 N/a N/a N/a N/a Family N/a N/a N/a N/a
Max
Volkswagen Passat GL Min 14990 N/a N/a N/a N/a Family N/a N/a N/a N/a
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1990 Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Nissan Maxima Min 18099 N/a 17899 N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 18949
USA
Buick Century Min 13685 11810 13150 N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 13685 14075
Buick LeSabre Min 17080 14740 16050 N/a N/a Family N/a Large N/a N/a
Max 17080 17400
Buick Regal Min 15690 13730 N/a N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 15910
Buick Skylark Min 10725 9899 10465 N/a N/a Family N/a Compact N/a N/a
Max 10725 13145
Chrysler New Yorker SalonMin 17919 15491 16342 N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 17919 19080
Dodge Dynasty Min 13625 13032 12995 N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 15085 14395
Dodge Monaco Min 13895 11861 15460 N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 13695 18060
Eagle Premier Min 15250 12999 15350 N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 14999 20284
Mercury Sable Min 15821 13224 15065 N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 15311 16067
Oldsmobile Cutlass Ciera Min 12495 13717 11995 N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 15895 12149
Oldsmobile Cutlass SupremeMin 14995 13027 14595 N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 15095 17995
Oldsmobile 88 Royale Min 17095 14839 15995 N/a N/a Family N/a Large N/a N/a
Max 17195 17395
Pontiac 6000 Min 12999 15878 16909 N/a N/a Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 18399
Pontiac Bonneville Min 16834 14528 15774 N/a N/a Family N/a Large N/a N/a
Max 16834 23994
Pontiac Grand Prix Min 14294 12622 14564 20000 21500 Family N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 14294
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1990 Class 4: High-Price - Rear Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Infiniti Q45 Min 39000 N/a 38000 N/a N/a Luxury N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max
Lexus LS400 Min 38000 N/a 35000 N/a N/a Luxury N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max
Mazda 929 Min 23385 N/a 23300 N/a N/a Luxury N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 24800
USA
Cadillac Brougham Min 30225 25782 27400 28000 N/a Luxury N/a Large N/a N/a
Max 30225
Lincoln Town Car Min 28581 25127 27986 25000 28000 Luxury N/a Large N/a N/a
Max 29458 32809 32000 32000
EUROPE
BMW 750i Min 49000 N/a N/a N/a N/a Luxury N/a N/a N/a N/a
Max
Mercedes-Benz 420 Min 53900 N/a N/a N/a N/a Luxury N/a N/a N/a N/a
Max
Volvo 760 Min N/a N/a 33185 N/a N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 33965
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1995 Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Acura Integra Min 15280 13513 16220 15000 17815 N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 20585 15740 20680 22000
Honda Civic Min 9690 10412 9750 9000 13210 N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 17000 11870 16950 17000
Hyundai Accent Min 8000 N/a 8079 8000 N/a N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 10 000 8979 11000
Hyundai Elantra Min 9602 N/a 10199 9000 12965 N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 11711 12324 13000
Kia Sephia Min 8670 7518 N/a 9000 12065 N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a
Max 10710 8495 14000
Mazda Protegé Min 11995 11174 11995 12000 13455 N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 16800 11995 16145 16000
Mercury Tracer Min 11260 10382 11380 11000 N/a N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 13210 11260 13290 15000
Mitsubishi Mirage Min 9799 10336 9836 8000 N/a N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 13299 11479 13025 14000
Nissan Sentra Min 11000 10584 10999 10000 13129 N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 16000 11169 14449 16000
Suzuki Swift Min 7962 8003 8699 8000 N/a N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 11191 8699 12000
Toyota Corolla Min 13000 10767 12498 13000 13498 N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 17500 12098 16848 19000
Toyota Tercel Min 9500 9502 9998 9000 N/a N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 11000 10558 11328 15000
USA
Chevrolet Cavallier Min 10060 9700 10750 11000 12950 N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 12465 10265 14295 22000
Dodge Neon Min 9995 8814 9500 10000 13500 N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 13995 9500 13567 16000
Eagle Sumit Min 9990 10953 9836 10000 N/a N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 13990 11545 13025 16000
Ford Escort Min 9560 10159 9680 9000 11580 N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 12700 11020 12820 15000
Geo Metro Min 8095 8467 8085 8000 9795 N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 9485 9085 9485 12000
Geo Prizm Min 11675 11115 11675 11000 N/a N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 12340 11675 12340 15000
Saturn SL Min 9995 8996 9995 10000 13455 N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 16775 9995 12695 17000
EUROPE
Volkswagen Jetta III Min 13475 14899 13475 14000 N/a N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 15550 16450 19975 19000
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1995 Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Hyundai Sonata Min 12772 11937 13399 12000 19516 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 16203 13299 17399 17000
Infiniti G20 Min 22000 18239 22875 21000 25325 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 27000 21975 25975 25000
Mazda 626 Min 14695 13540 14795 15000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 24500 14695 22695 24000
Mitsubishi Galant Min 14349 12771 14349 14000 21838 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 22269 14349 20269 23000
Nissan Altima Min 14840 13185 14799 14000 17694 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 20500 14799 19889 22000
USA
Ford Contour Min 13310 12011 13310 13000 17500 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 15695 13310 15695 22000
Mercury Mystique Min 13855 12506 13855 14000 14900 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 15230 13855 15230 23000
Oldsmobile Achieva Min 13500 12623 13500 13000 13995 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 15200 13500 15200 18000
Pontiac Grand Am Min 12904 11899 12904 14000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 14954 13004 14954 19000
Pontiac Sunfire Min 11074 10328 N/a 11000 N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a
Max 11224 11224 22000
EUROPE
Volvo 850 Min 22900 22480 24680 26000 33266 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 32500 24680 32345 34000
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1995 Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Acura Legend Min 34845 28636 35500 33000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 42740 34160 43200 42000
Honda Accord Min 14565 13204 14800 16000 19537 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 22185 15230 22090 27000
Lexus ES300 Min 34000 25584 31500 29000 33929 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 38000 31200 35000
Mitsubishi Diamante Min 27800 21638 27000 23000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 35250 25750 35250 31000
Nissan Maxima Min 22429 18493 19999 20000 27400 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 23529 20999 24819 28000
Toyota Avalon Min 22000 N/a 22758 24000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 27000 26668 29000
Toyota Camry Min 17750 18487 16128 16000 19978 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 23250 21878 24668 27000
USA
Buick Century Min 15160 16079 15160 15000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 17965 17965 17965 21000
Buick LeSabre Min 20410 19018 20410 20000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 25465 21735 24010 27000
Buick Regal Min 17960 17430 17960 17000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 19995 19920 21870 24000
Chevrolet Lumina Min 15470 14000 15460 16000 18235 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 16970 15000 16960 23000
Chrysler Concorde Min 20895 18496 17974 20000 N/a N/a N/a Large N/a N/a
Max 26000 20550 20844 27000
Dodge Intrepid Min 17990 16277 17974 17000 19837 N/a N/a Large N/a N/a
Max 20990 17974 20844 24000
Eagle Vision Min 20995 17750 17974 20000 24361 N/a N/a Large N/a N/a
Max 24995 19697 20844 26000
Ford Taurus Min 17585 15862 17585 16000 18133 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 25140 17585 21000 28000
Mercury Sable Min 18210 16407 18210 18000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 21570 18210 21570 25000
Oldsmobile Aurora Min 31370 29017 31370 31000 32390 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 31370 33000
Oldsmobile Cutlass Ciera Min 14460 15177 14460 14000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 17060 16060 17570 19000
Oldsmobile Cutlass SupremeMin 17460 16500 17460 16000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 25460 17460 25460 27000
Oldsmobile Eighty Eight Min 20410 22930 20410 19000 24595 N/a N/a Large N/a N/a
Max 24010 24010 24010 26000
Pontiac Bonneville Min 20804 18828 20804 20000 N/a N/a N/a Large N/a N/a
Max 25804 20804 25804 33000
Pontiac Grand Prix Min 16634 15220 16634 16000 20956 N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 17384 16634 19659 26000
EUROPE
Audi A6 Min 32239 29395 30600 35000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 49180 35120 45270 50000
Audi 90 Min 27450 23614 25670 28000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 34040 27820 35900 38000
Saab 9000 Min 29835 27684 29835 30000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 41300 32685 41300 43000
Volkswagen Passat Min 21000 20754 20890 18000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 23000 23075 21320 26000
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1995 Class 4: High-Price - Rear Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Infiniti J30 Min 37750 30299 38550 35000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 39500 36950 40550 37000
Infiniti Q45 Min 54000 40055 52400 48000 54145 N/a N/a Luxury N/a N/a
Max 59500 49450 59350 55000
Lexus LS400 Min 55000 40960 51200 38000 56524 N/a N/a Luxury N/a N/a
Max 60000 51200 45000
Mazda 929 Min 32850 27708 35795 32000 N/a N/a N/a Medium N/a N/a
Max 37700 32200 35000
USA
Cadillac Fleetwood Min 35595 32569 35595 34000 N/a N/a N/a Large N/a N/a
Max 37845 35595 36240 40000
Lincoln Town Car Min 36400 31664 36400 35000 N/a N/a N/a Large N/a N/a
Max 41200 36400 41200 41000
EUROPE
BMW 530 i Min 39900 35300 34760 41000 42890 N/a N/a Luxury N/a N/a
Max 49350 48600 41500 60000
BMW 740 Min 57750 N/a 59900 59000 N/a N/a N/a Luxury N/a N/a
Max 86100 89900 85000
Jaguar XJ12 Min 50000 42228 53450 54000 76563 N/a N/a Luxury N/a N/a
Max 75000 51750 65000 84000
Mercedes-Benz E420 Min 44000 34030 41000 42000 63022 N/a N/a Luxury N/a N/a
Max 82000 40000 79000 80000
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2000 Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
 Road&Track's Class. 
 Edmund's Class. 
 Consumer Report's Class. 
 Motor Trend's Class. 
 Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Acura Integra Min 20000 18033 20100 N/a N/a N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 24500 20000 22500
Daewoo Lanos Min 8800 8244 9449 8700 13296 N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 13500 9699 11719 13500 & under
Daewoo Leganza Min 14600 11630 13690 13900 18910 N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 19200 13660 18660 19000 & under
Daewoo Nubira Min 12300 10630 10990 11000 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 15900 12506 13560 15000 & under
Honda Accord Min 15750 13661 15350 15500 24545 N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 25500 15350 24550 25000 & under
Honda Civic Min 11000 11645 12885 11000 17860 N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 17500 12885 16830 17800 & under
Hyundai Accent Min 9170 8891 9899 9000 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 13000 9499 12000 & under
Hyundai Elantra Min 11570 10860 11799 12000 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 17200 11799 13500 & under
Hyundai Sonata Min 14820 13850 14999 14000 18962 N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 22200 14999 16999 18000 & under
Kia Sephia Min 10000 8996 10195 10195 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 14500 9995 11795 14430 & under
Mazda Protegé Min 12000 11445 11970 12100 16500 N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 17500 11970 15040 16500 & under
Mitsubishi Mirage Min 12600 12870 13987 11900 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 20200 13987 16974 17400 & under
Nissan Altima Min 15900 14547 15140 15100 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 21000 15140 20390 20400 & under
Nissan Sentra Min 12000 11097 11649 11700 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 17000 11799 14899 15700 & under
Suzuki Esteem Min 12750 11903 12399 13199 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 15000 12399 13899 16699 & under
Toyota Corolla LE Min 12800 11318 12418 12600 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 18500 12418 15068 17500 & under
Toyota Echo Min 11900 9543 10395 9995 11000 N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 13000 10295 14000 & under
USA
Chevrolet Cavalier Min 13575 12309 13260 13160 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 21000 13165 14805 17000 & under
Chevrolet Prizm Min 12828 13153 13910 14460 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 18200 13816 15960 19000 & under
Dodge Neon Min 12970 11499 12490 12500 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 16995 12460 16500 & under
Ford Escort Min 11920 10769 12000 12400 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 17500 11505 17400 & under
Ford Focus Min 12280 11319 12220 12500 20000 N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 15795 12125 15165 18000 & under
Pontiac Sunfire Min 14420 12959 14105 14175 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 22110 14010 18630 & under
Saturn SL2 Min 11185 9296 10685 11000 N/a N/a N/a Small $16000 N/a
Max 19495 10685 12895 16445 & under
EUROPE
Volkswagen Jetta Min 17200 15228 16700 N/a N/a N/a N/a Small N/a N/a
Max 25000 16700 24170
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2000 Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Acura Integra Min 20000 18033 20100 20300 N/a N/a N/a Small $20000- N/a
Max 24500 20000 22500 24550  $30000
Infiniti G20 Min 21500 19422 21395 21400 24190 N/a N/a Upscale $20000- N/a
Max 23500 21395 22895 24000  $30000
Mazda 626 Min 17000 16642 18245 18500 N/a N/a N/a Family $16000- N/a
Max 24000 18245 22445 24500  $20000
Toyota Camry Min 17600 15427 17518 17600 N/a N/a N/a Family $16000- N/a
Max 27700 17418 26198 31500  $20000
USA
Dodge Stratus Min 16445 14628 16080 17500 N/a N/a N/a Family $16000- N/a
Max 21500 15930 20260 24500  $20000
Chrysler Cirrus Min 20400 14791 16230 N/a N/a N/a N/a Family N/a N/a
Max 23000 16080 20085
Oldsmobile Alero Min 18185 14656 16005 17210 21200 N/a N/a Family $16000- N/a
Max 21800 15675 21545 23000  $20000
Pontiac Grand Am Min 16455 14841 16340 16140 21195 N/a N/a Family $16000- N/a
Max 20385 16220 19970 22640  $20000
EUROPE
Volkswagen Passat Min 21500 19293 21200 21400 N/a N/a N/a Family $20000- N/a
Max 29000 21200 27655 31200  $30000
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2000 Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Acura 3.2 TL Min 28500 25191 28400 28700 N/a N/a N/a Upscale $20000- N/a
Max 28400 30400 30700  $30000
Infiniti I30 Min 30000 26835 29465 29500 28990 N/a N/a Upscale $20000- N/a
Max 34000 29465 31540 34500 30710  $30000
Mazda Millennia Min 27000 22840 24995 26000 N/a N/a N/a Upscale $20000- N/a
Max 34000 24995 30995 35600  $30000
Mitsubishi Diamante Min 28100 24749 24997 25400 N/a N/a N/a Upscale $20000- N/a
Max 36600 27199 27897 29200  $30000
Mitsubishi Galant Min 17500 18338 17375 17600 N/a N/a N/a Family $16000- N/a
Max 25000 20157 23757 24000  $20000
Nissan Maxima Min 21049 19247 21049 21100 28400 N/a N/a Family $20000- N/a
Max 30000 21049 26249 26300  $30000
Toyota Avalon Min 25100 22058 26365 25600 N/a N/a N/a Large $20000- N/a
Max 31900 25195 30005 34000  $30000
USA
Buick Century Min 20162 17936 19725 19840 N/a N/a N/a Family $16000- N/a
Max 22297 19602 21860 25396  $20000
Buick LeSabre Min 23845 21260 23235 24107 27500 N/a N/a Family $20000- N/a
Max 27995 23235 27525 32476  $30000
Buick Regal Min 22780 20331 22670 22845 23495 N/a N/a Family $20000- N/a
Max 25625 22220 27395 27510  $30000
Chevrolet Impala Min 19265 17115 18790 18999 N/a N/a N/a Family $16000- N/a
Max 23025 18705 22590 26700  $20000
Chevrolet Lumina Min 18895 15878 18790 19490 N/a N/a N/a Family $16000- N/a
Max 22500 18790 20500  $20000
Chevrolet Malibu Min 16995 15061 16445 17020 N/a N/a N/a Family $16000- N/a
Max 20500 16460 19215 20000  $20000
Chrysler 300M Min 29685 26661 29085 28500 29150 N/a N/a Large $20000- N/a
Max 33500 29085 32500  $30000
Chrysler Concorde Min 22550 20146 22145 22000 N/a N/a N/a Large $20000- N/a
Max 26000 21990 26070 26500  $30000
Chrysler LHS Min 28685 25775 28090 28500 N/a N/a N/a Large $20000- N/a
Max 33500 28090 33500  $30000
Dodge Intrepid Min 20900 18677 20545 20500 25250 N/a N/a Large $20000- N/a
Max 25000 20390 24435 28000  $30000
Ford Taurus Min 18795 16306 17790 18500 23040 N/a N/a Family $16000- N/a
Max 21995 17695 20990 25600  $20000
Mercury Sable Min 19395 17177 18940 19185 N/a N/a N/a Family $16000- N/a
Max 26500 18845 21340 22500  $20000
Oldsmobile Intrigue Min 24283 20212 22210 22395 27400 N/a N/a Family $20000- N/a
Max 26280 22090 25840 29000  $30000
Pontiac Bonneville Min 24295 21667 23695 25075 24595 N/a N/a Large $20000- N/a
Max 32245 23680 31650 34090  $30000
Pontiac Grand Prix Min 20385 18131 19935 20300 N/a N/a N/a Family $20000- N/a
Max 24870 19815 24280 27345  $30000
EUROPE
Audi A4 Min 24000 25580 23990 24540 N/a N/a N/a Upscale Car$20000- N/a
Max 42000 28790 37900 28900  $30000
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2000 Class 4: High-Price - Rear Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Infiniti Q45 Min 49000 43255 48895 48895 52600 N/a N/a Luxury $40000- N/a
Max 52000 48200 50595 50595  $50000
Lexus GS 300 Min 37500 32663 37805 38138 50347 N/a N/a Luxury $30000- N/a
Max 53200 37605 46305 54439  $40000
Lexus LS400 Min 53800 45648 54005 55045 60869 N/a N/a Luxury $50000 N/a
Max 68500 53805 61105 & up
USA
Cadillac Catera Min 32000 31772 30860 31305 36661 N/a N/a Upscale $30000- N/a
Max 36000 34180 32860 35783  $40000
Lincoln LS series Min 32250 31624 31215 31665 N/a N/a N/a Upscale $30000- N/a
Max 41000 34690 34990 42800  $40000
Lincoln Town Car Min 39300 35186 38630 39145 N/a N/a N/a Luxury $30000- N/a
Max 44900 38630 43130 47400  $40000
EUROPE
BMW 540iA Min 38900 46150 38900 35000 55458 N/a N/a Luxury $30000- N/a
Max 71561 51100 69400 73000  $40000
BMW 750iL Min 62400 N/a 62400 62900 70850 N/a N/a Luxury $50000 N/a
Max 127000 92100 124400 & up
Jaguar S-type Min 48000 37128 42500 43655 N/a N/a N/a Luxury $40000- N/a
Max 57000 42500 48000 49355  $50000
Jaguar XJ8 Min 58000 N/a 55650 56355 N/a N/a N/a Luxury $50000 N/a
Max 71000 68550 83355 & up
Mercedes Benz C280 Min 31668 33434 31750 31750 N/a N/a N/a Upscale $30000- N/a
Max 57885 35950 35950 47335  $40000
Mercedes-Benz E430 Min 46900 48779 47100 47100 47500 N/a N/a Luxury $40000- N/a
Max 72635 52450 69800 75220 72000  $50000
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2005 Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Honda Civic Min 13160 13680 13260 13000 19500 N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 20650 16615 19900 19500  $15000
Hyundai Accent Min 9999 10499 9999 10000 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 10499 11299 10799 12000  $15000
Hundai Elantra Min 13299 13299 13299 N/a N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 14849 15649 14849  $15000
Kia Optima Min 15750 15900 15900 15200 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 19895 19895 19900 19200  $25000
Kia Spectra Min 12620 12620 12700 11200 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 15250 15970 15150 14200  $15000
Kia Rio Min 9835 9740 9995 9700 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 11480 10615 11500 11300  $15000
Mazda 3 Min 13680 13680 13680 13500 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 17105 16615 18685 18500  $15000
Mitsubishi Lancer Min 14374 13999 14299 14000 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 32500 19099 34699 29000  $15000
Nissan Sentra Min 12500 12600 12700 12000 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 17600 17700 17800 17300  $15000
Suzuki Aerio Min 13749 13449 13499 12999 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 15749 17449 17249 16799  $15000
Suzuki Forenza Min 13449 13449 13449 12000 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 16949 17449 17449 15000  $15000
Toyota Corolla Min 14195 13680 13780 13570 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 17970 17455 17555 15580  $15000
Toyota ECHO Min 10870 10885 10445 10245 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 11400 11685 10985 11575  $15000
USA
Chevrolet Aveo Min 9995 9455 9455 9999 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 13055 12570 12865 11500  $15000
Chevrolet Cobalt Min 13625 13625 13625 N/a N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 21430 18195 21430  $15000
Dodge Neon Min 14160 13615 13700 12700 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 21195 16750 20650 20100  $15000
Ford Focus Min 13550 13830 13315 13200 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 18450 17930 18215 19500  $15000
Saturn ION Min 11430 11995 23770 11430 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 20885 17370 29855 20000  $15000
EUROPE
Volkswagen Jetta Min 17680 17680 17900 17300 N/a N/a Under Small N/a N/a
Max 24070 25045 21385 23500  $25000
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2005 Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Acura TSX Min 26490 N/a 27190 26490 N/a N/a Under Upscale N/a N/a
Max 28490  $35000
Honda Accord Min 16195 16195 16195 16000 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 30000 28700 28700 28000  $25000
Hyundai Sonata Min 15999 15999 18000 15500 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 19799 19799 22000 19000  $25000
Mazda6 Min 18995 18995 18995 18800 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 22895 26125 27995 21300  $25000
Nissan Altima Min 19050 17250 17350 16750 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 29200 29200 29300 24000  $25000
Toyota Camry Min 18560 18045 18195 19045 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 25920 25405 25555 25405  $25000
EUROPE
Saab 9-3 Min 26850 26850 26850 25995 38615 N/a Under Upscale N/a N/a
Max 32850 32850 42600 39995  $35000
Volkswagen Passat Min 23360 22070 22070 22000 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 30865 32615 33615 41000  $25000
Volvo S40 Min 23260 23260 23560 24450 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 28910 27710 29385 29545  $25000
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2005 Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Acura TL Min 32650 32900 33100 33000 N/a N/a Under Upscale N/a N/a
Max 35100 34000  $35000
Hyundai XG350 Min 24600 24399 24899 23999 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 26000 25999 26499 25599  $25000
Kia Amanti Min 25245 25200 25500 22500 N/a N/a Under Large N/a N/a
Max 24500  $25000
Lexus ES 330 Min 31975 31975 32175 32000 N/a N/a Under Upscale N/a N/a
Max  $35000
Nissan Maxima Min 27100 27100 27350 26950 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 29350 29350 29600 28900  $35000
USA
Buick Century Min 22605 22040 N/a 21520 N/a N/a Under N/a N/a N/a
Max 26030  $25000
Buick LaCrosse Min 24000 22835 22835 N/a N/a N/a Under Large N/a N/a
Max 29000 28335 28335  $25000
Buick LeSabre Min 27150 26545 26725 25745 N/a N/a Under Large N/a N/a
Max 32810 32205 32385 31520  $35000
Chevrolet Impala Min 22780 22220 22350 21240 21990 N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 28985 26030 28555 27335 27790  $25000
Chevrolet Malibu Min 19620 19085 19200 17000 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 24480 23945 24610 21000  $25000
Chrysler 300 Min 23920 23295 23370 29180 N/a N/a Under Large N/a N/a
Max 34820 34195 39370 32615  $25000
Chrysler Sebring Min 19975 19350 19460 19850 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 31645 22360 31130 30325  $25000
Dodge Stratus Min 19770 20145 19255 18195 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 22250 21625 23235 22370  $25000
Ford Five Hundred Min 22795 22145 22145 24000 N/a N/a Under Large N/a N/a
Max 26795 27845 28070 30000  $25000
Ford Taurus Min 20685 20685 20935 19500 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 22595 22595 23690 24000  $25000
Mercury Montego Min 24995 24345 24345 25000 N/a N/a Under Large N/a N/a
Max 28895 28245 28570 31000  $25000
Pontiac G6 Min 21300 20675 20675 N/a N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 23925 23300 23300  $25000
Pontiac Grand Prix Min 23460 22900 23060 21760 N/a N/a Under Family N/a N/a
Max 27095 26560 29335 25860  $25000
EUROPE
Audi A4 Min 26500 25800 25800 26000 N/a N/a Under Upscale N/a N/a
Max 35250 47050 47050 45500  $35000
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2005 Class 4: High-Price - Rear Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Infiniti Q45 Min 55900 55900 56200 52000 N/a N/a Under Luxury N/a N/a
Max 62000  $45000
Lexus GS 430 Min 47975 38875 42900 38725 N/a N/a Over Luxury N/a N/a
Max 47975 51125 47825  $45000
Lexus LS 430 Min 55675 55675 56225 55125 N/a N/a Under Luxury N/a N/a
Max  $45000
USA
Cadillac CTS-V Min 29995 30000 30190 30140 N/a N/a Under Sporty N/a N/a
Max 49995 32250 49490 45000  $35000
Cadillac STS Min 40995 40300 40525 45000 N/a N/a Under Luxury N/a N/a
Max 47945 61815 70000 52000  $45000
Lincolm LS Min 32330 32475 32620 31860 N/a N/a Under Luxury N/a N/a
Max 43330 43452 43570 42860  $35000
Lincoln Town Car SignatureMin 41675 41875 42035 41020 N/a N/a Under Luxury N/a N/a
Max 50120 50245 50505 49675  $45000
EUROPE
BMW 545i Min 41995 41300 38000 41300 N/a N/a Under Luxury N/a N/a
Max 56495 55800 78000 75000  $45000
BMW 745i Min 70595 69900 69900 68500 N/a N/a Over Luxury N/a N/a
Max 117995 117300 117300 115800  $45000
Jaguar S-Type Min 51995 44230 44230 43230 N/a N/a Under Luxury N/a N/a
Max 51330 58330 62445  $45000
Jaguar XJ8 Min 61495 60830 60830 59330 N/a N/a Under Luxury N/a N/a
Max 89995 89330 89330 74330  $45000
Mercedes-Benz E500 Min 49220 48500 50050 48000 N/a N/a Over Luxury N/a N/a
Max 80220 59400 82600 77500  $45000
Mercedes-Benz S430 Min 76060 75300 64900 74500 N/a N/a Over Luxury N/a N/a
Max 125470 124750 169000 123000  $45000
266						Acta	Wasaensia
2010 Class 1: Low-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Honda Civic Min 15655 15655 15455 16075 16363 N/a $15000- Small N/a Under
Max 23800 27000 27000 27420 26050  $25000  $18000
Hyundai Accent Min 9970 13645 9970 11765 14365 N/a Under N/a N/a Under
Max 15070 14645 16995 16565  $15000  $18000
Hyundai Elantra Min 14120 14145 14145 14500 14865 N/a Under Small N/a Under
Max 20795 17845 19795 17000 18565  $15000  $18000
Kia Forte Min 13695 13695 13695 N/a 14390 N/a Under Small N/a Under
Max 18695 18495 18695 17890  $15000  $18000
Kia Rio Min 11495 11695 11495 11700 12145 N/a Under N/a N/a Under
Max 14025 15795 15125 14500 14675  $15000  $18000
Mazda 3 Min 15295 15345 15295 14700 15795 N/a Under Small N/a Under
Max 23195 22445 23195 24900 22250  $15000  $18000
Mitsubishi Lancer Min 14790 14790 14790 14665 15510 N/a Under Small N/a Under
Max 27590 27190 27590 38900 41710  $15000  $18000
Nissan Sentra Min 15420 15420 15420 17100 16140 N/a $15000- N/a N/a Under
Max 20080 20080 20080 21500 20800  $25000  $18000
Nissan Versa Min 10000 9990 9990 13650 10620 N/a Under N/a N/a Under
Max 16500 16780 16530 16870 16820  $15000  $18000
Suzuki SX4 Min 13500 13359 13359 15600 13994 N/a Under Small N/a Under
Max 16500 18899 19949 17000 16434  $15000  $18000
Toyota Corolla Min 15350 15450 15350 15910 16100 N/a $15000- Small N/a Under
Max 20050 20150 20050 19420 19610  $25000  $18000
Toyota Yaris Min 12355 13365 12355 12400 13865 N/a N/a N/a N/a Under
Max 13915 14165 13915 14800  $18000
USA
Chevrolet Aveo Min 11965 11965 11965 12120 12685 N/a $15000- N/a N/a Under
Max 15365 15365 15365 15520 14820  $25000  $18000
Chevrolet Cobalt Min 14990 14990 14990 15670 15710 N/a Under Small N/a Under
Max 24535 16470 24535 31410 17190  $15000  $18000
Ford Focus Min 15995 16290 15995 15690 16690 N/a $15000- Small N/a Under
Max 19300 18780 18485 16875 19180  $25000  $18000
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2010 Class 2: Mid-Price - Front Wheel Drive - Inline (straight) engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Honda Accord Min 21055 21055 21055 21425 21765 N/a $15000- Entry- N/a $18000-
Max 31305 31105 31305 29475 29475  $25000  Family  $25000
Hyundai Sonata Min 18995 18700 18700 18795 19420 N/a $15000- Entry- N/a $18000-
Max 26545 26550 26550 26345 27270  $25000  Family  $25000
Kia Optima Min 17495 17995 17995 17200 18170 N/a $15000- Entry- N/a $18000-
Max 22145 22795 22795 21400 22820  $25000  Family  $25000
Mazda 6 Min 18450 18600 18450 19220 19200 N/a $15000- Entry- N/a $18000-
Max 28390 28540 28390 24800 29140  $25000  Family  $25000
Mitsubishi Galant Min 21599 21599 21599 21774 23319 N/a $15000- Entry- N/a $18000-
Max 23999 23999 23999 27974 24719  $25000  Family  $25000
Nissan Altima Min 20100 19900 19900 20595 20620 N/a $15000- Entry- N/a $18000-
Max 2985 24520 29600 30075 25220  $25000  Family  $25000
Suzuki Kizashi Min 21000 18999 20000 27500 19374 N/a $15000- N/a N/a $18000-
Max 28000 26899 27000 29500 27484  $25000  $25000
Toyota Camry Min 19395 19395 19395 19580 20145 N/a $15000- Entry- N/a $18000-
Max 29045 29045 29045 26130 29795  $25000  Family  $25000
USA
Chevrolet Malibu Min 21825 21825 21825 21395 22545 N/a $15000- Entry- N/a $18000-
Max 25925 26995 26605 26670 27325  $25000  Family  $25000
Chrysler Sebring Min 20120 20120 20120 19800 22855 N/a $15000- Entry- N/a $18000-
Max 34705 22115 34705 33345 25105  $25000  Family  $25000
Dodge Avenger Min 20230 20230 20230 18895 20970 N/a $15000- Family N/a $18000-
Max 21730 21730 21730 25545 22470  $25000  $25000
Ford Fusion Min 19270 19695 19620 19345 20345 N/a $15000- Entry- N/a $18000-
Max 27270 28355 28030 25915 28755  $25000  Family  $25000
Mercury Milan Min 21180 21860 21535 20035 22260 N/a $15000- Entry- N/a $18000-
Max 27800 28480 28155 27010 28880  $25000  Family  $25000
EUROPE
Volkswagen Jetta Min 17500 17735 17605 17990 18305 N/a $15000- Entry- N/a $18000-
Max 26000 26090 25410 25240 25000  $25000  Family  $25000
Volkswagen Passat Min 28000 27195 26995 28380 27745 N/a $25000- Family N/a $25000-
Max 30000 27195 28395 30990  $35000  $40000
Volvo S40 Min 26200 26200 26200 29345 27050 N/a $25000- Compact- N/a $25000-
Max 33050 31350 31350 36295 32200  $35000  Sports  $40000
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2010 Class 3: Mid-High-Price - Front Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Acura TL Min 35105 35105 35105 37500 35915 N/a $35000- Upscale N/a $25000-
Max 43385 43385 43385 39500 39465  $45000  $40000
Acura TSX Min 29310 29310 29310 29720 30120 N/a $25000- Compact- N/a $25000-
Max 43385 37950 37950 35660  $35000  Sports  $40000
Hyundai Azera Min 25745 24970 24970 25295 24800 N/a $15000- Upscale N/a $25000-
Max 30345 29570 29570 29245 28750  $25000  $40000
Lexus ES 350 Min 35000 35175 34470 35100 34800 N/a $35000- Upscale N/a $25000-
Max  $45000  $40000
Nissan Maxima Min 30460 30690 30460 29950 31180 N/a $25000- Upscale N/a $25000-
Max 33180 33410 33180 32700 33900  $35000  $40000
Toyota Avalon Min 27945 27945 27945 28565 28695 N/a $25000- Upscale N/a $25000-
Max 35285 35285 35285 35905 36035  $35000  $40000
USA
Buick Lacrosse Min 27085 26245 27085 25590 27835 N/a $25000- Upscale N/a $25000-
Max 33015 33015 33015 33755 33765  $35000  $40000
Buick Lucerne Min 29265 29230 29230 29180 29995 N/a $25000- Upscale N/a $25000-
Max 40205 42515 39230 40080 39995  $35000  $40000
Chevrolet Impala Min 23890 24290 23890 24715 23795 N/a $15000- Family N/a $25000-
Max 29630 29930 29630 30455 31140  $25000  $40000
Ford Taurus Min 25995 25170 25170 25000 25995 N/a $25000- Upscale N/a $25000-
Max 37995 37770 37170 30000 37995  $35000  $40000
Lincoln MKZ Min 34115 34225 34115 32950 34965 N/a $35000- Upscale N/a $25000-
Max 36005 36115 36005 34840 36855  $45000  $40000
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2010 Class 4: High-Price - All Wheel Drive - V-engine - Sedans
Prices Classifications
Road & Track, $US
Edmund's, $US
Consumer Report, $US
Motor Trend, $US
Car & Driver, $US
Road&Track's Class. 
Edmund's Class. 
Consumer Report's Class. 
Motor Trend's Class. 
Car & Driver's Class. 
ASIA
Acura RL Min 46820 46830 46830 47040 47640 N/a $45000- Compact- N/a Over
Max 54250 54250 54250 54460  $55000  Sports  $40000
Infiniti G37 Min 33500 33250 33250 34000 34500 N/a $35000- Compact- N/a $25000-
Max 44000 43550 43900 41000 37000  $45000  Sports  $40000
Infiniti M35 Min 45800 45800 45800 45500 46665 N/a $45000- Luxury N/a Over
Max 54650 47950 54650 55500 56815  $55000  $40000
Lexus GS 350 Min 45000 45600 45000 45800 45000 N/a $45000- Luxury N/a Over
Max 55000 47550 56550 57200 53470  $55000  $40000
Lexus IS 350 Min 32000 37595 31845 32100 32720 N/a $35000- Compact- N/a $25000-
Max 57000 57760 57300 58635  $45000  Sports  $40000
USA
Cadillac CTS Min 36730 35165 36730 37555 35555 N/a $35000- Compact- N/a $25000-
Max 60720 48765 60720 62845 62775  $45000  Sports  $40000
Cadillac STS Min 46845 46846 46845 47640 45290 N/a $45000- Luxury N/a Over
Max 68785 68785 70335 71160 89940  $55000  $40000
Lincoln MKS Min 40870 41270 40870 38465 41695 N/a $45000- Upscale N/a Over
Max 47760 48160 47760 40355 48585  $55000  $40000
EUROPE
Audi A6 Min 45200 45200 45200 46025 44155 N/a $45000- Luxury N/a Over
Max 76100 59150 76100 78225 73845  $55000  $40000
Audi A8 Min 74550 74550 74550 74875 75375 N/a $55000- Luxury N/a Over
Max 78400 78400 78400 97025 79225  $85000  $40000
Audi S4 Min 31450 45900 31450 33525 32275 N/a $45000- Compact- N/a $25000-
Max 47900 47300 53400 41575 46275  $55000  Sports  $40000
BMW M3 Min 34425 35150 32850 33200 33675 N/a $35000- Compact- N/a $25000-
Max 66500 43950 66500 60000 55675  $45000  Sports  $40000
BMW M5 Min 45800 45950 45800 46625 45075 N/a $45000- Luxury N/a Over
Max 85500 60600 85500 89325 86675  $55000  $40000
Mercedes-Benz C350 Min 34475 33600 33600 32500 34475 N/a $35000- Compact Sports SedansN/a $25000-
Max 58225 57350 57350 57500 60325  $45000  $40000
Mercedes-Benz E350 Min 49475 48600 48000 52500 49475 N/a $45000- Luxury N/a Over
Max 89375 85750 85750 89500 88075  $55000  $40000
Saab 9-5 Min 38000 N/a 38000 38500 N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a
Max 42000 45000 40800
Volvo S80 Min 39200 39200 39200 33695 40050 N/a $35000- Luxury N/a Over
Max 50950 50950 50950 52645 52350  $45000  $40000
